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Comparative Criminal Justice as a
Guide to American Law Reform:
How Do the French Do It, How
Can We Find Out, and Why
Should We Care?
Richard S. Fraset
In the 197 0s and early 1980s, legal academics hotly debated the possi-
bility of basing American law reforms on continental procedures, but this
voluminous literature produced few conclusions and virtually no sustained
research and reform efforts. In this Article, Professor Frase argues that
this stalemate was largely due to the fact that the continental procedures
most often proposed for borrowing were actually the least feasible trans-
plants, whereas other, more modest possibilities were overlooked or misun-
derstood. To identify the latter, future researchers must analyze foreign
systems comprehensively, in practice as well as in theory, and must subject
domestic systems to equally comprehensive scrutiny. Professor Frase fur-
ther argues that these methodological principles are not unique to interna-
tional comparisons, but rather should guide all cross-jurisdictional studies,
even those within a single country. Applying these principles, Professor
Frase compares the American and French criminal justice systems and
concludes that the following features of the French system suggest desira-
ble and feasible American reforms: more careful selection, training, and
supervision of police, prosecutors, and judges; narrower scope of the crimi-
nal law; less frequent use of arrest and pretrial detention; more effective
control ofprosecutorial charging discretion; less abusive alternatives to plea
bargaining; and more frequent use of noncustodial sentencing alternatives.
Comparative criminal procedure-the study of how other countries
investigate and adjudicate criminal charges-entered the mainstream of
American legal literature during the decade of the 1970s. Unlike the
previous works of comparative law specialists, this new generation of
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, Universit6
Jean Moulin, Lyon, France, Spring 1982, 1986, and 1990. B.A. 1967, Haverford College; J.D. 1970,
University of Chicago.
I am grateful to my Lyon law colleagues, and to the many lawyers and officials with whom I
spoke during my three visits to Lyon, for their advice and instruction. I would also like to thank
Steven H. Goldberg, Jean-Pierre LaSalle, Robert J. Levy, Roger Park, Edward A. Tomlinson, Lloyd
Weinreb, and especially Arnold Enker and Frank Zimring, for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Article.
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research was explicitly reform-oriented. One group of writers argued
that Americans should learn from and adopt specific procedures found in
one or more continental European systems.2 Other writers doubted that
such foreign procedures would work in the American context3 or felt
they were of limited effectiveness even in Europe.' A few writers sug-
gested that the American system was not really so bad,5 although the
general consensus was and is that our criminal justice system is beset by
serious problems of uncontrolled discretion, lack of respect for the rights
of the accused, and failure to convict the guilty.6
1. One of the earliest examples of this new style of comparative research is K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969), in which the author argued that
American prosecutors should adopt the West German principle of "compulsory" prosecution. Id,
at 191-95, 224-25. Another early reform-oriented work examining continental criminal justice
systems is G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE-GRIFFITHS, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(1969).
2. See, eg., K. DAVIS, supra note 1; K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA (1976); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 117-46 (1977) (explaining and criticizing
present criminal processes in the United States and using continental criminal procedure as a
model); Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 439 (1974)
[hereinafter Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion]; Langbein, Land Without Plea
Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1979) [hereinafter Langbein, Land
Without Plea Bargaining]; Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative
Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 195 [hereinafter Langbein, Mixed Court and
Jury Court]; Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: 'Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE
L.J. 1549 (1978); Pugh, Ruminations Re Reform ofAmerican Criminal Justice (Especially Our Guilty
Plea System): Reflections Derived From a Study of the French System, 36 LA. L. REV. 947 (1976);
Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO
L. REV. 361 (1977); Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive
Model?, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1981).
3. See, eg., Darby, Lessons of Comparative Criminal Procedure: France and the United
States, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 277 (1982); Weigend, Continental Cures for American Ailments:
European Criminal Procedure as a Model for Law Reform, 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 381 (1980); Morris, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1367 (1978)
(reviewing L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE, supra note 2); see also Arenella, Reforming the
Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication,
78 MICH. L. REv. 463, 524-29 (1980). See generally Damalka, Structures of Authority and
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480 (1975) [hereinafter Damalka, Structures of
Authority] (suggesting that procedural differences between continental and Anglo-American criminal
justice systems reflect divergences in overall systems of governance).
4. See, e.g., Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial"
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240 (1977) [hereinafter Goldstein & Marcus,
Myth of Judicial Supervision]; Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure,
87 YALE L.J. 1570 (1978) [hereinafter Goldstein & Marcus, Comment]. But see Goldstein,
Reflections on Two Models Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1009, 1025 (1974) (suggesting usefulness of looking to European systems for guidance in controlling
prosecutorial discretion).
5. See, e-g., Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REv. 131
(1983); Johnson, Importing Justice (Book Review), 87 YALE L.J. 406 (1977) (reviewing L.
WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE, supra note 2) (questioning proposals to adopt continental
procedures given the strengths of U.S. system, the difficulty of adopting continental procedures, and
the weaknesses of those procedures).
6. See generally Part IV ("Restraints on Evidence Gathering"), Part VI ("Prosecutorial
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By the mid-1980s, however, the torrent of articles and books on con-
tinental criminal procedure7 had slowed to a trickle and has now practi-
cally ceased.8 What happened? Have we already learned everything
about continental criminal procedure? Have the skeptics proved their
case? The recent shift of attention toward English criminal procedure9
suggests that continental systems are now seen as too "foreign" to serve
as useful guides for American law reform, but are they?
The purpose of this Article is to survey the prospects for future
reform-oriented research on continental criminal procedure. My thesis is
that much still remains to be learned from these systems, provided that
we understand the lessons of past research efforts. This Article first
attempts to identify the methodological shortcomings of the existing
literature, and proposes a new approach (Part I). 10 The Article then
applies this approach to a study of the French system and suggests a
revised agenda for future reform-oriented research on that system (Parts
Charging Discretion"), and Part VII ("Plea Bargaining and Its Analogues"), infra text
accompanying notes 157-291 & 382-466.
7. In addition to the writings cited in the previous notes, the recent literature on continental
criminal procedure includes the following: W. FELSTINER & A. DREW, EUROPEAN ALTERNATIVES
TO CRIMINAL TRIALS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES (U.S. Dep't of Justice
1978); J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977); Alschuler,
Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial. Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50
U. CI. L. REv. 931, 972-95 (1983); Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1032 (1983); Campbell, A Comparative Study of Victim Compensation Procedures In France
and the United States: A Modest Proposal, 3 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 321 (1980); Casper &
Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, I J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1972); Damalka,
Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973) [hereinafter Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers]; Damalka, Presentation of
Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1083 (1975); Damalka, The Reality of
Prosecutorial Discretion: Comments on a German Monograph, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 119 (1981)
[hereinafter Damalka, Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion]; Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West
Germany, 13 L. &.Soc. REv. 309 (1979); Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the
Scope of Prosecutoial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 468 (1974); Hughes, Pleas Without
Bargains, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 753 (1981); Mendelson, Self-Incrimination in American and French
Law, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 34 (1983); Weigend, Criminal Procedure: Comparative Aspects, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 537-46 (1983); Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42
MD. L. REV. 37 (1983).
8. Only a few articles of significance have appeared since 1983. Among them is Pakter,
Exclusionary Rules in France, Germany, and Italy, 9 HAsT. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1985).
9. See, eg., M. GRAHAM, TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL JURY TRIAL IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES
(1983); Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is it Better Than Ours?, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 507 (1984);
Lynch, A Comparison of Prison Use in England, Canada, West Germany, and the United States: A
Limited Test of the Punitive Hypothesis, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 180 (1988); Van Kessel,
The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American
Approaches, 38 HAST. L.J. 1 (1986).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 12-44.
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II through VIII)." The Appendix briefly discusses some other distinc-
tive features of the French system that deserve lower priority for research
and reform.
I
INTRODUCTION: LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSED
METHODOLOGY
Certain methodological shortcomings of the reform-oriented com-
parative research of the past fifteen years help to explain why it sparked
much debate but kindled few sustained research and reform efforts. At
the center of the debate was a series of widely cited books and articles by
Professors Abraham Goldstein, John Langbein, and Lloyd Weinreb. In
1974 Professor Langbein published an article describing and advocating
adoption of the West German principle of "compulsory" prosecution.12
Subsequent articles by Langbeint 3 described the absence of plea bargain-
ing in West Germany and advocated a "streamlined nonadversarial" trial
procedure, to permit elimination of plea bargaining in the United States.
In 1977 Professor Weinreb published a book in which he described the
ills of the American system of criminal justice, and advocated adopting
procedures modeled after those used in France.14 These proposed proce-
dures include: (1) investigation of charges by a judge who would develop
both prosecution and defense claims, interrogate the defendant without
Miranda safeguards, and make full disclosure of all findings to the
defense;15 (2) abolishment of guilty pleas; (3) replacement of the
American jury with a mixed panel of one judge, two attorneys, and seven
laypersons;16 and (4) nonadversarial presentation of evidence at trial.17
Also in 1977, Professor Goldstein and Yale Research Fellow Martin
11. See infra text accompanying notes 45-629.
12. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 2; see also K. DAVIS, supra note
1.
13. See, eg., Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2.
14. L. WEINREB, supra note 2, at 117-64; see also Johnson, supra note 5; Morris, supra note 3.
15. Other writers have also recommended adoption of one or both of these aspects of judicial
investigation. See G. MUELLER & F. LE POOLE-GRFFrrHs, supra note 1, at 29-84 (discovery);
Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 729-31 (1988) (interrogation); Frankel, The Search for Truth: An
Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975) (interrogation and discovery); Pugh, supra note 2,
at 962-63 (interrogation); Schlesinger, supra note 2 (interrogation and discovery); see also Kamisar,
Kauper's "Judicial Examination of the Accused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a
Remarkable Article, 73 MICH. L. REv. 15 (1974); Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A
Remedy for the Third Degree 30 MICH. L. REv. 1224 (1932) (interrogation).
16. Professor Langbein has also advocated the mixed panel procedure. See Langbein, Mixed
Court and Jury Court, supra note 2; see also Casper & Zeisel, supra note 7.
17. The presiding judge, already familiar with the pretrial investigative fie, would determine
the choice and order of all witnesses. The witnesses would then testify in narrative form, subject to
few rules of evidence. Prosecution and defense attorneys would recommend witnesses and questions
to the presiding judge, and make closing arguments. See Frankel, supra note 15; Pugh, supra note 2
1990]
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Marcus published the results of their own research"8 into the "inquisito-
rial" (nonadversary)19 systems of criminal justice in Germany, France,
and Italy. Goldstein and Marcus argued that, in practice at least, these
systems suffered from many of the same problems of uncontrolled discre-
tion and procedural "shortcuts" found in the United States. Plea bar-
gaining still exists, they maintained, at least in the form of "tacit"
bargains in which defendants expect and in fact receive leniency in return
for waiving full "due process" procedures. Moreover, judicial supervi-
sion of the investigatory and adjudicatory stages is a "myth": pretrial
investigation is dominated by the police; police and prosecutors retain
substantial discretion in the filing of charges; and nonadversary trials
rarely address evidence or charges other than those presented by the
police and the prosecution.
The Goldstein and Marcus article provoked a strong response from
Professors Langbein and Weinreb.20 The latter two argued that signifi-
cant theoretical and practical differences do exist between European and
American procedures which might suggest desirable changes in
American procedures. In particular, Langbein and Weinreb argued that
even if relatively "summary" procedures are frequently used in Europe,
they may be superior to American summary procedures such as the
guilty plea.21 In a reply article, Goldstein and Marcus stressed the func-
tional similarities of European and American systems, questioned
whether the courts in either system can exert significant control over the
exercise of law enforcement discretion, and called for further empirical
research into whether European systems are superior in practice.2
(suggesting an expanded role for trial judge to speed trial and oversight of investigation by
magistrate).
18. Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4.
19. For discussion of the different meanings of "inquisitorial" procedure and a
recommendation that the term "nonadversary" be used to describe continental procedures, see
Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 7, at 555-78.
20. Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 2; see also Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining,
supra note 2.
21. Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1550.
22. Goldstein & Marcus, Comment, supra note 4. To a great extent, the differences in the
views expressed by Goldstein and Marcus and by Langbein and Weinreb seem attributable to the
very different analytic approaches of these authors, and the different assumptions following from
their approaches.
The "functional" or "systemic" approach of Goldstein and Marcus assumes that, underneath
the surface differences of formal law and legal culture, Western systems of criminal justice are very
similar because they face similar problems. These problems include limited resources, political
pressures, the conflict between generally applicable law and the desire for case-specific "equity," the
inherent dominance of the police over the investigative process despite efforts to impose judicial
control, and the tendency in the criminal justice system for reforms in one part of the system to be
cancelled out by compensating changes in other parts of the system (the "system hydraulic").
Langbein and Weinreb, on the other hand, seem to apply a more "formal" or theoretical model:
Where legal rules or culture differ substantially, it should be assumed that behavior also differs, at
least to some extent. Both approaches thus allow their adherents to make major assumptions about
[Vol. 78:539
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Scholars writing later than these authors have generally supported
the conclusions of Goldstein and Marcus.23 Later scholars have also
stressed the broader differences in legal culture between Europe and
America which make it difficult, if not impossible, to "import" European
procedures to America. In particular, these writers point to the existence
of difficult-to-change American constitutional requirements (for exam-
ple, the right to a jury trial),24 the vastly different traditions of training
and career advancement of American judges and prosecutors, and the
fundamentally different American view of the relationship between the
individual and the state.25
The latter arguments are not without considerable force, but some
incongruity exists in the combination of these arguments with those of
Goldstein and Marcus. We are told that European procedures will not
work in the United States because those systems are too different from
ours, but on the other hand, European procedures are really not that
different from ours in practice! Perhaps what these various writers mean
to say is that some European procedures (for example, nonadversary tri-
als) are so different that they are unlikely to be adopted in the United
States; at the same time, other European procedures (such as close judi-
cial supervision of the investigatory process) could be adopted because
they are not really that different in practice.
But surely this categorization does not exhaust all of the possibili-
ties. Some European procedures may be significantly different from (and
superior to) American procedures; yet the proposed context may be suffi-
ciently similar to permit adoption in the United States. A major short-
coming of comparative criminal procedure literature thus far is that it
has focused attention on the extremes of difference and similarity. What
is needed now is greater attention to smaller yet real differences which
what officials actually do in practice, and each set of authors frequently has accused the other of
substituting assumptions for data. The present Article attempts to provide some of that missing data
and suggests the important areas where more research is needed.
23. See Arenella, supra note 3, at 525-27; Darby, supra note 3; Hughes, supra note 7; Johnson,
supra note 5, at 410-14; Morris, supra note 3; Tomlinson, supra note 5; Weigend, supra note 3. But
see Alschuler, supra note 7, at 981-85 (contending that the European system is not equivalent to plea
bargaining); Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 2, at 31 (suggesting that Goldstein and Marcus reach
"false conclusions" because they unwittingly transferred certain assumptions from their own legal
system).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 696-702. But see Alschuler, supra note 7, at 995-1011
(arguing that federal constitutional requirements in state cases could be lowered without resort to
constitutional amendment or "radical" judicial reinterpretation if new procedures such as a "mixed"
court of lay and professional judges were found to serve adequately the purposes of traditional Bill of
Rights guarantees).
25. See generally M. DAMAgKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986);
Damalka, Structures of Authority, supra note 3; Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 7;
Dama-ka, Reality of Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 7; see also W. FELSTINER & A. DREW,
supra note 7, at 20, 41 ("gulf" separates American and continental legal cultures, especially
regarding prosecutorial careers and roles, and the use of written versus oral evidence).
1990]
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may permit viable "legal transplants"26 to the American context.
Indeed, as Professor Norval Morris has noted, such smaller, "politically
viable incremental steps" might lead to the eventual adoption of major
elements of European procedure that cannot be adopted all at once.27
This Article is intended as a start in that direction, to break the stalemate
in the academic debate and focus our research and reform efforts on
more attainable goals.
This Article focuses entirely on the French criminal justice system.
But why, one might ask, study any of the continental systems? Shouldn't
we look first to other "common law" countries, which are both easier for
Americans to study and more likely to offer viable legal transplants?
These seem to be the assumptions behind the recent shift of attention to
the study of English criminal procedure,2 8 and they may ultimately prove
correct. Certainly, no one should underestimate the difficulties of com-
parative research, even in so "familiar" a context as England.29 On the
other hand, common law systems-because they are so similar to
ours3°--provide fewer possibilities for comparison and borrowing.
Before we give up all hope of borrowing or adapting any continental pro-
cedures, we need a better understanding of how those procedures differ
from our own, which ones suggest viable reform possibilities, and where
further research is needed. This Article attempts to provide that assess-
ment and to suggest a narrower, more realistic agenda for future reform-
oriented research on continental criminal justice.
I have chosen to focus on only the French criminal justice system
for several reasons. First, much more is known about the French system
than about any other continental system except perhaps that of West
Germany.31 Second, focus on a single country permits better under-
standing of specific foreign procedures and their interrelationships.
26. See generally A. WATsON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 21-35 (1974) (defining a "legal transplant" as "the moving of a rule or a system of law from
one country to another or from one people to another").
27. Morris, supra note 3, at 1370.
28. See, eg., Hughes, supra note 9, at 508 (English system is ripe for comparison because of its
"congruence" with the American system); Van Kessel, supra note 9, at 7 (choosing to compare
English and American systems because of their "common core" of values).
29. For a general discussion of the problems of comparative research, see A. WATSON, supra
note 26, passim; Hughes, supra note 9, at 509-11; Koopmans, Understanding Political Systems: A
Comment on Methods of Comparative Research, 17 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 261 (1987).
30. Actually, in some important respects the British criminal justice system differs more from
our own than does the French. For example, prior to the passage of the Prosecution of Offences Act,
1985, ch. 23, decisions to prosecute and the conduct of trials were controlled primarily by the police
and their hired attorneys; only a small proportion of prosecutions were controlled by the Director of
Public Prosecutions. Hughes, supra note 9, at 541-45. It remains to be seen whether the 1985 Act
will dramatically reduce police control over the prosecution function. Prosecutorial discretion in
France is discussed in Part VI ("Prosecutorial Charging Discretion"). See infra text accompanying
notes 382-466.
31. The focus on Germany in the literature seems misplaced, since the German system is in
[Vol. 78:539
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Much of the recent literature on "continental" criminal procedure
implies that "if you've seen one European country you've seen 'em all."
Yet this approach tends to minimize important differences among the
countries of Europe32 and fails to present an accurate, detailed, or coher-
ent portrait of any of them. Third, by analyzing each component part of
one country's criminal justice system, we see how the parts complement
and compensate for each other in the system as a whole.33 Such "sys-
tem" analysis has been a standard feature of recent American criminal
justice research34 and is just as essential in the study of foreign systems.
This insight was eloquently stated by Professor George Pugh in an early
article on French criminal procedure:
A system for administering criminal justice is a detailed tapestry woven
of many varied threads. It is often difficult to understand the nature and
significance of any particular fiber without at least a general appreciation
of the function of other threads, and also a realization of the impact of
the whole.35
For all these reasons, future reform-oriented comparative research
must examine foreign systems separately as I have done. The "continen-
tal" or "families of law" approach only serves to confuse the reader (and
perhaps occasionally the author). Future research must also extend
beyond criminal "procedure" to include other dimensions of criminal
justice (for example, the scope of the criminal law, sentencing practices,
and training and supervision of prosecutors) that have an important
bearing on the functioning of procedural rules and are important in their
own right as well. For similar reasons, reform-oriented research must
some respects less similar to our own than the French system. For instance, the German rule of
"compulsory prosecution," see supra note 12 and accompanying text, finds no counterpart in either
the American or French systems. See infra text accompanying notes 382-466.
32. For an example of an attempt to describe the "typical" procedure in a "continental
country," see Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 364-69. The composite portrait presented appears quite
favorable until one realizes that no single court system in any one country contains all of the
safeguards described. The multi-country approach is consistent with the traditional aim of the
"science" of comparative law: "to observe, describe, classify and investigate in their relations among
themselves and to other phenomena, the phenomena of law." Rheinstein, Teaching Tools in
Comparative Law, 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 95, 98 (1952). A single country approach, on the other hand,
may be more appropriate if our concern is reform based on "borrowing" foreign rules and
procedures. See infra text accompanying note 36.
33. For example, one can understand a criminal justice system by studying the interactions
between pretrial detention practices, interrogation procedures, the defendant's decision to contest
the charges or admit them, and sentencing practices.
34. See, ag., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1973); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 7-12 (1967) [hereinafter
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME]; F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM:
MATERIALS ON THE ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1980).
35. Pugh, The Administration of Criminal Justice in France, An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA.
L. REv. 1 (1962); see also MAJOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 15-16 (G. Cole, S. Frankowski & M.
Gertz eds. 1981).
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consider all stages of the criminal process, not just the one to be
reformed. Seemingly desirable foreign practices may depend critically on
one or more related aspects of the foreign system, and those supporting
structures may be impossible to duplicate in our own system or may be
objectionable on policy grounds.
Such "system-wide" analysis has its costs, of course. For one thing,
it sometimes requires a choice of breadth over depth of analysis. System-
wide analysis can also be very frustrating: the more one understands
about the complex interrelationships among different dimensions and
stages of criminal justice, the more difficult seems the task of changing
particular rules and procedures. Indeed, one can easily be led to the con-
clusion that selective reforms and "transplants" are impossible-that we
must reform our entire system at once, and adopt all of a foreign system,
or none of it. Since total system reforms and transplants are extremely
unlikely to occur, such a conclusion virtually eliminates the utility of
reform-oriented comparative studies (or even noncomparative ones). But
it is far from clear, given our present state of knowledge about continen-
tal systems, that our only choice is "their" system or "ours." The work-
ing hypothesis of this Article is that smaller transplants are possible and
that the hybrid systems of criminal justice produced by such transplants
may be superior to either parent system.36
To keep the length of this Article within manageable limits, I will
examine only the differences between American and French systems that
seem most significant from a reform perspective. Furthermore, I have
emphasized seven features of the French system which I believe deserve
the highest research priority because they either suggest desirable and
feasible American reforms, or because they might be seen as posing insu-
perable barriers to borrowing other aspects of that system. Those seven
features, discussed in Parts II to VIII of this Article, are: (1) more care-
ful selection, training, and supervision of police, prosecutors, and judges;
(2) narrower scope of the criminal law; (3) fewer limits on gathering and
use of evidence against the accused; (4) less frequent use of arrest and
pretrial detention; (5) limits on prosecutorial charging discretion; (6)
absence of explicit plea bargaining, as well as less abusive forms of tacit
bargaining; and (7) less severe sentencing laws and practices.
The Appendix briefly discusses seven other important differences
between the French and American systems and explains why I have
given them less emphasis. These differences are: (1) pretrial judicial
investigation and review of charges; (2) broader rights of crime victims;
(3) liberal defense discovery rights; (4) nonadversary (judge-run) trials;
(5) "mixed" court of lay and professional judges; (6) less restrictive trial
36. Cf Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1550 ("[The issue should not be posed as 'this
model or that,' as if criminal procedure came complete in indivisible packages . . ").
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procedure and evidence rules; and (7) broader defense and prosecution
appeal rights.
Throughout this Article, I will attempt to describe not only what is
different and possibly better about the French system, but also the many
similarities between French and American practices. These similarities
suggest that the "legal culture gap" between the French and American
systems is not as great as some comparative researchers have supposed.3"
This in turn suggests that the donor and recipient systems are compati-
ble, and that some legal transplants may be both "politically" feasible-
that is, acceptable to legislators, judges, and attorneys-and practically
viable-that is, administratively workable, and effective at improving the
quality of justice.
A final, preliminary note about sources: One of the greatest meth-
odological problems of comparative research is the lack of reliable, com-
parable data on the actual functioning of different systems. This is
particularly true in the case of France, where legal academics seem more
interested in principles than in practice.38 The following discussions
attempt to incorporate all of the available descriptive and empirical data
37. See authorities cited supra note 25. A number of writers have suggested that the gap
between civil and common law systems is narrowing. See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 1020
(European and American systems "tend to converge"); Merryman, How Others Do It. The French
and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1865-76 (1988) (French and German systems have
undergone revolutionary change in post-war era, due to reduced reliance on code law and increased
role of constitutional and European Community law; process makes French and German judges
more like American judges); Vroom, Constitutional Protection of Individual Liberties in France: The
Conseil Constitutionnel Since 1971, 63 TUL. L. REv. 265, 266 (1988) ("revolutionary" 1971 decision
of the Constitutional Court has produced a "fundamental shift in French political structure").
38. In some respects, the French system is far better documented than our own. For example,
statistics on prosecutor screening rates have been gathered on a national basis for at least 50 years.
On the other hand, to my knowledge no study has been completed, locally or nationally, of the
reasons for screening decisions-for example, what proportion are based on evidentiary
considerations versus prosecution policy or alternatives to prosecution of the current offense. Cf P.
GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POGGIO, M. STRUMWASSER & P. LEON, PROSECUTION OF ADULT
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE at v-xiv (Rand Corp.
1973) [hereinafter PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS] (identifying and analyzing
factors within the criminal justice system in Los Angeles County that affect treatment of individual
defendants); Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980) (examining the exercise of discretion by
federal prosecutors).
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contained in published official statistics, 39 French language treatises, 40
American and British studies,4" statutes,42 and case law.43 My own
interviews and observations during three semesters spent in France are
also incorporated. As is equally true for research on American criminal
justice systems, each of these sources has its limitations, and none can be
viewed as definitive. Rather, they support and corroborate each other,
providing-in Hans Zeisel's classic phrase-"triangulation of proof."'
The present study is thus an attempt to overcome one of the most serious
39. The principal French statistical sources used in this Article are the following: MINISThRE
DE LA JUSTICE, COMPTE GPNtRAL DE L'ADMINISTRATION DE LA JUSTICE PANALE 1978 (La
Documentation Frangaise 1982) [hereinafter COMPTE GNPRAL], containing data on prosecutor
screening rates; activities of examining magistrates; conviction rates, sentences, and some manpower
data for the years 1978 through 1981; MINISTtRE DE L'INTtRIEUR, LA CRIMINALITA EN FRANCE
EN 1980 (La Documentation Frangaise 1981) [hereinafter LA CRIMINALIT EN FRANCE], reporting
police statistics on crimes known, crimes solved, and persons taken into custody in 1980; and
MINISTtRE DE LA JUSTICE, ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE LA JUsICE-1984 (La Documentation
Frangaise 1986) [hereinafter ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE], containing police, prosecution, and court
statistics for the years 1974 through 1984.
In the remainder of this Article, the statistics cited are generally for the year 1980, although
more recent figures are sometimes available. I chose this year because complete data are not
available for 1984 and later years, and because data for the years 1981 through 1983 are significantly
distorted by the 1981 presidential amnesty decree, which caused a 30-40% drop in reported
convictions in 1981 and lesser but nevertheless substantial reductions in 1982 and 1983. ANNUAIRE
STATISTIQUE, supra, at 109-21; see also infra text accompanying note 582.
40. The most frequently cited treatises are: 2 R. MERLE & A. ViTu, TRAITf DE DROIT
CRIMINEL: PROCEDURE PANALE (3d ed. 1979); J. PRADEL, PROCEDURE PPNALE (3d ed. 1985); G.
STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BOULOC, PROCEDURE PfNALE (12th ed. 1984); and J. VINCENT, G.
MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, LA JUSTICE ET SES INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1985).
41. Some of the major descriptive works in English include R. DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS
STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY (M. Kindred trans. 1972); A. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE (1975); Pugh, supra note 35; Tomlinson, supra note 5; and
Vouin, The Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Trials, 18 AM. J. COMP. LAW 483 (1970).
Sheehan's work is the most coherent and comprehensive portrait of the French criminal justice
system, but it is already out of date in many important respects. Furthermore, it employs none of
the nationwide statistics cited in the previous note and contains almost no citations to relevant
articles of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. For an overall summary of the French criminal
justice system which attempts to remedy these defects, see Frase, Introduction to THE FRENCH
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-40 (G. Kock & R. Frase trans. 1988) [hereinafter FRENCH
SYSTEM] (introduction to revised translation).
42. Except where otherwise noted, all citations to provisions of the French Code of Criminal
Procedure (for example, "Proc. Code art. 16-1") refer to the 1988 Kock and Frase revised
translation, supra note 41. Individual laws are cited by date, number, and periodical page (for
example, "Law of Dec. 30, 1987, No. 87-1062, 108 GAZETrE DU PALAIS, Legislation [G.P.L.] Jan.
6-7, 1988, 19"). Since no recent English translation of the French Penal Code exists, citations will
refer to the current French language version, CODE PPNAL [C. PEN.]. Cf. THE FRENCH PENAL
CODE (J. Moreau & G. Mueller trans. 1960).
43. Major cases reported in the Bulletin des arrts de la Cour de cassation, chambre criminelle
(Imprimerie Nationale, various years) are cited as, e.g.: "Judgment of Nov. 8, 1979 [date of opinion],
Bull. Crim. No. 311 [case number]." Other cases are cited by date, court, and page in the Gazette du
Palais, supra note 42.
44. H. ZEISEL, SAY IT WITH FIGURES 190-99 (5th ed. rev. 1968) (referring to a confluence of
proof from two or more independent sources).
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weaknesses of the existing literature which, by relying primarily on for-
mal rules and impressionistic studies, sparked much debate, few conclu-
sions, and virtually no sustained research and reform efforts.
To summarize, future comparative studies should be guided by the
following principles, which are illustrated and applied in the remainder
of this Article. First, researchers should study each foreign system both
individually (not in "families") and as a whole (not just the procedural
rule or stage of the criminal process proposed to be reformed). Second,
studies of foreign systems must examine all available sources: formal
legal rules and structures, impressionistic descriptions of practice, and
quantitative data. Third, researchers must also be prepared to re-
examine their own system, in theory and especially in practice, to deter-
mine the extent to which it actually differs from the foreign system.
Finally, research and reform efforts should concentrate on the smaller
differences between foreign and domestic systems that are revealed by the
above approach, since it is the smaller differences that are most likely to
suggest feasible "borrowings" from abroad.
II
SELECTION, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISION OF POLICE,
PROSECUTORS, AND JUDGES
Among the perceived barriers to adoption of European procedures
in the United States, one of the most fundamental is the difference in the
institutions of criminal justice. European systems are "hierarchical,"
with police, prosecutors, and judges subject to nationwide bureaucratic
selection, training, promotion, and supervision. In contrast, United
States institutions are said to be "coordinately" organized, with a prefer-
ence for local control, democratic selection, lay participation, and more
flexible decisionmaking.45 These differences have been cited as particti-
larly significant barriers to our ever adopting the French institution of
the examining magistrate,46 or to adopting other aspects of the French
system.
There is little doubt that these institutional differences exist. More-
over, given these differences, the average quality of French officials may
be greater than the quality of ours in ways that might permit the French
45. See generally Damalka, Structures of Authority, supra note 3; Dama ka, Evidentiary
Barriers, supra note 7 (suggesting replacement of accusatorial or inquisitorial trial-centered models
of criminal procedure with organizing concepts based on authority, such as hierarchical or
coordinate models of procedure).
46. Johnson, supra note 5, at 412 (citing Anglo-American tradition of decentralized authority
as barrier to adoption of examining magistracy); Morris, supra note 3, at 1368-69 (contrasting lack
of judicial "career line" for U.S. lawyers with structure of French legal profession; this lack is a
barrier to the U.S. adoption of the institution of examining magistrate). See infra text accompanying
notes 637-48 for a discussion of the French examining magistrate.
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system to dispense with some of the costly, delay-producing procedural
safeguards we consider essential to our system. But such institutional
differences can also be viewed more positively by reform-minded
Americans: Shouldn't we improve the quality of our institutions,
whether or not we adopt any other aspects of French procedure? The
minimal American standards used for selection, training, and supervision
of police, prosecutors, and judges seem shocking to French observers and
perhaps should shock Americans as well.
I argue that we should consider adopting certain aspects of the
French system, namely those concerning police, prosecutorial, and judi-
cial organization. Such changes are feasible because they would build on
similar practices that already exist in the United States. The fact that
similar American practices exist also suggests that the French and
American systems are not so fundamentally different as to preclude
American adoption of other aspects of the French system-even without
concurrently adopting improvements in American police, prosecutorial,
and judicial personnel.47
A. Police
The French police are organized in two nationwide hierarchies: the
National Police under the Minister of the Interior, and the Gendarmes
under the Minister of Defense.48 The standards for hiring, promotion,
and internal discipline of these police forces have not been discussed in
the current literature, and more research is needed. One might nonethe-
less hypothesize that such national hierarchies permit certain methods of
maintaining police quality: supervision of the local "police chief";
regional or national training programs (which local departments cannot
or will not pay for); hiring from a wide pool of applicants; ability to
transfer officers to where they are needed most; preservation of promo-
tion incentives in "top heavy" departments; and a local force with a
broader perspective on local policing problems than the police tend to
have in the United States.4 9 On the other hand, anyone who has ever
47. In any case, I do not believe that the French-inspired reform proposals discussed in Part
III ("Scope of the Criminal Law") and Parts V through VIII ("Arrest and Pretrial Detention,"
"Prosecutorial Charging Discretion," "Plea Bargaining and Its Analogues," and "Sentencing Laws
and Practices") depend on substantial improvements in American personnel. See infra text
accompanying notes 127-56 & 292-629. The seemingly broader investigatory powers of the French
police, discussed more fully in Part IV ("Restraints on Evidence Gathering"), do seem to require
very high quality of personnel; it is not certain, however, that American police really have less power
in practice, or that French law enforcement is really any more effective than our own. See infra text
accompanying notes 157-291.
48. See Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 157.
49. For a discussion of the related American concept of "lateral entry"-hiring of police
officers and supervisors from outside the jurisdiction and from non-police governmental agencies-
and its value to police administration, see THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 34, at 111-12.
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lived in France knows that incidents of police misconduct (brutality, cor-
ruption, under- and over-enforcement) do occur.
In any case, a national police hierarchy is clearly not compatible
with our federal system and would probably be administratively unwork-
able even if it were. After all, France is in some respects (such as size
and cultural homogeneity) more comparable to a large American state
than to the United States as a whole. Perhaps even a statewide police
department is too foreign to our system to be politically feasible in the
near future, although some statewide patrol and investigative agencies
already exist, and some jurisdictions have created statewide police licens-
ing.50 However, two other aspects of the French system of policing merit
serious consideration by future reform-oriented researchers.
L High-Level Police Authorization Rules
Although the French police have somewhat broader investigative
powers than American police,5' the Code of Criminal Procedure limits
the exercise of these broad powers to a select group: the Officers of the
Judicial Police (OJPs). 52 OJPs are designated by ministerial decree from
a list of persons declared eligible by statute. The Attorney General may
suspend or revoke the designation if an OJP abuses his or her powers,
and certain judges also have disciplinary powers over OJPs and other
members of the police.53
The requirement that especially sensitive investigations be author-
ized by high-ranking officials or supervisors within the police hierarchy is
not simply a minor formality.54 It serves the important function of cen-
tering responsibility in the hands of those police officers who are expected
to be the most qualified (because they have the most experience) and who
have the most to lose (because of the threat of demotion) if a serious
50. An example is the Minnesota Peace Officers Standards and Training Board (P.O.S.T.),
which sets hiring and conduct standards for most police officers in the state. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 626.84-.863 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. R. ch. 6700 (1989).
51. See generally infra text accompanying notes 157-291. Such powers include broad
authority to investigate "flagrant" offenses without judicial supervision and to order 24-hour
investigatory detention (garde d vue). See infra note 161. French police may also exercise delegated
judicial investigatory powers under "rogatory commissions." Proe. Code arts. 151 to 155
(describing various components of a judicial investigation). See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra
note 41, at 15.
52. See infra note 161. Further distinctions are made as to the powers of the two lower grades
of judicial police-Agents and Assistant Agents-and the powers of various specialized
"fonctionnaires" are also limited. See J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note
40, at §§ 572-573. Throughout this Article, initial capitals are used in referring to each of these
three grades to remind readers of the important differences in their powers.
53. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 6 n.39 (describing powers of attorneys general).
54. See, eg., Judgment of June 17, 1987, Bull. Crim. No. 253 (reversing confiscation of radar
detector seized by Agents, not Officers, of the Judicial Police). However, further research is needed
on the operation of these rules in practice and, in particular, whether OJPs routinely approve of
operations that they do not personally supervise or that have already been carried out by others.
1990]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
error is made. This regulatory technique is especially valuable where the
substantive legal standard governing the particular police activity is weak
or nonexistent, as is arguably the case with many aspects of American
criminal procedure, such as search standards." The smaller the number
of decisionmakers, the more consistent the decisions are likely to be. 6
At the same time, one might hypothesize that contemporaneous police
supervision would be stricter than after-the-fact supervision by judges,
who may be tempted to defer to police expertise-especially when the
alternative is to throw out crucial, irreplaceable evidence.
Even if police supervision is less strict than judicial review, the for-
mer represents a useful intermediate approach between judicial control
and no control. Examples of this approach may be found in the internal
regulations of some American police and prosecutorial agencies57 and in
procedural rules governing the decision to incarcerate a suspect rather
than to issue a citation. 8 High-level police approval has also been
viewed by courts as a necessary component of a constitutionally valid
drunk-driving roadblock. 9 I believe that serious consideration should be
given to adoption of legislation (or criminal procedure rules) requiring
supervisory-level approval for these and other critical police actions,
which American law generally permits any police officer to undertake on
55. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 184-86 (discussing limitations of American
probable cause requirements).
56. See Frase, supra note 38, at 293 n.126.
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988) (provisions of the federal wiretap statute (Title III) requiring
that all requests for wiretap orders be authorized by certain high-level prosecutors); F. ZIMRING &
R. FRsasE, supra note 34, at 236-41 (a "full investigation" by the FBI must be authorized by FBI
headquarters); id at 600-14 (Manhattan District Attorney's Office guidelines for plea bargaining and
sentencing, reprinted from Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District Attorney's
Office, 11 CRiM. L. BULL. 48 (1975)); 42 CRIM. L. RPTR. (BNA) 2340 (proposed Department of
Justice policies for plea bargaining under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, requiring supervisor
approval for certain plea agreements); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 130.1-
130.2 (1975) (key role of "station officer" in processing and disposition of arrestees); id. § 160.2(7)
(requiring one designated officer responsible for conduct of all identification procedures).
58. See, eg., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01, subd.l(1)(b) (decision must be made by "the officer in
charge of the police station or the county sheriff in charge of the jail or an officer designated by the
sheriff").
59. See, eg., State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983)
(invalidating roadblock because of its unilateral establishment by patrolman and operation of
roadblock without benefit of guidelines or specific directions).
[Vol. 78:539
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
his or her own. Examples might include undercover operations;' war-
rantless, nonexigent arrest in public places;61 line-ups and other identifi-
cation procedures not subject to the right-to-counsel safeguards;62 and
prolonged custodial interrogation.6
2. Police-Prosecutor Relations
A second interesting feature of French policing is that it is more
closely integrated with the prosecution function than in the United
States." The prosecutor is to be notified "without delay" when the
police learn of an offense, and "immediately" if it is a "flagrant"
offense.65 In the latter case, if a prosecutor arrives on the scene, his or
her authority supersedes that of the OJP previously in command.66 Indi-
vidual prosecutors have all the powers of an O-P and may also order the
police to conduct investigations whether or not the offense is
"flagrant.2
67
Even if prosecutors rarely take direct charge of an investigation68
and infrequently order investigation of facts that the police would not
60. Cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that use of
"wired for sound" informants is not a "search" or "seizure" under the fourth amendment and thus
does not require judicial approval).
It might be argued that undercover operations require a degree of secrecy incompatible with
high-level approval requirements. However, similar arguments have been rejected in the case of CIA
covert operations, which are subject to presidential approval and congressional oversight. Indeed,
former CIA Director William Colby has suggested that such intrusive operations should be limited
as a matter of policy to cases supported by the high degree of consensus needed to prevent "leaks"
when information is shared. Panel Discussion, Secrecy in Government, Univ. of Minnesota Law
School (Oct. 16, 1987), reported in T. O'Toole, Mondale and Colby Speak Out On CIA, I The
Source: Newsletter of the University of Minnesota Law School 1 (issue 5).
61. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (police may make warrantless arrests on
probable cause in a public place, even if there is time to obtain a warrant beforehand).
62. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (holding that right to counsel does not apply
to identification procedures held prior to commencement of "adversary judicial procedures" against
the defendant); see also infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
63. Although even brief custodial interrogation is subject to Miranda safeguards, there is
reason to question the effectiveness of these rights. See infra notes 227-36; cf. Police and Criminal
Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, §§ 34-45 (British law requiring approval by certain high-ranking officers
of prolonged detention and questioning).
64. See generally 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1060 (describing duties of police to
inform prosecutors of the commission of certain crimes and explaining supervision of certain police
functions by prosecutors). By contrast, less communication is generally required between police and
prosecutors in the United States. See generally W. McDONALD, H. ROSSMAN & J. CRAMER,
POLICE-PROSECUTOR RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U.S. Dep't of
Justice 1982).
65. Proc. Code arts. 19, 54; see also CODE DE LA SANTA PUBLIQUE art. L.627 (requiring
written authorization by the prosecutor or examining magistrate prior to any search of a residence
for drugs).
66. Proc. Code art. 68. One observer states that prosecutors "normally arrive at the scene of a
serious offense soon after the police." Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 147.
67. Proc. Code arts. 38, 4142, 75.
68. See G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BOULOC, supra note 40, § 267.
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themselves investigate, the mere possibility of such intervention may
serve a valuable function in checking the power of the police. At the
very least, the French prosecutor must be kept informed, at an early
stage, of the existence and progress of the investigation. This permits the
prosecutor to have more input into the direction and methods of investi-
gation. If the offense is one that will probably not be prosecuted,69 the
police may avoid wasting time and unnecessarily bothering the suspect,
his or her associates, and witnesses. If the police are using questionable
investigatory methods, the prosecutor may be able to intervene in time to
protect both the rights of citizens and the admissibility of the evidence.70
In contrast to this "integrated" model, the police and prosecutorial
functions in the United States seem to reflect a strict "division of labor"
theory.7 1 American prosecutors are rarely involved in prearrest investi-
gation decisions or in the arrest decision itself. The major exception to
this rule is the U.S. Attorney, who generally declines prosecution with-
out any arrest ever being made (albeit usually long after the commence-
ment of the investigation).72 Similarly, U.S. Attorneys, Department of
Justice Attorneys, and some state and local prosecutors sometimes work
closely with police agencies to design and carry out prosecutions involv-
ing public corruption, organized crime, narcotics, and other complex
matters.73
We must learn much more about the actual day-to-day working
relationship between police and prosecutors in France and in this coun-
try, but even now it appears that closer police-prosecutor relationships
are both feasible and desirable. Specific changes in American procedures
to achieve a more integrated, efficient, and responsible police function
might include the following: requiring the police to notify the prosecutor
at an early stage of the investigation and, whenever possible, prior to
arrest;74 giving the prosecutor (or designated prosecutors) explicit
69. See infra text accompanying notes 383-408 (discussing the broad discretionary power not
to prosecute).
70. This was one of the reasons for the Crime Commission's proposal that police departments
employ a full-time legal advisor. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 34, at 114.
71. See generally W. McDONALD, H. ROSSMAN & J. CRAMER, supra note 64 (analyzing
problems in police-prosecutor relations).
72. See Frase, supra note 38, at 251, 316-30.
73. See, eg., THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 34, at 196-98 (organized crime).
74. Cf. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 2.02 (complaint normally requires prosecutorial approval); MINN.
IL CRIM. P. 4.02, subd.3 (police shall notify prosecutor "[a]s soon as practical" after warrantless
arrest); I A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-3.4(b) (2d ed. 1979 & Supp.
i986) ("[a]bsent exceptional circumstances," arrest or search warrant should require prosecutor
approval). For a discussion of the importance of reducing the number of arrests, and the use of
pretrial detention after arrest, see Part V ("Arrest and Pretrial Detention"), infra text accompanying
notes 292-381.
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authority to direct or order specific police investigatory acts;7- and plac-
ing in the hands of the chief prosecutor or attorney general some police
administrative or disciplinary powers similar to the French Attorney
General's control over the OTP designation.76
B. Prosecutors
The most distinctive features of the prosecutor's office in France
may also be the hardest to duplicate in this country. These include
organization in a single, national hierarchy; a nationwide entrance exam-
ination and training program; and a tradition that views the position of
prosecutor as a career rather than a steppingstone to other careers. Nev-
ertheless, each of these attributes suggests possibilities for useful and fea-
sible reforms of the prosecution function in the United States.
L Hierarchy
All prosecutors in France serve in a bureaucratic hierarchy headed
by the Minister of Justice.77 Although individual prosecutors are theo-
retically free to speak their own minds in court,78 in their written submis-
sions they must follow the written orders of their superiors. If they do
not, they are subject to disciplinary action, including dismissal.79 The
French apparently recognize the problems of judicial administration that
would arise if individual prosecutorial decisions were always subject to
reversal by superiors. Thus, although the chief prosecutor for each
court"0 may be disciplined for his or her decisions, the decisions them-
selves may not be reversed by superiors even if they are directly contrary
75. See 1 A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 74, Standard 3-2.4(b)
(investigative resources should be under prosecutor's direct control); id. Standard 3-3.1(a)
(prosecutor should, when necessary, initiate investigation independent from police).
76. See supra text accompanying note 53.
77. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 6-7 (describing various actors in the hierarchy
under the Minister of Justice).
78. The French maxim, "The pen is bound, but speech is free," is codified in article 33 of the
Procedure Code (written submissions of official counsel who conduct prosecutions must follow
instructions of higher authorities, while oral observations need not and may be made freely). Some
observers assert that this freedom is rarely exercised. See A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 17 n.19;
Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 146 n.43. Other observers claim that it is "jealously defended," J.
VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40, § 505; that it exists in order to insure
that prosecutorial arguments can accommodate any unforeseeable events at trial, 2 R. MERLE & A.
Vrru, supra note 40, § 1009, at 247; and that local prosecutors retain "great independence" from the
central Ministry of Justice, Pugh, supra note 35, at 7-8.
79. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1008; J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A.
VARINARD, supra note 40, §§ 504, 508. Before imposing major disciplinary measures, the Minister
of Justice must consult a special commission, but in most cases the commission's findings are only
advisory. Id. § 508.
80. The chief prosecutor in the court of general jurisdiction is the Prosecuting Attorney, and is
the Attorney General in the courts of appeal. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 2, 4, 6.
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to written orders."1 Within each chief prosecutor's office, however, all
individual decisions are subject to review and correction by superiors,
and prosecution policies can be enforced uniformly within those offices
(and, to some extent, nationwide).82 Responsibility for prosecution pol-
icy is thus centralized at higher levels.
Such a nationwide hierarchical structure is, of course, incompatible
with our federal system.83 As for state and local prosecutors, some states
have already adopted a unified prosecution hierarchy under the state
attorney general, 4 thus achieving-or at least clearing the way for-
whatever benefits the French system might provide. In other states, the
county attorney (and sometimes also the city attorney responsible for
misdemeanor prosecutions) is an elected official. This implies that he or
she is not subject to supervision by the state attorney general and could
not be made so without a state constitutional amendment. Nevertheless,
the attorney general in many states enjoys concurrent statutory authority
to prosecute some or all criminal offenses," which provides at least the
possibility of a parallel check on local decisions not to prosecute. More-
over, it would not necessarily be inconsistent with the status of local
prosecutors as elected officials to adopt statewide standards for hiring
81. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1009; J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A.
VARINARD, supra note 40, § 505.
82. Very little has been reported in either French or American literature concerning the extent
to which French prosecution policies are published and thereby uniformly enforced, locally or
nationally. However, the Minister of Justice does issue instructions and policy statements to his
subordinates, which may suggest some uniformity of views from higher-ups. For example, see the
Circulaire of October 21, 1981, from the Minister of Justice to all Attorneys General and
Prosecuting Attorneys, regarding some of the new Socialist government's specific criminal justice
policies. 64 BULLETIN LPGISLATIF DALLOZ [B.L.D.] 372 (1981).
83. On the other hand, U.S. Attorneys and their assistants are all appointed, not elected, and
are currently subject to limited supervision by the Department of Justice in Washington. See Frase,
supra note 38, at 249-50 (describing limits on authority of U.S. Attorneys). It would thus be feasible
for the Department to exercise greater control, particularly in setting uniform prosecution policies
and perhaps also in setting standards for hiring and evaluation of Assistant U.S. Attorneys. See
generally U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., GREATER OVERSIGHT AND UNIFORMITY NEEDED IN U.S.
ATTORNEYS' PROSECUTIVE POLICIES (U.S.G.P.O. 1982) (discussing uniform prosecution and
evaluation policies); see also Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1080-90 (1972) (recommending greater
Department of Justice scrutiny of local federal prosecution policies).
84. In the state of Alaska, for example, the attorney general has supervisory authority over all
district attorneys and assistant district attorneys in the state because they are members of the State
Department of Law, of which the Attorney General is chief executive officer. ALASKA STAT.
§§ 44.23.010-.020 (1989). It was apparently this unusual authority which permitted the Alaska
Attorney General in 1975 to abolish at least the most visible forms of prosecutorial plea bargaining
throughout the state. See M.L. RUBINSTEIN & T.J. WHITE, ALASKA'S BAN ON PLEA BARGAINING
I (Alaska Judicial Council 1978), reprinted in F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, supra note 34, at 674; Cf. I
A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 74, Standard 3-2.2(b) and commentary
(statewide prosecution system analogous to federal system may be appropriate in smaller states, and
has been adopted in Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island).
85. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., POWERS, DtIrlES AND OPERATIONS OF
STATE ATrORNEYS GENERAL 104-07 (1977).
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and evaluation of assistant prosecutors and perhaps even statewide
charging standards for all state criminal laws. 6
Some might argue that any substantially unified state prosecution
function is undesirable because it would sacrifice needed flexibility and a
valued degree of local control in setting law enforcement priorities. It is
also unclear, at present, to what extent the French prosecution hierarchy
actually exercises effective supervisory control.87 More research is
needed on both sides of the Atlantic, but one can at least say this much:
The observed differences in the traditional structure of the prosecution
function in France and in the United States do not necessarily pose an
insuperable barrier to the adoption in the United States of reforms
modeled on the French system, since some state systems already incorpo-
rate important elements of the French hierarchical structure.
2. Training
A second major difference between prosecutors in France and in the
United States is that French prosecutors appear to be better trained for
their roles. The French have instituted a nationwide recruitment and
training program for all "magistrates," both prosecutors and judges.8
The normal path of entry into either branch of the magistrature is by
completion of a twenty-four-month training program.89 The few posi-
tions in this program are open primarily to law graduates who have com-
pleted three years of study,90 and who are selected on the basis of a
86. Cf. I A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 74, Standard 3-2.2(c)
(suggesting that states should assure "maximum practicable uniformity" in criminal law
enforcement throughout state); id Standard 3-2.2(e) (recommending "central pool of supporting
resources and manpower").
87. See supra note 82.
88. Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 146.
89. To remedy the recent shortage of magistrates, a limited number of magistrates may be
appointed each year without completing the training program. J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A.
VARINARD, supra note 40, § 466. All permanent appointees must have at least a licence (three-year
law degree). In addition, public employees and attorneys must have at least eight years of
experience; full professors and associate professors of law must have two years of teaching
experience, and assistant professors, four years. Id. § 473. In 1981, approximately 50 to 60
magistrates were recruited in this fashion; by comparison, in 1982, 266 magistrates were recruited by
means of the training program. Id. §§ 471,473. French law also permits temporary magistrates to
be hired for a fixed, nonrenewable term of three, six, or nine years. The maximum allowable number
of such appointments, as a percentage of vacancies, is now one-third or one-fifth, for first- and
second-level appointments respectively. Id. § 473.
90. French students enter law school directly after completing their secondary education and
without attending an "undergraduate" college, although French secondary education is often said to
be roughly equivalent to a junior college degree in the United States. See Pugh, supra note 35, at 6
n.33. The first two years of law school lead to the Dipl6me d'Etudes Universitaires Gdndrales
(D.E. U.G.). This degree is primarily designed to prepare students for further legal study, but it also
confers eligibility to take certain civil service examinations. The third year of study leads to the
Licence en Droit, and includes some specialization (for example, in private law or public law). The
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nationwide competitive entrance exam.9 The first seven months of the
program are spent in classes at the National Magistrates' School in
Bordeaux, followed by three periods of internship: (1) thirteen months in
one of the provincial courts of appeal; (2) two months with a judge or
prosecutor in Paris; and (3) two months in the office selected by the can-
didate for his or her first post.92 Between their second and third intern-
ships, candidates (known as auditeurs dejustice) take an examination to
determine their class ranking and then they choose (in rank order) a post
from the list of available openings. During their internships, candidates
may not sign documents on behalf of actual magistrates, but they may do
any of the following: assist an examining magistrate or prosecutor dur-
ing all phases of his or her respective functions; sit on the bench with
judges of civil or correctional courts and join their deliberations (in a
nonvoting consultative capacity); orally present the prosecution's plead-
ings before these courts; and attend the deliberations of the judges and
jurors in the assize court.93
During the entire twenty-four-month period, candidates receive a
salary and are subject to most of the requirements applicable to magis-
trates, including an oath of office, no outside employment, and no right
to strike. Candidates must also agree at the outset to remain in the mag-
istracy for at least ten years. 94 During the first four years after their
installation, all new magistrates are required to complete four months of
additional, specialized training in sessions of at least two weeks each. 95
Although the role of the prosecutor is at least as important in the
United States as it is in France, the procedures for training American
prosecutors are rudimentary at best. Chief prosecutors are typically
elected or appointed after limited criminal practice experience, 96 and
assistant prosecutors are often hired right out of law school where any
fourth year is even more specialized, leading to the Maltrise en Droit. Doctoral and other advanced
degrees are obtained after five or six years.
Although students are eligible to enter the magistrate training program after three years, many
do not do so until after four or five years of law school. Admission to the bar requires the maftrise
(fourth-year) degree. J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40, § 470.
91. J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40, §§ 469-471. Up to one-
third of the positions may be filled by nomination rather than by the competitive exam. Nominees
must have a doctor of law degree (a five- or six-year program), or three years of legal work. Id.
§ 470.
92. Id. § 471. For further description of the program at the National Magistrates' School, see
Applebaum, Cogestion and Beyond: Change and Continuity in Modern French Legal Education-A
Design for U.S. Law Schools, 10 NOVA L.J. 297, 310-14 (1986); see also M. VOLCANSEK & J. LAFON,
JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE CROSS-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES ch. 6
(1988).
93. J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40, § 472.
94. Id.
95. Id. § 471 n.9.
96. See generally Reiss, Public Prosecutors and Criminal Prosecution in the United States of
America, 1975 JURID. RnV. 1, 9-10.
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clinical or trial practice training is likely to have involved only criminal
defense or civil procedure. In recent years, many new prosecutors have
attended in-service training programs, but we probably can learn some-
thing more from the French in this area.
Even if it is not feasible (especially in smaller jurisdictions) to
require chief prosecutors to have specified experience or training prior to
their election or appointment, why shouldn't they be expected to attend
specially designed training programs soon afterward, rather than trying
to learn everything "on the job"? The answer may be that such pro-
grams do not exist at present or are too expensive for most states to
establish. But the prosecution function, and the role of chief prosecutors
in particular, is probably uniform enough throughout the United States
to justify a nationwide program-perhaps sponsored and partially
funded by the federal government. As for assistant prosecutors, who are
almost always appointed rather than elected, it might be feasible to estab-
lish and require pre-appointment training programs run by law schools
or by continuing education centers; if not, post-appointment training can
and should be required (and publicly funded).97
3. Career Tradition
A third distinctive feature of the prosecution function in France is
that becoming a prosecutor in France is more a long-term career choice,
whereas the average tenure of prosecutors in the United States is rela-
tively short.98 In part, the French career tradition is due to the fact that
candidates must undergo two years of specialized training before becom-
ing prosecutors and must agree to remain in the magistracy for at least
ten years. 99 Moreover, the nationalized, bureaucratic structure of the
French prosecution hierarchy may allow more possibilities for advance-
ment than are available in the smaller, self-contained American prosecu-
tor's office, and perhaps may also provide more protection from removal
for purely political reasons.
A system of "career" prosecutors should permit greater develop-
ment and use of expertise, and might also make prosecutors more
accountable and responsive to their superiors. There may be disadvan-
tages as well: "burnout" and cynicism; narrow-minded pro-prosecution
partisanship; and unwillingness to work cooperatively with judges and
defense counsel.l °" Again, more research is needed into the nature of
97. See 1 A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 74, Standard 3-2.6
(advocating use of public funds for prosecutors to attend "substantially expanded" continuing
education programs).
98. Reiss, supra note 96, at 9 (noting that average tenure in office of U.S. prosecutors is four
years).
99. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
100. Since prosecutors in France (as in the United States) often aspire to become judges, they
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prosecution "careers" in France.
If Americans want to encourage this kind of system here, there are a
number of measures we could employ. Assistant prosecutors in some
jurisdictions already hold civil service positions,"0 ' and no doubt a
number of experienced career prosecutors may be found in these offices.
Even where prosecutors are not protected by civil service guidelines, they
would have the incentive to develop a career interest if they were paid
well enough at higher levels and protected, by law or custom, from rou-
tine discharge by newly elected or appointed chief prosecutors. 10 2 Surely
the prosecution function is too important in our system to allow assistant
prosecutor positions to be used solely for patronage purposes. The tradi-
tionally high rate of voluntary turnover in these positions is also undesir-
able, although it does reduce salary costs. In the end, though, we get
what we pay for. 103
C. Judges
French judges share several of the distinctive traits of French prose-
cutors, including an organization with a single, national hierarchy, and a
nationwide entrance examination and training program."° As with the
prosecution function, each of these features suggests possibilities for use-
ful, feasible reforms of the judicial system in the United States. 0 5
L Hierarchy
French judges, like prosecutors, are part of a national hierarchy,
may not be entirely unresponsive to pressures from the bench. It is apparently quite common for
senior French prosecutors to follow this career path. See R. DAVID, supra note 41, at 61.
101. As of 1973, civil service prosecutors were found in about 3% of American jurisdictions.
Reiss, supra note 96, at 9.
102. See 1 A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 74, Standard 3-2.3(a)
Ourisdictions should promote continuity of service for prosecutors); id. Standard 3-2.3(c)
(recommending non-partisan selection); id Standard 3-2.3(d) (urging pay for prosecutors
comparable to peers in private sector).
103. The same could be said for public defenders. The French system is less helpful in this area.
Perhaps owing to the less active role of counsel at trial, see infra notes 678-90 and accompanying
text, French defense counsel receive little specialized training either in law school or after
graduation. American legal education, with some schools' recent emphasis on clinical studies and
trial practice training, is far ahead of the French system in this area.
104. The third distinctive feature of French prosecutors-a tradition viewing this work as a life-
long career-is even more true of French judges. In this respect, however, the judiciaries in France
and the United States are not that different. The typical American judge is first appointed or elected
after considerable experience as an attorney or prosecutor, and then remains a judge until
retirement. See, eg., H. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLITICS (1988).
105. Another distinctive feature of the judicial corps in France is the high proportion of women
judges. In 1979, 23% of all magistrates (including prosecutors) were women, and the figure is
expected to surpass 50% by 1990; a higher proportion of women is found among judicial than
among prosecutorial magistrates. J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40,
§ 466.
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with the same classification grades and promotion procedures.' 0 6 How-
ever, judges are not subject to a similar chain of command; 0 7 as in the
United States, judicial decisions may only be reversed through the appel-
late process. 108 Moreover, in order to protect their independence and
perceived fairness, French judges are considered, in principle, "unremov-
able":'0 9 Once appointed, they hold office until the age of mandatory
retirement and may not be fired, suspended, transferred to a different
court, or even promoted against their wishes." 0
To deal with the inevitable "bad apples," a special procedure exists
for ordering disciplinary measures-which include removal, demotion or
transfer 1 '-but this procedure is used infrequently."t 2 Thus, in practice,
the quality of judicial performance appears to be maintained by other
mechanisms: (1) careful initial selection and training of judges; (2) use of
the promotion process to reward good performance; and (3) broad rights
of appeal. The first two of these will be considered presently, and the
third is discussed in the Appendix.'
13
All French magistrates (including prosecutors) are classified in one
of five ranks." 4 Except for the highest rank, promotion requires a cer-
tain number of years of experience"' and inscription on an approved list,
made up under the supervision of the Commission of Advancement,
which is composed of both judges and prosecutors. 1 6 Every magistrate
has his or her own personnel file or dossier," 7 thus allowing the Commis-
sion to use the magistrate's past performance in making promotion
decisions.
Although we must learn more about how the French system works
106. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
108. See FRENCH SYsTEM, supra note 41, at 36-38.
109. J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40, §§ 479-481.
110. Id. Apparently, judges may be given different or fewer cases by their superiors, or be
transferred to a different assignment within the same court. Id. § 73.
111. These decisions are made by the Conseil supifrieur de la magistrature, id. § 492, which also
has a role in the initial appointment of judges. Id § 483, at 504 n.ll. The sanctions available are:
(1) reprimand, with a notation in the judge's personnel file; (2) transfer to a different assignment; (3)
removal of certain powers; (4) reduction in grade; (5) forced retirement; and (6) dismissal, with or
without loss of pension rights. Id. § 493.
112. Between 1958 and January of 1981 there were only 39 disciplinary actions. Id. § 492 n.37.
In 1982 there were approximately 3,600 professional judges in France. See id. § 466.
113. See infra notes 737-42 and accompanying text.
114. The highest classification includes judges of the French supreme judicial court (Cour de
cassation), the first presidents and Attorneys General of the Courts of Appeal, and certain judges in
courts in the major cities. J. VINCENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40, § 483, at
535 n.11.
115. For example, to be promoted from the lowest rank to the next rank requires seven years of
active service. Id. § 484.
116. Id. The members of the Commission are nominated by the College of Magistrates, which
is composed of magistrates elected from each appellate district. Id § 484 n.12.
117. A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 14.
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in practice, the system appears to be superior to ours in several respects.
Judges in the United States at a given court level may aspire to higher
judicial positions, but there is little assurance that their ability and per-
formance level will be recognized by the politicians or advisory commit-
tees responsible for filling these positions. 118 There are fewer systematic
records of judicial performance, such as disposition rates and backlog,
appellate reversal rate, forced recusals, and complaints received from
parties or witnesses. Moreover, many of the most desirable higher posi-
tions are filled not from the ranks of experienced jurists, but "laterally"
by attorneys with political connections but little or no judicial experi-
ence.'1 9 Even where promotions are guided by performance rather than
by politics, the bar tends to control advancement decisions and other
judges have little input. The French system, which gives other judges
and prosecutors an explicit role in promotion decisions, may or may not
yield better decisions, but it is certainly different and worthy of further
study.
2. Training
The procedures for selection and training of French judges are iden-
tical to those previously described for prosecutors, 120 except that judges
are appointed with the advice of a special commission. 121 Thus, most
French judges begin their careers having received twenty-four months of
specialized pre-appointment training, and they receive four months of
additional training some time during the first four years of service.
In contrast, specialized training-either before or after appointment
or election to the bench-traditionally has not been required of
American judges. This apparently casual approach to judicial compe-
tence may reflect both the influence of democratic theory-elected offi-
cials require no particular training-and the tradition of electing or
appointing older, more experienced attorneys to the bench. However, in
recent years the federal courts and many states have adopted rules
requiring judges to attend special orientation and training sessions within
a certain period of time after appointment,1 22 and experimental attempts
118. See generally H. STUMPF, supra note 104.
119. See id. at 180, 218 (57.8% of justices on state high courts from 1961 to 1968 and 56% of
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1933 to 1981 had prior judicial experience). In 1977, 24%
of state trial judges had been promoted from the position of lower court judge. Id. at 184. From
President Johnson's term through President Reagan's first term, the proportion of district court
appointees with prior judicial experience ranged between 34 and 55%; and between 54 and 75% of
court of appeals appointees had had such experience. Id. at 199, 202.
120. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
121. J. VINcENT, G. MONTAGNIER & A. VARINARD, supra note 40, §§ 474-475.
122. In Minnesota, for example, the Supreme Court requires that all state judges complete 45
hours of approved judicial education coursework every three years (the same number of CLE credits
required of attorneys), and that all district court judges complete an approved sentencing institute
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are being made to adapt "hands on" trial advocacy training methodol-
ogy 23 to the training and improvement of judges.'24
Such training programs may be preferable to the French program,
which does not offer structured feedback or critique of simulated judicial
exercises. 2 ' Nonetheless, many other American jurisdictions still have
only minimal judicial training requirements; as a result, the quality of
their judges is only as good as their selection process. And the quality of
judges determines, in large measure, the quality ofjustice. This is partic-
ularly true in the trial courts, where many decisions are legally or practi-
cally nonappealable.' 26 Arguably, French judges need to be better
trained than ours due to their more active role at trial and during pretrial
investigation; still, it seems clear that American judges need more train-
ing than they have traditionally received.
III
SCOPE OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: VARIETIES OF
DECRIMINALIZATION
The quality of justice dispensed by police, prosecutors, judges, and
other officials is determined not only by the quality of these officials, but
also by the nature of the offenses that they must handle. A system that
must process large numbers of trivial, unpopular, difficult-to-enforce
laws will have fewer resources to devote to serious offenses against per-
sons and property. Accordingly, many observers of the American sys-
tem have argued for the repeal or narrowing of laws involving
during each term of office. In addition, within the first year after appointment or election all new
judges must complete an orientation course approved by the Office of Continuing Education for
State Court Personnel (for example, a three- or four-week course at the National Judicial College of
the University of Nevada at Reno). Supreme Court Administrative Policy No. 11, Policies
Regulating Continuing Education for Members of Minnesota's Judiciary (Oct. 11, 1979).
In the federal system, the training of judges and other court personnel is supervised by the
Federal Judicial Center, established in 1967. See H. STUMPF, supra note 104, at 144.
123. This usually consists of videotaped trial exercises with both self critique and professional
feedback.
124. Such a program was established at the University of Minnesota Law School in the spring of
1983, under the direction of Clinical Professor Stephen Simon, and has also been offered at the
National Judicial College at Reno. For a description of the training program at the University of
Minnesota, see Simon & Poritsky, Judicial Trial Skills Training, 37 J. LEGAL EDuc. 428 (1987).
125. See supra text accompanying note 93. I also doubt whether the French practice of
appointing judges at the outset of their legal careers could or should be adopted in the United States.
Indeed, some French observers have expressed a preference for the greater age, experience, and
prestige of American judges. See eg., Faut-ilfaire leprocdsdesjuges?, L'EXPRESS, Apr. 10, 1987, at
46, 50.
126. In criminal cases, of course, the appeal of most trial rulings adverse to the prosecution is
barred by double jeopardy rules. See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 24.1, 24.3 & 24.4 (1985). Defendants have broader legal appeal rights, but in practice trial judges
have broad discretion in many areas affecting the conduct of the trial. Even constitutional
requirements and standards of review leave room for considerable lower court discretion in making
critical factual determinations. See, eg., infra text accompanying notes 184-86 & 253.
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"victimless" crimes, 12 7 particularly the following: public drunkenness;
vagrancy; disorderly conduct; various sexual acts when occurring
between consenting adults (fornication, adultery, bigamy, incest, sod-
omy, homosexuality, and prostitution); obscenity; pornography; drug
offenses; abortion; gambling; and juvenile offenses that would not be
criminal if the actor were an adult.
In France, as a result of legislative and administrative decriminaliza-
tion and downgrading of offense severity, such problematic offenses
appear to play a much smaller role in the criminal justice system than
they do in the United States. The impact is particularly visible in the law
enforcement and court systems responsible for handling serious offenses
against persons and property.
There is some question whether the offenses listed above are all "vic-
timless" in any single sense of the word, or whether a workable definition
of this term could ever be devised. 128 The alternative concepts some-
times employed-"morals," "public order," "complaintless" or "consen-
sual" offenses-confront similar definitional problems. For present
purposes, however, it is sufficient to note that most of these offenses
(hereinafter "consensual offenses") share at least two of the following
three characteristics: (1) generally, police officers are the only com-
plaining parties; (2) the offense involves goods or services that are prohib-
ited but strongly desired by the participants, or acts over which the actor
has little control; and (3) the targeted individual harms or social dangers
are widely seen as not very serious, and not worth the cost of social
intervention. 129
Each of these three attributes causes major problems in administer-
ing criminal justice. The absence of complaining parties makes these
offenses difficult to detect and prosecute, and forces the police to use
methods of enforcement that are unpopular or susceptible to abuse. 130
Lack of visibility also permits discriminatory enforcement, bribery of offi-
cials, and extortion by such officials and thus leads to diminished public
respect for law enforcement. To the extent that the prohibited goods and
127. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIANS' GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 6
(1970); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 151 (1968); see also E. SCHUR,
CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS: DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY-ABORTION,
HOMOSEXUALITY, DRUG ADDICTION (1965).
128. Frase, Victimless Crime, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1608 (1983)
[hereinafter Frase, Victimless Crime]; see also E. SCHUR & H. BEDAU, VICTIMLESS CRIMES: Two
SIDES OF A CONTROVERSY 66-76 (1974); Oaks, The Popular Myth of the Victimless Crime, U. CHI.
LAW ALUMNI J. 3, 5 (1975). The various alternative criteria for making decisions about the scope of
the criminal law are discussed in Frase, Criminalization and Decriminalization, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 438 (1983).
129. See Frase, Victimless Crime, supra note 128, at 1608.
130. These methods might include intrusive searches, electronic surveillance, undercover agents
and informers, and decoys.
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services are strongly desired, or the prohibited acts are difficult for the
actor to control, violation rates remain high notwithstanding the risk of
criminal penalties. Finally, the enforcement of these laws diverts scarce
criminal justice resources from more serious offenses, overloads the
courts and other institutions of criminal justice, and leads to the wide-
spread use of procedural shortcuts--especially plea bargaining13 1-to
dispose of cases.
In light of these problems, it is important to examine both the theo-
retical and practical scope of the criminal law when comparing different
systems of criminal justice. As shown in the following table, the consen-
sual offenses listed above apparently play a much smaller role in the
French law enforcement and court systems responsible for handling
nonpetty crimes-felonies and delicts-than in comparable U.S. sys-
tems.132 In 1980 less than 6% of all persons charged by French police
with felonies and nontraffic delicts were charged with these crimes. In
the United States comparable offenses accounted for over 30% of all
arrests, notifications, or citations for nontraffic violations.
131. See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the
Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 931, 1012 (1983).
132. There are three grades of criminal offenses under French law: crimes, ddlits, and
contraventions (translated herein as "felonies," "delicts," and "contraventions," respectively).
Different trial courts-the assize, correctional, and police courts, respectively-have jurisdiction
over each, and more serious offenses are generally subject to more elaborate procedural safeguards.
Felonies are punishable by a maximum penalty of either life imprisonment or a prison term of five
years or more. Delicts are punishable by a prison term of more than two months but (with some
exceptions) not exceeding five years, or by a fine exceeding 10,000 francs (about $1,750 at the March
1990 exchange rate of 5.7 francs to the dollar). Contraventions are punishable by a fine of up to
10,000 francs and/or ajail term not exceeding two months. There are five classes of contraventions,
of which only the fourth and fifth are punishable by incarceration; the maximum lengths for those
classes are five days and one month, respectively, for first offenses. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM,
supra note 41, at 1-2.
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France1 3 3  U.S.
13 4
Offense % %
Offenses Against Public Authority 2.2 *
Public Indecency/Morals/Pornography 1.4 *
Drunkenness * 12.5
Disorderly Conduct * 8.5
Nonviolent Sex Offenses * 0.7
Curfew/Loitering * 0.8
Vagrancy/Begging 0.3 0.3
Prostitution-Related 0.2 1.0
Drug Offenses 1.6 6.4
Gambling 0.1 1.0
Subtotal 5.9%** 31.2%
Violent Offenses (including
Arson and Weapons) 9.3 12.8
Property Offenses 67.9 28.8
Other Specified Offenses (not
includable in above) 6.4 7.51 a5
Other, Unspecified Offenses 136  10.5 19.7
Total (%) 100.0% 100.0%
Total (number) 686,354 9,014,300
* No such offense specified in statistics for this country.
•* This subtotal differs from the sum of the component figures because the figures are
rounded off.
To some extent, these statistical differences reflect differences in the
relative numbers and types of crimes committed in each country, 137 but
133. These statistics are taken from LA CRIMINALrTt EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 60-61.
Since "arrest" as such is an exceptional measure-most defendants are simply sent a notice to appear
in court, see infra text accompanying notes 301-17-some other general measure of law enforcement
activity is needed. The closest analogue appears to be the data on the number of persons charged
(mise en cause) by the police, that is, "persons against whom sufficient evidence is uncovered, during
the course of official investigation, to permit the assumption that they are the perpetrators of or
accomplices to a felony or delict." LA CRIMINALITf EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 5.
There are no statistics on the number of persons charged by French police with contraventions,
but French police may charge many consensual crimes as contraventions. See infra text
accompanying note 147.
134. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATEs-1980, at 191 (U.S.G.P.O. 1981) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE U.S.-1980]. These
reports include no traffic offenses other than drunk driving, which has been excluded from the
present analysis since traffic offenses are not included in the cited French statistics.
135. Id. Most of these (5.1% of all non-traffic arrests) were for violations of "liquor laws." It is
not clear how the French deal with liquor violations, since they are not listed separately in the
statistics of persons charged by the police with felonies and delicts. Another 1.7% of American
arrests in 1980 were of "runaways." No such charge appears in French police statistics, and it is
unclear what role the police play in this area. Some have argued that all juvenile offenses which
would not be criminal if committed by an adult should be decriminalized. N. MORRIS & G.
HAWKINS, supra note 127, at 3, 146-56.
136. It seems likely that some of the persons in this category were charged with consensual
crimes. If we exclude all unspecified "other" offenses from the denominator-assuming, in effect,
that the offense mix in this category is similar to the mix among specified offenses-then the
proportions of persons charged with consensual crimes would be 6.5% for France, and 39.0% for
the United States.
137. This is probably particularly likely for drug offenses. However, see infra note 607.
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differences in criminal justice policy have also played an important role.
The French have deemphasized consensual crimes through a combina-
tion of legislative decriminalization, administrative decriminalization
(nonenforcement), legislative downgrading of offense severity, and
administrative downgrading of charges. Decriminalization completely
removes the offense from the criminal justice system; downgrading
allows the application of less expensive and time-consuming procedures
and reduces caseload pressures in the courts that handle serious criminal
offenses.
There are several examples of legislative decriminalization in
France: adult prostitution is not itself a crime, although pandering
38
and public solicitation 139 are; fornication and adultery1" are not crimes,
although bigamy still is;"a ' homosexual acts between adults in private are
not criminal;142 and some forms of gambling are prohibited, 143 but many
others are permitted. 1" As for legislative downgrading of offense sever-
ity, the most notable example was the 1959 decision to move a number of
offenses from the middle-level offense category (delicts) down to the least
serious offense category (contraventions).145 Before 1959, the legislature
also downgraded several offenses from felonies to delicts.1
46
138. See C. PEN. arts. 334 to 335.
139. See id. arts. R.34(13), R.40(l1). Article R.34(13) prohibits "passive soliciting," M.
VOUIN, DRorr PflNAL SPECIAL 233 (1976) ("an attitude on a public street of a nature'likely to
provoke debauchery"), which is a contravention of the third class (fine of 600 to 1,300 francs).
Article R.40( 1) prohibits "active soliciting," id at 231 ("those who by gestures, words, writing, or
other means publicly solicit persons of either sex, to commit debauchery"), which is a contravention
of the fifth class (fine of 2,500 to 5,000 francs and/or 10 days to one month in jail for a first offense).
140. Cf. C. PEN. arts. 336 to 339 (repealed 1975) (making fornication and adultery crimes).
141. C. PEN. art. 340.
142. Cf. id Article 330, paragraph 2 of the CODE P9NAL, defining the felony of public
homosexual conduct, was repealed in 1980. However, exposure and other forms of public indecent
conduct are still punishable under paragraph I of that article, and certain homosexual acts with
minors are punishable as delicts under C. PEN. arts. 331 and 331-1. Obscenity and pornography are
punished either as delicts, i d, arts. 283 to 290, or as a contravention of the fourth class (fine of 1,300
to 2,500 francs and/or up to five days in jail for a first offense). Id. arts. R.38(9), (10).
143. See id art. 410 (delict, punishable by up to six months in jail); id. art. R.30(5)
(contravention of the second class, punishable by a fine of 250 to 600 francs).
144. See, eg., provisions of the Decree of June 19, 1987, reprinted in C. PEN. (following art.
410) (establishing the procedure for authorization of lotteries).
145. 1 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, TRArrA DE DROIT CRIMINEL: PROBLtMES GfiNfRAUX DE LA
SCIENCE CRIMINELLE § 378, at 476 (5th ed. 1984); A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 81. For a
description of a similar legislative downgrading process in West Germany, see J. LANGBEIN, supra
note 7, at 92-96.
Included in the delict offenses downgraded in 1959 were minor assaults and active public
solicitation of prostitution. C. PEN. art. R.40(l), (11). Other examples of consensual crimes
chargeable only as contraventions include disturbing the peace, id art. R.34(8), "passive" public
solicitation of prostitution, iad art. R-34(13), see also supra note 139, brawling and other "light
violence," C. PEN. art. R.38(1), and first-time public drunkenness, id. app. at 842 (86e ed. Petits
Codes Dalloz 1988-89) (CODE DES DIfBrS DE BOISSONS ET DES MESURES CONTRE L'ALCOLISME
art. R.5).
146. Examples of crimes reclassified from felony to delict are abortion (1923); bigamy (1933);
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The decisions of police and prosecutorial authorities to decline or
downgrade charges probably have had an even greater quantitative
impact than the legislative decisions noted above. Several consensual
offenses are chargeable as either delicts or contraventions, 147 and the sta-
tistics previously cited suggest that delict charges are rare. Whether
these and other consensual crimes are often charged as contraventions,
or whether they are declined outright, is harder to say since there are
very few offense-specific statistics for contraventions. 48 As discussed
more fully in Parts VI a9 and VII,"5 ° French prosecutors often decline
prosecution, but it is not known how often this involves consensual
offenses.
However, even if large numbers of consensual offenses are not
declined but are instead prosecuted as contraventions, this does not rep-
resent a major drain on the resources of the French criminal justice sys-
tem. Persons charged with contraventions may neither be arrested nor
detained, but may only be issued a citation to appear in court.1 51 Gener-
ally, far fewer than one percent of contravention cases result in a custo-
dial sentence;, 52 such charges are usually disposed of by penal order or
preset fine schedule, without even a single court appearance. 5 3 In this
respect, the French police courts, which handle contraventions, 154 func-
tion much like the traffic law violations bureaus found in many American
municipal courts. Although the American bureaus have not been used to
process consensual crimes, this would be one way for Americans to bet-
ter manage such offenses. 5 This in turn would help us to improve the
bribery and misappropriation of public funds (1943); and forgery and fraudulent bankruptcy (1958).
2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1394. Abortion was partially decriminalized in 1975, and
further decriminalized in 1979. C. PEN. art. 317.
147. See C. PEN. app. at 838, 842 (86e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1988-89) (CODE DES DIBITS DE
BOISSONS ET DES MESURES CONTRE L'ALC6OLISME arts. L.65 (delict of third-offense public
drunkenness), R.4 & 5 (contravention, first or second offense)); see also supra notes 142 (obscenity
and pornography) & 143 (gambling).
148. The statistics on persons "charged by police," supra note 132, do not include those charged
with contraventions. Moreover, conviction statistics by offense are only available for the most
serious (that is, fifth class) contraventions and are not available for the years 1979 and 1980, see
supra note 39. For the years 1981 through 1984 combined, 2.8% of fifth class contravention
convictions were for the consensual crimes listed in the text, mostly soliciting prostitution, see supra
note 139. Additional consensual crimes may be included in the category of "other" offenses, which
accounted for 12.5% of fifth class contravention convictions in this four-year period. ANNUAIRE
STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 123.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 382-466.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 467-562.
151. See infra text accompanying note 310.
152. ANNUAIRE STATISTiQUE, supra note 39, at 123-25.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 551-56 & 587. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra
note 41, at 31.
154. See supra note 132.
155. The parallel between the French Police Court and an American Violations Bureau is
discussed more fully infra at text accompanying notes 558-62. See generally N. ABRAMS,
[Vol. 78:539
1990] COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
integrity of our criminal justice systems and deal more effectively with
serious crimes against persons and property. 156
IV
RESTRAINTS ON EVIDENCE GATHERING
It is commonly assumed that continental law enforcement authori-
ties are much freer than their American counterparts to gather and use
evidence of criminal offenses. 157 Some writers have argued that
American police should be given similarly broad powers so that they can
fight crime more effectively;158 we should, in other words, "take the
handcuffs off" of our police. Others believe that such powers would be
excessive and inconsistent with American ideals.159 But even if we are
unable or unwilling to give our police broader powers, the absence of
such powers could pose a significant barrier to American adoption of
other continental procedures that depend critically on a broad investiga-
tory power. For example, the greater powers of authorities working
within continental systems might help to explain why they have less need
for coercive plea bargaining than do U.S. authorities: When prosecutors
have mostly "dead bang" cases (with little risk of acquittal), they have
much less incentive to offer charge or sentencing leniency in return for
waiver of trial rights."6 Thus, whether or not one accepts the desirabil-
ity and feasibility of "de-handcuffing" American police, it is essential to
examine the extent to which continental investigative authorities really
do have broader powers than their American counterparts.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS ALTERNATIVES TO THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (1979) (suggesting switch
to civil administrative process enforcement for certain criminal offenses).
156. As shown in the table in the text, 77% of the persons charged by French police with non-
traffic felonies and delicts were charged with violent or property offenses, whereas such offenses
represented only about 42% of American arrests. The comparatively low proportion of consensual
crimes charged as felonies or delicts thus permits the French police and criminal court systems
responsible for non-petty offenses to concentrate more of their efforts on violent and property crimes.
157. See Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 7, at 506, 522; Tomlinson, supra note 5, at
182-83. These two articles deal with both the limits on law enforcement investigatory activity and
related exclusionary rules, and the general rules of trial evidence and procedure such as hearsay,
privilege, and impeachment. The remainder of this Part of the Article focuses on the former
category of evidentiary restrictions. General trial evidence and procedure rules are discussed in the
Appendix, infra text accompanying notes 703-36.
158. See, eg., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting absence of exclusionary rules in England and Canada); Schlesinger, supra note 2,
at 377-85 (expressing a preference for European rules encouraging defendants to testify before and at
trial). Ironically, others have suggested that American exclusionary rules should be cut back for the
opposite reason-because they are ignored by police and courts, thus breeding disrespect for the law.
M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 263-65.
159. Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 195.
160. Similarly, the more admissible evidence of guilt the prosecution has, the more it can afford
to allow broad pretrial discovery to the defense, with less fear that evidence-tampering or "tailoring"
of defense evidence will prevent conviction at trial. See infra text accompanying notes 669-77
(discussing French and American discovery rules).
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A. Overview of French Investigatory Powers and Exclusionary Rules
The French Code of Criminal Procedure permits four types of inves-
tigations: investigations of "flagrant" 6 ' offenses; "preliminary" investi-
gations; 162 identity checks; 163 and formal judicial investigation conducted
161. A "flagrant" felony or delict is one that is "in the process of being committed or which has
just been committed." Offenses may also be treated as flagrant at the request of the head of a
household in which the offense was committed, or "when, in the period immediately following the
act" a person "presents traces or indications leading to the belief" in his complicity. Proc. Code art.
53. In such cases, the Code permits Officers of the Judicial Police (as well as prosecutors and
examining magistrates, ide arts. 68, 72) to: (1) search the scene of the offense, and seize any evidence
found there, iad art. 54; (2) search the domiciles of all persons who appear to have participated in the
offense or to be in possession of evidence, and seize any evidence "useful to the manifestation of the
truth," ide art. 56; (3) designate experts to conduct scientific or technical examinations, id. art. 60;
(4) detain persons on the scene until completion of the investigation, id. art. 61; (5) summon (by
force, if necessary) and interrogate (not under oath) any persons capable of furnishing evidence, Id.
art. 62; and (6) place witnesses and suspects in investigatory detention (garde d vue) for up to 24
hours (which can be extended to 48 hours with the approval of the prosecuting attorney), id. art. 63.
Investigatory detention is frequently employed; it can also be invoked during a preliminary
investigation or a judicial investigation, see infra note 167. The total number of persons subject to
such detention in 1980 represented 38% of the total number of persons charged by police with
felonies or non-traffic delicts. If "bad check" cases are excluded, the proportion is 45%. LA
CRIMINALIrr EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 64. About one-seventh of all detainees were held for
more than 24 hours. Id.
162. Proc. Code arts. 75 to 78. These inquiries "constitute the only form of investigation used
in most cases involving traffic violations, contraventions, and nonflagrant delicts." FRENCri
SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 11. They are noncoercive procedures: Searches and seizures of evidence
may only be made with the express written consent of the person affected, and the police cannot
summon suspects and witnesses or detain persons at the scene. However, if a suspect or witness
"voluntarily" comes to the police station or is being held for some other reason, he or she can be
placed in investigatory detention for the same duration and be subject to the same procedural
protections applicable in a flagrant offense investigation. The prosecutor may use the results of a
preliminary investigation in deciding whether to request the opening of a judicial investigation, to
send the matter directly to police or correctional court, or to decline prosecution. Id. at 11-12.
163. Officers of the Judicial Police (and under their orders, Agents and Assistant Agents) may
demand identification from any person suspected of committing or attempting an offense, or
preparing to commit a felony or delict. Officers may also demand identification from one who is
likely to furnish information useful to an inquiry in a case of felony or delict, or who is a person
sought by order of a court. Identification may also be demanded "to prevent a breach of the public
order, particularly a violation of the security of persons and property." Proc. Code art. 78-2. If the
person refuses or is unable to furnish identification, he or she may be detained for up to four hours if
necessary to permit verification of his or her identity. Certain procedural protections apply to such
detentions, and to the creation of police records based on the incident. Id. art. 78-3; see infra text
accompanying note 215; see also infra note 351.
Although weapons frisks during an identity check are not specifically authorized, they were
common under prior laws and were upheld by the Court of Cassation. FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note
41, at 12.
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by an examining magistrate.' The Code stipulates the evidence-gather-
ing and arrest powers available under each type of investigation.'65 In
addition the Code defines, with varying degrees of specificity, when the
failure to comply with these rules will lead to exclusion of the evidence
obtained.166
At first glance, these provisions do appear to give French law
enforcement authorities much broader powers than are enjoyed by police
and prosecutors in the United States. French search and seizure powers
are indeed broader in several respects: First, there is no general legal
requirement of probable cause to search, arrest, or detain.' 67  Second,
there is no general judicial warrant requirement for search or arrest. 168
Finally, identity checks need not always be based on individualized suspi-
cion, and detention for identification purposes may last for up to four
hours. Moreover, there is no separate "articulable suspicion of danger"
164. Proc. Code arts. 79 to 190. A judicial investigation (instruction) is required only when the
prosecution wishes to charge a felony. Use of the instruction in contravention cases is very rare. Its
use in delict cases is a little more common; in recent years, less than 10% of delicts tried in
correctional court have been preceded by an instruction. An instruction is only used when further
investigation is needed, when the case is politically sensitive, or when there is a need for an arrest
warrant, pretrial detention, or pretrial supervision. FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 12-13.
The judge has broad power to issue arrest and detention orders, conduct searches, question
witnesses and suspects, and undertake other acts of investigation. Id. at 13-15. Most of these
powers may also be delegated to other judges, or to Officers of the Judicial Police, by "rogatory
commissions." Proc. Code art. 151. The right to counsel and warnings of the right to remain silent
are required only for those persons as to whom there exist "grave and concordant indications of
guilt." Proc. Code arts. 104, 105, 114; see also FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 14-15.
165. FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 8-16.
166. Id.
167. However, the opening of a flagrant offense inquiry requires objective signs (indices
apparents) that an offense has occurred and is still "flagrant." See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41,
at 9 n.59. Moreover, the decision to renew (extend) the garde d vue during the course of a flagrant
offense investigation requires "grave and concordant indications of such a nature as to substantiate
charges against [the suspect]." Proc. Code art. 63[2], [3].
In contrast, the following procedures apparently require no particular suspicion or justification:
the first 24 hours of detention in garde d vue, Proc. Code arts. 63[1], 77; renewal of the garde d vue
during a preliminary investigation, 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1086; searches carried
out during a flagrant offense inquiry, Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 185-88; searches, arrests, and
detentions carried out directly by the examining magistrate, or by means of a rogatory commission,
FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 13-15; and the temporary, pre-arraignment detention permitted
under the immediate appearance procedure, see infra note 301 and text accompanying notes 316-17.
168. The closest counterpart to the Anglo-American search warrant is the rogatory
commission. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 14-15; see also supra note 164. However, the
search powers thus delegated are apparently limited neither by "particularity" nor "staleness" rules.
FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 14 (examining magistrate has almost complete discretion).
Arrest warrants are sometimes issued by examining magistrates in the course of a judicial
investigation. Id at 15. Even without an arrest warrant, however, Officers of the Judicial Police
who are executing a rogatory commission may hold suspects in investigatory detention for up to 24
hours without judicial approval. Proc. Code art. 154[3].
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requirement for accompanying weapons frisks.16 9 Police powers to inter-
rogate are broader because there is no general Miranda rule, 170 and
defendants may be held in investigatory detention (garde d vue) for up to
forty-eight hours without probable cause, judicial approval, or
mandatory court appearance.1 71 Pretrial line-ups are not protected by a
right-to-counsel rule.
172
Furthermore, although the Procedure Code does provide important
safeguards for many of these investigatory procedures, the exclusionary
remedies to enforce these safeguards are quite narrow." Finally,
Officers of the Judicial Police (OJ'Ps) directing the investigation of "fla-
grant" offenses have several other important powers not expressly
granted to American police: They may detain any person on the scene,
summon witnesses to testify (not under oath), and designate expert wit-
nesses to conduct scientific or technical examinations. 74
This is indeed a formidable array of investigatory powers, strongly
suggesting that American law enforcement authorities are, relatively
speaking, "handcuffed" by limited authority and strict exclusionary
rules. The discussion below will attempt to demonstrate, however, that
American police can and do exercise most of the powers listed above and
that the evidentiary fruits are usually admissible under one theory or
another. The discussion also notes important French safeguards lacking
in the United States, and concludes with a comparison of arrest and con-
iction rates in France and the United States. It may still be true that
French authorities have more power than their American counterparts,
and that French citizens have fewer rights. Subject to further research,
however, we must no longer simply assume that the American system
protects individual rights and limits investigative authority more than
the French system does, nor that the French system is significantly more
successful at catching and convicting offenders.
B. Comparison of American Police Powers and Exclusionary Rules
Contrary to the assumptions of both liberal and conservative critics,
American police powers are, in practice and even in theory, almost as
broad as those enjoyed by French investigating authorities. This is true
because our substantive constitutional rights rarely apply or are easily
avoided by the police, and because the exclusionary remedy is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. To readers who regularly teach or write in the
169. See supra note 163.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 222-23.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 241-44.
172. See Judgment of July 8, 1959, Bull. Crim. No. 347; Judgment of October 21, 1975, Bull.
Crim. No. 221; L. LAMBERT, FORMULAIRE DES OFFICIERS DE POLICE JUDICIAIRE 180 (1979).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 254-56.
174. See supra note 161.
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area of constitutional criminal procedure, the specific American rules
summarized below will seem very familiar, but it is also important to
consider the cumulative impact of all these rules: To a very great extent,
the American police, like their French counterparts, can do whatever
they want to do.
L Probable Cause Requirements
Although probable cause is a presumptive fourth amendment
requirement to arrest, search, or detain someone, 175 there are numerous
exceptions to this rule. To begin with, most searches occur either inci-
dent to an arrest or by consent of the arrestee. 176 The former situation
requires arrest but not "search" probable cause; the latter requires
neither.1 77 Moreover, the power to search incident to arrest continues
for some period of time after arrest, at least with respect to the person
and clothing of the arrestee.1 17 An even broader search without probable
cause is permitted when an arrestee is booked into jail.179 If the search
involves the arrest of a person in a car, the searchable area is deemed to
include the entire passenger compartment and any containers found
therein.18 0 If the police validly impound a car (whether occupied or
unoccupied), they may routinely examine and take an inventory of the
entire contents of the car, including any closed compartments and lug-
gage therein.18 1 Cars may also be stopped at roadblocks set up at or near
175. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 3.3(a).
176. Van Duizend, Sutton & Carter, A Review of the Search Warrant Process, 8 STATE Cr. J. 4,
6 (1984). This study also suggests that "consent is the easiest thing in the world to obtain... you
just make an offer that cannot be refused." As one officer put it:
[You] tell the guy, "Let me come in and take a look at your house." And he says, "No, I
don't want to." And then you tell him, "Then, I'm going to leave Sam here, and he's going
to live with you until we come back [with a search warrant]. Now we can do it either
way." And very rarely do the people say, "Go get your search warrant, then."
Id. at 6. One might add that such "offers" are particularly irresistible when made to a nonsuspect
who has sufficient "joint access or control" over the premises to give valid "third-party" consent.
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974) (cohabitants assume the risk that any one
among them might permit search of common areas).
177. Search incident to arrest requires a valid custodial arrest based on probable cause, but
police may search the arrestee and the area of the arrestee's "immediate control" without
independent probable cause to search. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (search
of the arrestee); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (establishing "immediate control"
test). "Voluntary" consent, by the defendant or a third party, avoids both probable cause and
warrant requirements. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
178. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974) (person arrested at night and searched the
following morning).
179. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (inventory search of arrestee's shoulder bag).
180. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
181. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory of contents of closed containers found
in vehicle of drunk-driving arrestee); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory
search of car impounded for parking violations).
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international borders.182 Roadblocks far from any border have also been
upheld when used to enforce driver's license or drunk-driving laws.18 3
Even where the probable cause requirement applies-for example,
search of a private residence, office, or motor vehicle-the standard is not
very strict. In recent years the Supreme Court has substantially relaxed
the requirements of probable cause based on information from anony-
mous informants, 184 and has also held that evidence need not be sup-
pressed when it is obtained in reasonable reliance on a warrant
subsequently found to be defective because of a prior incorrect determi-
nation of probable cause. 85 Read together, these two rulings have ren-
dered most magisterial findings of probable cause practically
unreviewable. 186
2. Warrant Requirements for Arrests and Searches
The fourth amendment also imposes a presumptive judicial warrant
requirement for arrest, search, or detention, 87 but here again there are
many exceptions, and most searches and arrests in fact are conducted
without a warrant.18  The broad French provision for warrantless search
and detention in "flagrant" cases has much in common with the
American "hot pursuit" and "exigent circumstances" exceptions to the
warrant requirement.1 89 The latter exceptions apply in many recent-
182. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (checkpoint 66 miles north
of U.S.-Mexico border).
183. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (driver's license checkpoint); State v. Deskins, 234
Kan. 529, 673 P.2d 1174 (1983) (drunk-driving roadblock).
184. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (abandoning the "two-pronged" standard of
probable cause requiring evidence of informant's veracity and basis of knowledge, and upholding
search warrant based largely on anonymous telephone tip under a more flexible "totality of the
circumstances" test).
The French supreme judicial court (Cour de cassation) recently held that an anonymous
telephone call does not provide sufficient basis (indices apparents) to invoke the "flagrant offense"
doctrine described supra notes 161 & 167. See Judgment of Feb. 2, 1988, Bull. Crim. No. 52, at 142-
45.
185. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
186. One might argue that this is no change. See Frase, Criminal Procedure in a Conservative
Age: A Time to Rediscover the Critical Nonconstitutional Issues, 36 J. LEGAL EDUc. 79, 82 n.10
(1986) (probable cause is too fact-dependent to yield enforceable legal rules; in addition, the two-
pronged standard abandoned in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), had already been undercut by
the decision in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), giving trial courts broad discretion to deny
disclosure of the informant's identity).
187. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965).
188. See Van Duizend, Sutton & Carter, supra note 176, at 6. Even when warrants are
obtained, the haste and superficiality of these ex parte proceedings substantially limit their value.
See Goldstein, The Search Warrant, the Magistrate, and Judicial Review, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1173,
1182-83 (1987) (1983 study found many proceedings lasted "only two to three minutes" and police
often sought judges who would give application minimal scrutiny).
189. See generally Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless entry to arrest armed
robbery suspect).
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crime cases, which the French would consider "flagrant." In addition,
the American warrant exceptions apply to some offenses that are no
longer "flagrant" (for example, when exigent or "hot pursuit" entry is
based on a recent tip in an old case). American law enforcement officers
may also make warrantless arrests of any person found in a public place
if the arrest is based upon probable cause. 190 Detention may then con-
tinue for at least several hours-sometimes for several days-without
judicial approval,' 91 and the required judicial approval for further deten-
tion may be obtained in an informal ex parte hearing, 192 in most cases
based solely on hearsay and written testimony.193
As for searches, a number of exceptions apply. Any motor vehicle
found in a public place may be searched on probable cause alone without
a warrant, and certain containers found inside may also be searched.
194
If the vehicle is impounded, an inventory search may be done without a
warrant.' 95 When the arrest is properly made without a warrant, all
searches incident to that arrest do not require a warrant.' 96 Even where
an arrest warrant is obtained, it need not specifically authorize the search
incident to arrest.' 97 Other exceptions to the search warrant requirement
include jail booking searches, 98 "frisks" in the course of investigatory
stops, 199 various "administrative" searches (such as roadblocks, regula-
tory inspections, and school and workplace searches),2 " and consensual
searches.2° '
Where search warrants are required-for example, for residential20 2
and private office searches2° 3-the particularity and staleness limitations
imposed by American law may grant greater protection to citizens.
190. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrest in a restaurant by postal
inspector).
191. See infra text accompanying note 248.
192. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (probable cause determination required for
extended detention after arrest).
193. Id. at 120.
194. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (probable cause to search vehicle allows police
to search any container which might contain object of search); see also California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386 (1985) (warrantless search of mobile home in public parking lot permitted); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search also permitted after car and its occupants have
been taken to police station).
195. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
196. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
197. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (valid custodial arrest permits search
of arrestee).
198. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
199. See W. LAFAVE & I. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 3.8.
200. Id. § 3.9.
201. Id. § 3.10.
202. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (invalidating warrantless entry and search
of a house).
203. See, e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (invalidating warrantless entry and
search of an office).
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However, the contrast with French law should not be overstated.
American police may rely on a warrant that fails to describe with partic-
ularity the things to be seized, unless the defect would have been appar-
ent to a reasonably well-trained officer. 2" The staleness rule-requiring
that a search warrant be executed within a certain number of days2 5-
seems preferable to the rogatory commission procedure, which is the
French equivalent to American warrant procedure and sets no time limit.
But the fact that the latter can only be executed by an OJP or by another
judge20 6 may serve to reduce the number of unreasonably stale searches.
French law also imposes a number of other procedural requirements
unknown in the United States. In particular, most residential searches
must be witnessed by a resident or by two persons not subject to the
administrative authority of the searching official, who must read and sign
the official report of the operation.2 °7
3. Stop and Frisk Rules
The French identity check procedure has much in common with the
American "stop and frisk" doctrine-both are aimed at preventing, as
well as detecting, crime-but the French procedure at first glance
appears to give the police broader powers. French law does not always
require individualized suspicion for preventive stops, 20 8 nor is any suspi-
cion of danger required for accompanying weapons frisks,20 9 and French
stops may last longer (up to four hours).210
Once again, however, we must ask whether American law actually
204. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984). In an earlier case, the Supreme Court
had held that the particularity requirement was satisfied by a warrant specifying certain items
"together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown."
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479-82 (1976).
205. See, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(l); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.15 (West Supp. 1990).
206. Proc. Code art. 151[l].
207. See id arts. 56 to 57.
208. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (requiring particularized suspicion for a stop and
weapons frisk).
Between 1983 and 1986, the French Procedure Code required all identity checks to be based
either on individualized suspicion or on some immediate threat to public safety in the area.
Accordingly, the Court of Cassation invalidated a stop based on general frequency of crime in the
area (subway stations). Judgment of Oct. 4, 1984, Bull. Crim. No. 287, at 767-69. See generally J.
PRADEL, supra note 40, § 307. But in 1986 the Code was changed to allow identity checks "to
prevent a breach of the public order, particularly a violation of the security of persons and
property." Proc. Code art. 78-2[2]. This change was specifically intended to eliminate the
requirement of any "immediate" (in space or time) threat to public safety. See Ministare de la
Justice, Circulaire of Sept. 10, 1986, 1986 RECEUIL DALLOZ-SIREY, Ldgislation [D.S.L.] 487.
209. See supra note 163.
210. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to impose any specific maximum time limit on
an investigative stop, but the Court has invalidated the detention of a traveler's luggage for 90
minutes. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); cf MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIONMENT
PROCEDURE, supra note 57, § 110.2(1) (recommending a maximum length of 20 minutes). In Place,
the Court "question[ed] the wisdom of a rigid time limitation." 462 U.S. at 709 n.10.
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provides suspects with significantly greater protection. American cases
invalidating an investigatory stop are rare,2 1' and courts increasingly
avoid even the minimal "articulable suspicion" requirements by holding
that no forcible "stop" occurred at all.212 American cases invalidating
frisks are almost as rare as cases invalidating stops, 213 and the permissi-
ble scope of the frisk appears to be expanding.
214
Moreover, French identity checks are more limited in several other
respects than American investigatory stops. 21 '5 First, French suspects
may only be detained for the time "strictly required" to establish their
identity.216 Second, the procedure may not apply to persons preparing to
commit, or possessing evidence relevant to commission of, a contraven-
tion.21 ' Third, an identity check must be authorized by an OP.2 18
Fourth, French suspects who have been stopped cannot be held incom-
municado.21 Finally, there are limitations on the taking of photographs
and fingerprints and on the creation of permanent police records of the
encounter.22 o
4. Miranda Rights During Police Interrogation
Although some French suspects do have Miranda-like rights22' to
211. This is especially true in the case of traffic stops. See People v. Ingel, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420,
330 N.E.2d 39, 44, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 74 (1975) (required basis for traffic stop is "minimal. An actual
violation of [traffic laws] need not be detectable.... All that is required is that the stop be not the
product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.").
212. See, eg., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (no stop occurred when INS agents entered
factory and questioned employees about their citizenship while other agents remained stationed near
exits).
213. See, eg., State v. Gobely, 366 N.W.2d 600 (Minn.) (upholding frisk of a person entering an
apartment being searched who refused to identify himself, tried to leave, was "obviously" acquainted
with at least one of known suspects, and "could" have been one of the armed robbery suspects not
yet identified), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 922 (1985). But see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (no
basis to frisk patrons of bar being searched for evidence of drug sales).
214. See, eg., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (after stop of suspect believed to be
dangerous, police could search passenger compartment of his automobile for places where a weapon
might be hidden, even though suspect had stepped out of the vehicle).
215. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 12.
216. See Proc. Code art. 78-3[3].
217. See id. art. 78-2[1]. However, it is possible that article 78-2[2] of the Procedure Code,
discussed at supra note 208, will be interpreted broadly to allow identity checks intended to prevent
"public order" offenses which are only contraventions (for example, disturbing the peace, or
solicitation of prostitution, see supra note 145). On the other hand, the last clause of this provision,
referring to "security of persons and property," suggests that nonviolent breaches of public order
may not be covered.
218. Proc. Code art. 78-2[l].
219. Id. art. 78-3[l].
220. Id. art. 78-3[l], [5].
221. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to inform arrestees of their fifth
amendment rights, including their right to presence of counsel during custodial interrogation).
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
counsel and silence warnings during interrogation by the examining mag-
istrate,222 no such rights apply during police interrogations, which are
much more frequent.223 On the other hand, French defendants have the
right, in theory at least, to withdraw any pretrial confession given to the
police or examining magistrate prior to or at the time of trial.224 In addi-
tion, certain procedural protections applicable to French police interro-
gations are not required by American constitutional law or by local rules
and statutes in most jurisdictions: in France the investigatory detention
records must note the dates and times of interrogation, rest, and release,
and they must also document that the suspect was advised after twenty-
four hours of his or her right to a medical examination. 225 These records
must also be shown to the suspect and signed by him or her.226
Furthermore, there is some question regarding how useful the
broader Miranda right is to most American defendants. The available
empirical evidence suggests that Miranda warnings are often not fully
given to suspects in custody,227 and that they are frequently misunder-
stood when given.22' The evidence also suggests that the right to counsel
is rarely invoked, 229 and that suspects continue to confess almost as fre-
quently as they did before Miranda was decided. 230 However, it is possi-
ble that these studies were conducted too soon after the Miranda
decision to fully reflect police assimilation of, and compliance with, that
ruling.
On the other hand, more recent decisions of the Supreme Court
222. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 14-15 (warnings must be given to suspects as to
whom there exist "grave and concordant indications of guilt").
223. In 1980, 262,289 persons were held by police in investigatory detention. LA CRIMINALITA
EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 64. Only about 66,000 criminal matters were referred to examining
magistrates in that year. ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 107.
224. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 976. These authors also state, however, that trial
judges remain free to consider the validity of the retraction, applying the same broad discretion
applied in weighing the confession itself. Id.
225. Proc. Code arts. 64 to 65. See generally FRENCH SYsrEM, supra note 41, at 10 (citing
examples of procedural safeguards).
226. Proc. Code art. 64[2].
227. The best known studies include the following: Note, Interrogations in New Haven: The
Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1550-52 (1967) (empirical study of practices in New Haven
police station pre/post Miranda); Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our
Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1362-64 (1968)
(empirical study of pre/post Miranda conduct in the District of Columbia). But cf Leiken, Police
Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DEN. L.J. 1, 10 (1970) (Denver
County Jail study found warnings always given).
228. Griffith & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Protesters, 77
YALE L.J. 300, 310-11 (1967) (interviews with arrested divinity students); Leiken, supra note 227, at
15-18; Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 227, at 1372-75.
229. Griffith & Ayres, supra note 228, at 310-11; Leiken, supra note 227, at 27; Medalie, Zeitz
& Alexander, supra note 227, at 1352 nn. 21-23, 1372 table 8.
230. Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, supra note 227, at 1352 n.20. But see Seeburger & Wettick,
Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1967).
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have substantially undercut Miranda itself. Thus, statements obtained in
violation of the Miranda rules are admissible for impeachment of the
defendant if he or she testifies.23 This highly foreseeable and valuable
use therefore gives the police considerable incentive to omit Miranda
warnings altogether.232 Moreover, recent cases narrowing the scope of
suppressible "fruits" of Miranda violations give the police much more
reason to hope that unwarned statements will lead to evidence admissible
in the case-in-chief.233 Finally, even if no statement is obtained, omission
of the warnings allows a defendant's silence to be used to impeach his or
her testimony at trial.23 In short, it appears that the post-Miranda case
law strongly encourages police to omit the warnings in exactly those
cases where such warnings would be most likely to prevent a suspect
from making an incriminating statement.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has continued to limit
Miranda's scope. Thus, warnings are not required prior to interrogation
of a suspect who "voluntarily" comes to the police station at the request
of police and is consequently not considered to be in custody.235 The
requirement of "interrogation" is not met when a suspect in custody
"volunteers" a statement in response to booking, other routine police
activity, or "subtle compulsion." '236 It is true that Miranda has now been
supplemented by the sixth amendment right-to-counsel theory first
applied in Massiah v. United States, 237 and that this protection, where
231. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (interrogation improperly continued after
warnings given and suspect asked for a lawyer); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)
(defective Miranda warnings).
232. Similarly, if warnings are given and the suspect requests counsel, the police have nothing to
lose and much to gain by continuing to press for a statement. See Hass, 420 U.S. at 725 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
233. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (second, warned statement obtained
approximately one hour after unwarned statement not necessarily suppressible fruit if neither
statement shown to be involuntary; lower court and dissenters noted that suspects are very likely to
confess again, once "the cat is out of the bag." Id. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting)); see also New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) ("public safety" exception to Miranda). Justice O'Connor's
concurring and dissenting opinion in Quarles goes even further, arguing that physical evidence
obtained as a result of a voluntary, but unwarned, statement should always be admissible, even
where the statement itself is inadmissible. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660.
234. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam) (permitting impeachment use of
post-arrest silence when no Miranda warnings were given); cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619
(1976) (impeachment use of silence impermissible when silence followed giving of Miranda
warnings).
235. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (parolee who agreed to meet police officer
at the state patrol office near the parolee's apartment was not in custody); see also Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-40 (1984) (roadside questioning during "ordinary traffic stop" is not
custodial); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 433-34 (1984) (probationer required to meet with
probation officer was not in custody during such meeting); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341,
347 (1976) (suspect who was clearly the focus of a criminal investigation by tax agents was not "in
custody" when interrogated in a private home where he occasionally stayed).
236. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 303 (1980).
237. 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (use of "wired" informant treated as post-arrest interrogation without
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applicable, may be more successful at preventing suspects from making
self-incriminating statements to police.2 38  However, the Massiah doc-
trine applies only after the defendant has been charged or has appeared
in court,239 whereas most police interrogation takes place at earlier
stages.24°
Apart from Miranda guarantees and their relative ineffectiveness, it
might be argued that the French police have greater power to obtain
admissible statements because of their broad powers to seize and interro-
gate suspects without any showing of probable cause, and because there
is no requirement for judicial review of the detention or even judicial
advice of rights and appointment of counsel. The investigatory detention
(garde d vue) procedure, applicable primarily in the investigation of "fla-
grant" felonies and delicts, permits OJPs to seize, detain, and interrogate
suspects for up to twenty-four hours (or forty-eight hours with the
approval of the prosecutor).24 1 In the United States, suspects may not be
held this long unless the police had probable cause to arrest.24 2 In addi-
tion, state and federal rules of procedure require that arrested defendants
counsel). This doctrine was resurrected in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (emotional
appeal by police which elicited statement violated right to counsel), and was extended further in
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (use of "jail plant" informant violated right to
counsel). But see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (jail plant's "merely listening"
does not trigger Massiah protections).
238. Although some lower courts had held that waivers of the Mussiah right should be judged
by stricter standards than waivers of Miranda rights, see, eg., United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d
1140, 1153 (2d Cir. 1980) (dictum) (waiver ineffective unless judicial officer has given explanation of
Massiah right's significance), the Supreme Court has now held that Miranda warnings generally
suffice for waiver of both rights, Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-300 (1988). However, the
Court indicated that there are still some cases where a waiver valid for Miranda purposes will not be
valid under Massiah. Id. at 296 n.9 (sixth amendment protection of attorney-client relationship
extends beyond Miranda's fifth amendment right to counsel).
239. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). The Court suggested
that such procedures include "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment." Id. at 689; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977) (Massiah right
applied where arrest warrant had been issued and defendant had been arraigned on the warrant).
The Brewer Court cited Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), which held that the analogous Wade-
Gilbert right to counsel at lineups "attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated . .. whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment." Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-89.
240. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 1.4(e) (noting that questioning of suspect,
while rare, generally takes place after arrest and booking and before charging and arraignment in
court). Indeed, interrogation occurs at this early stage almost by definition, since it is often
necessary to question the suspect before a charging decision can be made. Similar reasons appear to
explain the early timing of most identification procedures. See infra note 252 and accompanying
text.
241. See supra note 161.
242. A prolonged Terry stop will be treated as a de facto arrest which is invalid if the police lack
probable cause. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 3.8(b). Any confession obtained as a
result of such an invalid arrest may be suppressible, even if Miranda warning and waiver
requirements have been met. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604-05 (1975).
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be arraigned in court "without unnecessary delay,"243 and arrests require
judicial review of probable cause prior to extended pretrial detention. 2'
However, each of these American requirements is subject to impor-
tant limitations and exceptions. The standard of probable cause has
become less strict in recent years.245 Furthermore, if the police can show
that a subsequent interrogation was sufficiently "attenuated" from the
illegal arrest that led to detention, the fact that an arrest was conducted
without probable cause will not result in exclusion.246 The requirement
that arraignment proceed "without unnecessary delay" still allows sub-
stantial periods of prearraignment interrogation.247 Similarly, the consti-
tutionally required judicial review of probable cause may take place
several days after arrest,248 and such hearings may be held ex parte, with
no need for counsel or other adversary procedures.249
5. Right to Counsel at Line-Ups
Pretrial line-ups in France, whether conducted by the police or the
examining magistrate, are not protected by the right-to-counsel require-
ment recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark Wade and
243. See, eg., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.02 (person arrested on a warrant shall be taken "promptly
before the court that issued the warrant if it is in session," and otherwise shall be brought before
another judge of such court "without unnecessary delay"); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02(5)(1) (discussed
at infra note 247); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) (person arrested with or without a warrant shall be
taken "without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistrate" or other
authorized judicial officer); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451-53 (1957) (applying rule 5(a)
to exclude confession obtained as result of unnecessary delay in taking suspect before magistrate).
244. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 184-86.
246. See, eg., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106-10 (1980) (arguably illegal detention did
not taint confession obtained 45 minutes later, where defendant had received Miranda warnings, the
detention was accompanied by a "congenial atmosphere," defendant's admissions were "apparently
spontaneous reactions" to police discovery of his drugs in his girlfriend's purse, and any illegality in
the detention did not "rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct").
247. See, eg., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02(5)(1) (requiring that person arrested without a warrant
be taken to court in the county where the offense occurred "without unnecessary delay, and in any
event, not more than 36 hours after the arrest, exclusive of the day of arrest, Sundays, and legal
holidays, or as soon thereafter as such judge or judicial officer is available"). If read broadly, this
rule would often allow court appearance to be delayed for several days (for example, from Friday
afternoon to noon on Monday); if read narrowly, the rule would require appearance, where feasible,
in less than 36 hours, and the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated in dicta that statements obtained
during such "unnecessary" delays might be excludable. See State v. Wiberg, 296 N.W.2d 388, 391-
93 (Minn. 1980) (arraignment after two and one-half days in custody held to constitute unnecessary
delay). Under FED. R. CRiM. P. 5(a), which contains only the general "unnecessary delay"
language, it appears that confessions obtained within 6 to 24 hours of the start of federal custody are
generally admissible if they are voluntary and Miranda compliant. 8 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5.02[6] (2d ed. 1989).
248. See Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 386-87 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding 72-hour delay
between arrest and Gerstein (probable cause) hearing).
249. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120-23 (1975).
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Gilbert cases.2" ° However, the American right to counsel only applies
after the commencement of "adversary judicial proceedings" against the
defendant,251 and most police line-ups are conducted before this point.
Line-ups before the right to counsel attaches are necessary almost by def-
inition, since it is often only on the basis of the line-up that a decision to
commence judicial proceedings can be made.252 In any case, police and
prosecutors have considerable incentive to time the line-up, charging,
and arraignment procedures in order to eliminate the counsel require-
ment. Even where the narrow Wade right to counsel applies, it does not
appear to be strictly enforced: Courts have "readily avoided reversing
convictions by stretching, often beyond reason and logic, the doctrines of
independent source and harmless error." '253 As discussed more fully
below, lax enforcement is a general problem not limited to line-ups.
6. Exclusionary Rules
Even if substantive rights related to search and seizure, interroga-
tion, and line-ups are not really very different under French and
American law, it might be argued that French rights are worthless
because of the narrow scope of exclusionary remedies available in that
country.254 Moreover, although some American observers have sug-
gested that French rights are effectively enforced by means of administra-
tive discipline,25 the French themselves are skeptical of such remedies:
"[E]xperience proves that the sole ordinary sanction is exclusion. '256
250. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (establishing right to counsel at post-
indictment line-up); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-74 (1967) (requiring exclusion of in-
court testimony concerning prior line-up identifications where line-up violated accused's right to
presence of counsel at line-up).
251. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
252. See Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69
MINN. L. REv. 141, 210-12 (1984), and authorities cited therein.
253. Grano, Kirby, Biggers & Ash, Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the
Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 717, 722 (1974) (criticizing weakening of
right-to-counsel doctrine and suggesting reform).
254. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 4, 16. The Procedure Code contains only a few
explicit exclusionary rules, which apply primarily to judicial investigations and certain police
searches. Thus, most violations give rise to exclusion only if they are found to have violated
"substantial" provisions of the Code, especially "the rights of the defense" (a vaguely defined group
of procedural guarantees, often not based on any particular Code provision, which are deemed to be
implicit in principles of justice and equity). Violations of the latter type do not necessarily lead to
exclusion of evidentiary "fruits," and violations of either type usually require a showing of prejudice
to the defendant's interests. Finally, lower courts have limited authority to exclude evidence. Id.;
see also 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, §§ 1271-1281; Pakter, supra note 8, at 8-15, 24-29,
33-38, 52 (noting lack of French exclusionary rule for due process violations and noting increase of
exclusion in search and seizure cases).
255. See, eg., Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1555.
256. See 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrri, supra note 40, § 1272, at 541 n.2 (further noting that "it is
unfortunate that, at least in serious cases, personal penalties are not imposed [on transgressors]");
accord J.-C. SOYER, MANUEL DE DROIT P9NAL ET PROCEDURE PfNALE 285 (6th ed. 1984)
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Because there are now so many exceptions and limitations to the
American exclusionary rules, one could argue that the rules have little
impact on police behavior. To begin with, strict standing requirements
prevent defendants from objecting to even outrageous violations of
another person's rights.25 7 Moreover, even where the defendant's own
fourth, fifth, or sixth amendment rights are violated, the prosecution may
still introduce derivative "fruits" of the violation: (1) if there is sufficient
"attenuation" of the causal link between the illegality and the fruits;
25 8
(2) if the fruits have a legal "independent source";259 or (3) if the prose-
cution successfully argues that the fruits would have been "inevitably"
discovered by lawful means.2 Furthermore, the defendant him- or her-
self is never a suppressible "fruit '261 no matter how illegal the arrest:
only physical or other evidence derived from the arrest is suppressible.
Any constitutional illegality must also be shown to be the product of
"state action. '2 62  Thus, the prosecution may make use of evidence
obtained by private parties who have conducted searches and seizures
without a warrant or probable cause, or who have interrogated the
defendant in the absence of counsel. Furthermore, evidence illegally
obtained by the police is almost always admissible to impeach the defend-
ant's testimony at trial, 63 and may be almost as useful to the prosecution
in this supposedly limited use-or as a means of keeping the defendant
(discussing nullification as a remedy for unorthodox or improper acts during adjudication); see also
J. PRADEL, supra note 40, § 464 ("the most effective sanction is [not disciplinary but] procedural:
exclusion").
257. See, ag., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (ownership of drugs seized from
companion's purse not sufficient basis to challenge search of purse); United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant lacked standing to object to government use of illegal search of third
party's briefcase); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (passenger of car lacks standing to object to
search of car); United States v. Underwood, 717 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendant, who had no
expectation of privacy in third party's home, could not object to lack of search warrant when police
entered home and arrested him).
258. See, eg., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1978) (testimony of witness first
questioned by the police because of an illegal search need not be suppressed); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (connection between defendant's confession and his prior illegal
arrest was sufficiently attenuated, in light of defendant's release from custody and voluntary return
to meet with police several days later).
259. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (dictum); see also
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471-74 (1980) (in-court identification of robbery defendant not
suppressible fruit of defendant's illegal detention, although preliminary identification by victim was
based on photograph taken during illegal detention).
260. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984) (body located using information illegally
obtained from suspect was admissible since search parties were close to body's location and thus
would have discovered it anyway).
261. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980).
262. See, eg., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475-76 (1921) (no governmental action
where search conducted by agents of defendant's employer).
263. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980) (illegally seized evidence admissible for
impeachment, even though defendant did not clearly contradict that evidence until prosecutor
brought it up during cross-examination); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (Miranda
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off the stand-as it would be if introduced in the case-in-chief. The
"good faith" exception to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule allows
evidence to be admitted whenever the police have "reasonably" relied on
a statute or on a search or arrest warrant.2" If all else fails, courts are
inclined to find that any improper evidence was harmless error,265 pro-
vided-as is usually the case-that there is other substantial evidence of
guilt.
The results of recent empirical studies of the implementation of
exclusionary rules mirror the cumulative impact of all of these exceptions
and limitations: Fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment violations have
almost no impact on the outcome of federal criminal cases and have very
little impact in state cases. Studies of the federal system show that only
0.4% of matters that U.S. Attorneys declined to prosecute were rejected
primarily because of a search and seizure problem.266 Of prosecuted fed-
eral defendants, only 11% filed a motion to suppress on fourth amend-
ment grounds; evidence was excluded on such grounds in only 1.3% of
cases, and half of the cases in which evidence was excluded still ended in
conviction.267
Similarly, a four-year study of California district attorneys found
that only 5% of felony complaints rejected for prosecution were rejected
primarily for search and seizure problems; such search and seizure rejec-
tions comprised less than 1% of total felony arrests reported by the
police.268 A study of several state court systems found that "due pro-
cess"-related reasons not limited to search and seizure violations
accounted for 1 to 9% of prosecutor rejections at initial screening, and 1
to 12% of postfiling dismissals, mostly in drug cases.269 Another study
of 7,500 cases in three states found that motions to suppress were filed,
granted, and resulted in no conviction with the following frequencies: 270
violation admitted to impeach); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65-66 (1954) (illegally seized
evidence used to impeach defendant's testimony).
264. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359-61 (1987) (reliance on statute); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (reliance on warrant).
265. See generally R. FRAsE, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
RULES LIMITATIONS 13-14 (1989).
266. COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE ON FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 8-9, 11, 13-14 (1979) (two-month study of case dispositions on fourth
amendment grounds in 42 U.S. Attorneys' offices).
267. Id.
268. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs" ofthe
Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of"Lost"Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. Ras. J.
611, 632-33. Looking at the cumulative effect of the exclusionary rule through all stages of the
adjudication process, about 2.4% of felony arrests were dropped due to illegal searches. Id. at 635.
269. K. BROSI, A CRoss-CrrY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 18-20 (U.S.G.P.O.
1979) (data for 1977). Similar data were reported for 1979 in B. BOLAND, E. BRADY, H. TYSON & J.
BASSLER, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS, 1979, at 9 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1983).
270. Narduli, The Societal Cost ofthe Exclusionary Rul" An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 585, 593-602, tables 2, 8, 12 [hereinafter Nardulli 1983]; see also Nardulli, The
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Percent of All Cases
Type of Evidence Motion Filed Granted No Conviction
Physical Evidence 4.6271 0.69 0.56
Identifications 4.8 0.08 0.01
Confessions 6.6 0.16 0.07
In all these studies, moreover, it must be recognized that many of the
cases rejected by prosecutors or dismissed in court would not have led to
conviction in any event, because of other evidence problems or policy
reasons for nonprosecution.272 Studies of prosecutors' reasons for declin-
ing prosecution suggest that they prefer to cite evidentiary problems
rather than purely policy reasons.273
Z Other Police Investigative Powers
In addition to the broad search powers exercised by Officers of the
Judicial Police (OJPs) in the course of a flagrant offense investigation,
OJPs have several other important powers not formally granted to
American police: the power to detain any person on the scene; the power
to summon witnesses to testify (not under oath); and the power to desig-
nate expert witnesses to conduct scientific or technical examinations.
Viewed in the aggregate, the powers of the OJP rival those of an investi-
gating grand jury in the United States, though French procedure appears
to be faster and more efficient.274
It would seem that the broad powers of the OJP ought to improve
the ability of the French police to solve crimes and present sufficient evi-
dence to obtain conviction. As the discussion below indicates, however,
Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 223, 239 [hereinafter
Nardulli 1987] (reporting similar results from a later study of Chicago courts, and also concluding
that unsuccessful suppression motions "play no systematic role in the guilty plea process").
271. Most of these were drug or weapons cases. Nardulli 1983, supra note 270, at 585, 594 table
5.
272. Id. at 600; see also Davies, supra note 268, at 655.
273. See, eg., PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 38, at 60-68
(following adoption of official office policy permitting assistant district attorneys to charge felony
drug cases as misdemeanors, reasons offered by assistants for charging a misdemeanor shifted
dramatically from evidentiary reasons to policy reasons); Frase, supra note 38, at 264-68, 306-08; see
also Nardulli 1987, supra note 270, at 234-37 (majority of cases "lost" due to the exclusionary rule
would probably not have ended in conviction in any event; if convicted, "vast majority" would not
have received a custody sentence; most suppression cases involved drug possession offenses).
274. Another technique available to the French examining magistrate during the investigation is
the "confrontation" of witnesses who have provided contradictory accounts. The examining
magistrate calls the witnesses before him and asks them to repeat their own account and comment
on others' accounts. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 102 (5th ed. 1986) (claiming that
this technique is "unlike anything in Anglo-American legal procedure," and that, because of it,
"perjured testimony in criminal cases has been almost eradicated"). However, except for problems
of obtaining Miranda waivers from all witnesses who are also suspects, it is unclear why American
police could not use a similar technique; perhaps they do.
1990]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
the available evidence does not support this hypothesis. One reason may
be that American police have no need for such formal powers. Police
crime lab technicians may function much like expert witnesses in prac-
tice, and the powers to arrest and detain suspects and witnesses can be
exercised without formal authority.27 As discussed below, another rea-
son that seemingly broader investigative powers have little effect on law
enforcement effectiveness may be that the investigatory process itself has
certain inherent limitations.
C. Comparative Crime Control Effectiveness
If the investigative powers of the French authorities are much
broader than those of American police, one would expect to find that
French "clearance" rates-the percentage of known crimes that the
police believe they have solved-are also significantly higher than those
reported by American police. However, this does not appear to be the
case. Although French and American offenses are not defined identi-
cally, the following offenses seem sufficiently comparable to permit at
least a rough comparison of clearance rates, by offense, in France and the
United States:
1980 Clearance Rates
(percent)
Offense France 276  U.S. 277
Murder & Non-Negligent Homicide 79278 72
Forcible Rape 77 49
Robbery 26279 24
All Burglary & Theft280  17 17
As indicated in the accompanying note, the French clearance rate
for homicide would be lower than the American rate if some French
275. For example, defendants lack standing to object to another's arrest and detention, and can
move to suppress only evidence derived from their own arrest. See supra text accompanying notes
257 & 261.
276. LA CRIMINALIT EN FRANcE, supra note 39, at 60-61.
277. CRIME IN THE U.S.-1980, supra note 134, at 182.
278. This percentage is based on 2,253 offenses known, including 1,751 "nonvillainous
homicides" (clearance rate equal to 89%). The latter category may include some negligent
homicides, which are excluded from the American statistics; excluding them all would lower the
French clearance rate to 46%. Another 598 homicides, labeled "suspicious deaths not solved"
(clearance rate of zero), are excluded from computation of the French clearance rate shown in the
text, since it is not clear how often such deaths are included in American homicide statistics. If they
were all included (increasing total offenses known to 2,851), the rate shown in the text would drop to
63%.
279. Includes armed robbery and all other "theft with violence."
280. Includes burglary, larceny/theft, and motor vehicle theft. These have been combined to
minimize the effect of differing offense classifications. Forgery, bad checks, other frauds,
embezzlement, and receiving stolen property are excluded.
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offenses of questionable comparability were excluded (or if others were
included). The very large difference in rape clearance rates for the two
countries is harder to explain, although it may simply reflect the fact that
police statistics for this offense are notoriously unreliable due to varia-
tions in rates of victim reporting and police "unfounding. ' '28 1 Police sta-
tistics for robbery, burglary, and theft are probably more reliable, 82 and
the French and American clearance rates for these offenses are quite sim-
ilar. Although much more research needs to be done here,2 83 these pre-
liminary results suggest that the French system is not substantially more
effective at solving crimes than the American system.
However, perhaps the advantage of the French system lies not in
identifying suspects but in apprehending and convicting them. The
broader investigative powers of French authorities, combined with what
are commonly believed to be more relaxed standards of proof at trial,284
may substantially increase the proportion of "cleared" offenses leading to
conviction. Unfortunately, the data needed to make such comparisons
are not available, but the limited data suggest that overall conviction
rates are not significantly different in the two countries. In France, dur-
ing the two-year period 1979-80, the total number of adult convictions
for robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft equaled about 7%
of the total number of these crimes known to the police.28 Although
comparable figures are not available for the United States as a whole, the
available data suggest very similar conviction rates as a percentage of
281. "Unfounding" occurs when a police investigation of the complaint shows that no offense
occurred or was attempted. See F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, supra note 34, at 67. For a discussion of
the problems of police statistics in general, see id. at 46-81.
282. Major theft offenses-especially burglary and motor vehicle theft-are more likely to be
consistently reported to the police because of the possibility of collecting insurance, and the
consequent need to document the offense. See id at 61; LA CRIMINALITA EN FRANCE, supra note
39, at 5.
283. In addition to problems of offense comparability, it is not clear whether the police in the
United States and France employ comparable standards for determining when they have "solved" a
crime. The French statistics state that an offense is considered cleared (elucide) when "the proof
allows it to be imputed to one or more identified persons ... without consideration of subsequent
decisions of the courts." LA CRIMINALITA EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 5. Nevertheless, it is
conceivable that French police only consider an offense cleared when conviction seems highly
probable. Other possible sources of non-comparability between French and American clearance
rates include differences in victim reporting and/or police "unfounding" rates. See infra text
accompanying note 290.
284. See infra text accompanying notes 703-36.
285. The number of offenses known to police in 1979 was compared with the average number of
convictions per year for these offenses in 1979 and 1980 (a two-year average was used because
offenses known in a given year are not all brought to trial within that year). In 1979, 1,461,410 cases
of vol (robbery, burglary, and larceny of all types) were reported known by French police.
ANNUAIRE sTATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 99. In 1979 and 1980, 195,081 persons were found guilty
of one of these offenses. Id. at 111, 115. The average number per year, 97,541, equals 6.7% of
offenses known in 1979.
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offenses known.28 6
The conviction-rate data thus lend considerable support to Professor
Zeisel's conclusion that "one may easily overestimate the effect of proce-
dural differences," and that "[h]owever much the details of criminal pro-
cedure may vary from country to country, the loss between arrest and
conviction appears to be the unavoidable result of the judicial safeguards
built into all Western law enforcement systems. '2 7 Based on the clear-
ance rate data presented earlier, it appears that much the same could be
said about the loss between offense-reporting and arrest. It remains to be
seen whether the first two links in the law enforcement process-the
reporting of offenses to and by the police-are comparable in France and
the United States. Given the greater rights accorded crime victims in
French criminal cases, 2s8 one might expect higher rates of victim report-
ing. Similarly, the supposedly greater professionalism of the French
police28 9 might make them less likely to under report crimes known to
them. If such differences in reporting exist, they could distort compari-
sons of clearance and conviction rates since such rates would be inflated
for the country in which a lower proportion of difficult-to-prove cases
were reported to and by the police. However, the limited available evi-
dence suggests that French and American reporting rates are quite
similar.29 °
286. There are no nationwide, offense-specific statistics on the numbers of persons found guilty
in the United States. However, the FBI formerly reported data for selected cities on the disposition
of persons charged by the police. In 1977, the last year for which this information was reported, the
data was based on a sample of 1,847 cities with a total estimated population of 30,123,000 in 1977.
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATEs-1977, at 218 (1978) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE U.S.-1977]. For robbery, burglary,
larceny/theft, and motor vehicle theft a combined total of 1,518,464 offenses were reported known to
police in these cities: 297,854 of these offenses were cleared; 260,203 persons were "charged," and
93,458 persons were found guilty as charged or guilty on lesser charges. The latter figure represents
6.2% of the 1,518,464 offenses known. As with the French data in the previous note, juveniles are
included in the number of offenses known, but are excluded from the numbers of persons convicted.
It is not known how representative these 1,847 cities were of the country as a whole, although both
the crime rates and the clearance rates reported for these cities were slightly higher than the national
averages for that year. Id. at 161, 218; see also H. ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 8,
18 (1982) (for New York City in 1971, only 6.7% of total felony offenses reported to police led to
conviction for a felony or a lesser offense).
287. H. ZEISEL, supra note 286, at 25 (conclusion based on comparison of American, German,
and Austrian prosecution rates).
288. See infra text accompanying notes 651-68.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 48-76.
290. Research on these issues is hampered by the fact that the French have not conducted the
kinds of broad victim surveys undertaken in the United States since 1973. Cf. F. ZIMRING & R.
FRASE, supra note 34, at 71-81 (describing U.S. government survey of victimization of individuals
and commercial establishments). However, reporting rates may be estimated for property crimes,
based on international Gallup polls and police statistics. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune, Nov. 15,
1984, at 23A, col. I (in both France and the United States, 9% of adults surveyed reported "home
broken into" in the past 12 months; for "money or property stolen," the figures were 11% for
France, and 12% for the United States); see also MINIST RE DE L'INTtIRIEUR, LA CRIMINALIT- EN
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Perhaps the ultimate measure of crime control effectiveness is the
incidence of crime itself. As indicated in the following table, the 1980
American property crime rate (burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft
combined) was about twice that of France, and the American violent
crime rate (murder, rape, and robbery) was about four times higher.291
Reported Crime Rates (per 100,000 population) in 1980
U.S. France Ratio
Murder & Non-
Negligent Manslaughter 10 4 2.5:1
Rape 36 4 9:1
Robbery 244 66 3.7:1
Subtotal: Murder,
Rape & Robbery 290 74 3.9:1
Burglary 1,668 512 3.3:1
Motor Vehicle Theft 495 399 1.2:1
(Other) Theft 3,156 2,031 1.6:1
Subtotal: Burglary
& All Thefts 5,319 2,942 1.8:1
Of course, crime rates are determined by many factors other than
law enforcement effectiveness. Until we learn more about the nature and
causes of crime in both countries, we cannot assess the effects attributa-
ble to differences in police powers. Indeed, the causal relationship may
actually be the reverse: More crime may cause less effective law enforce-
ment because police and courts become overloaded and break down.
Viewed in this light, American clearance and conviction rates compare
FRANCE EN 1984, at 66 (1986) [hereinafter MINISTkRE DE L'INTtRIEUR] (4,006 cases per 100,000
population, of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft known to police); FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES-1984, at 41 (1985)
[hereinafter CRIME IN THE U.S.-1984] (4,492 cases per 100,000 population, of these property
offenses). The victimization percentages reported in the Gallup polls can be made comparable to the
police statistics (reported crime rates per 100,000 population) by multiplying the former by 100,000.
For example, if 9% of the French say they have been burglarized, this is equivalent to a
vicitimization rate of 9,000 crimes per 100,000; if 11% say money or property was stolen, this yields
a rate of 11,000, for a combined burglary/theft rate of 20,000. We can then divide reported crime
rates by victimization (or "actual") rates; this yields an estimated reporting rate of 20% for France
(4,006 divided by 20,000 (9,000 + 11,000, supra)), and 21% for the United States (4,492 divided by
21,000 (9,000 + 12,000)).
291. See CRIME IN THE U.S.-1980, supra note 134, at 41; LA CRIMINALITA EN FRANCE, supra
note 39, at 56 (figures rounded to the nearest whole number). The FBI's "violent crime" index
includes a fourth offense: aggravated assault. These offenses were excluded from the table in the text
because no comparable offense category exists in French police statistics.
By 1984 the differences shown in the text had narrowed dramatically; the American violent
crime rate was "only" twice (2.1 times) as high as France's, and the American property crime rate
was almost the same (1.1 times higher). CRIME IN THE UNITED STATEs-1984, supra note 290, at
41; MINIsTPRE DE L'INTERIEUR, supra note 290, at 66.
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even more favorably with those of France, for we perform almost as
well-with a much heavier caseload. If American authorities are hand-
cuffed, then they must all be Houdinis!
V
ARREST AND PRETRIAL DETENTION
The power to arrest and detain suspects is one of the most critical
and problematic aspects of any criminal justice system. Custodial arrest
is usually embarrassing and inconvenient, involving the sudden, forcible
interruption of one's activities, a thorough search of one's person and
effects,292 and the use of handcuffs, holding cells, and other intrusive
security and investigative measures.293 Even temporary detention in the
typical American jail is a significant hardship, since the facilities tend to
be old, poorly maintained, overcrowded, and insufficiently staffed to pre-
vent assaults by other inmates.2 94 Prolonged detention also aggravates
the problems of plea bargaining by significantly increasing the price of
demanding and waiting for a full trial.295
Although jail and plea bargaining reforms ease some of these
problems, unnecessary arrest and pretrial detention still deplete scarce
public resources and violate precious rights of physical liberty and the
presumption of innocence. Unwarranted arrest and detention unneces-
sarily divert police manpower to transporting and booking arrestees and
increase the expense of building, maintaining, and operating jails and
detention cells. Arrest and detention also disrupt stabilizing family and
community ties, and replace these associations with the criminalizing
effects of enforced idleness in the company of other criminals. Finally,
perhaps the greatest cost is the bitterness of the substantial number of
detainees who eventually receive probation or dismissal of their
charges.296
292. See supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
293. Formal arrest also creates a law enforcement record which may adversely affect the citizen,
not only during the pendency of charges but long after the criminal charges have been dropped.
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 735 n.18 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Miany employers will treat
an arrest the same as a conviction and deny the individual employment or other opportunities on the
basis of a fact that has no probative value with respect to actual criminal culpability."); G. TRUBOW,
PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION: AN ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY
IssuEs 19-20 (U.S.G.P.O. 1978).
294. For a discussion of the conditions of American jails, see R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE
ULTIMATE GHET O (1975), and Mattick, The Contemporary Jails of the United States: An Unknown
and Neglected Area of Justice, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 785 (D. Glazer ed. 1974).
295. For a discussion of the effect of pretrial detention on plea bargaining and sentencing, see H.
ZEISEL, supra note 286, at 47-48, 217-27 (noting that pretrial detention encourages suspects to plead
guilty in exchange for "time served" sentences). See also Frase, Defining the Limits of Crime Control
and Due Process, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 212, 233-44 (1985) (analyzing the limitations and policy
implications of Zeisel's data).
296. One study found that almost half of those detained in New York City in the early 1970s
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The broad powers of French law enforcement officials, who are
unhampered by any general probable cause and warrant requirements,297
suggest that arrest and pretrial detention rates would be higher in
France. If these rates were in fact higher, it would be no surprise, since a
number of other aspects of the French system seem to rely on an
enhanced role for pretrial detention. In particular, without explicit plea
bargaining 9 8 one would expect increased reliance on pretrial custody to
permit thorough police interrogation and to "encourage" confession and
other forms of cooperation. Furthermore, liberal pretrial discovery by
the defense299 increases the risk that defendants who see the strength of
the prosecution's case would flee or tamper with the evidence if it were
not for pretrial detention. This risk is heightened because courts could
not punish flight without violating the general prohibition on consecutive
sentences. 3 o
Thus formal rules and systemic needs both suggest that pretrial cus-
tody is used more in France than in the United States. It is difficult to
empirically test whether this use is in fact greater, however, given the
procedural differences between the two countries and the limited data
available for each country as a whole. Nonetheless, analogous statistical
comparisons can be made using measures based on the timing of and
purposes served by preconviction custody in each country. Specifically,
the "arrest rate" for each country will be defined as the number of per-
sons taken into preconviction custody at any stage, divided by the
number of persons charged by the police. The "pretrial detention rate"
will be defined as the number of persons held for initial or continued
court appearances divided by the total number of prosecuted defendants.
The remainder of this Part briefly summarizes French arrest and
detention procedures and then analyzes each of these measures in turn.
These analyses suggest that the French use arrest and pretrial detention
much less often than we do. The discussion concludes with a review of
the aspects of French procedure that appear to account for these differ-
ences, and that may suggest possibilities for useful reform of American
procedures. In closing, I also note areas where more research is needed.
A. Overview of French Arrest and Detention Procedures
Except for the brief detentions permitted during the course of an
identity check or an investigatory detention, or pending an "immediate
either had their cases dismissed or received a non-custodial sentence. See H. ZESEL, supra note
286, at 219; Frase, supra note 295, at 239 n.61.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
298. See infra text accompanying notes 467-562.
299. See infra text accompanying notes 669-77.
300. See infra text accompanying notes 424-37.
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appearance" in correctional court,3 0 1 arrest or pretrial detention must bc
judicially approved by either the examining magistrate30 2 or the assize or
correctional court. These judicial authorities may also order conditional
release ("pretrial supervision"). 303
Persons charged with a felony may be detained on the examining
magistrate's warrant of arrest or confinement. 3 4 Written justification for
such detention is not required; however, an adversary hearing must be
held.305 The magistrate may issue a warrant of confinement against sus-
pects charged with a delict only if the maximum sentence for the offense
is at least two years' imprisonment (or one year or more for "flagrant"
delicts). The magistrate must also find that pretrial supervision is insuffi-
cient and that detention is necessary to prevent interference with the evi-
dence or witnesses, further crime, flight of the accused, or harm to the
accused.306 The order must state reasons and is limited to four months,
,but it may be extended for additional periods of up to four months
each. 0 7 If the accused's current offense and prior convictions are not
very serious, total pretrial detention may not exceed eight months.30 8
At the termination of the judicial investigation, suspects referred for
trial in police court must be released from pretrial detention or supervi-
sion.30 9 If there was no judicial investigation, defendants are simply
301. Identity checks and investigatory detention are described at supra notes 161 & 163. The
immediate appearance procedure was formerly applicable only to certain "flagrant" offenses (defined
atsupra note 161), but it was expanded in 1986 to include nonflagrant offenses punishable by at least
two-years imprisonment provided the prosecuting attorney believes that "the assembled charges are
sufficient and that the matter is ready to be tried." Proc. Code art. 395[l]. When this procedure is
used, the defendant is held for arraignment in correctional court instead of being released on his
promise to appear. If arraignment is not possible on the same day, a judge of the correctional court
may authorize continued detention for up to two additional working days. Id. art. 396.
302. This summary states the law as of June 1989, and does not incorporate further limitations
on pretrial detention which will result from the Law of July 6, 1989, No. 89-461, J.0. July 8, 1989,
109 G.P. No. 5, at 323-25.
303. Proc. Code arts. 138 to 143 (examining magistrate may order pretrial supervision for
suspects facing possible imprisonment).
304. In a judicial investigation of any offense, examining magistrates may issue four types of
warrants: (1) a warrant for appearance (similar to a summons); (2) a warrant of attachment, which
permits forcible arrest of the accused and temporary jailing until he can be interrogated; (3) a
warrant of arrest, which is similar to the preceding but is used only if the accused is in flight or lives
outside the country; and (4) a warrant for confinement (pretrial detention order). Id. art. 122.
305. Id. art. 145[2]-[8].
306. Id. arts. 144[l], 145. The examining magistrate may also order pretrial detention if the
defendant violates the conditions of pretrial supervision. Id. art. 144[2].
307. Id. arts. 145[1], 145-1.
308. Id. art. 145-1[2] (maximum six months' detention during the judicial investigation,
consisting of initial four-month detention plus an extension not to exceed two months). Id. art.
179[4] (additional two months' detention between end of judicial investigation and defendant's
appearance in correctional court).
309. Id. arts. 178, 21313], 531; see also id. art. 17911]-[2] (when judge finds that facts indicate a
delict, he or she may remand to correctional court; a procedural order terminates pretrial detention
or supervision).
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issued citations to appear in police court.31° In contrast, suspects
charged with felonies may be, and usually are, held in custody while
pending review by the indicting chamber, 31  and before and during the
trial.312 In cases of delict, the examining magistrate may continue-or
"exceptionally" initiate-pretrial detention for up to two more months,
pending the accused's appearance in correctional court.313 The correc-
tional court itself may continue pretrial detention 314 (and may continue
or initiate pretrial supervision),315 but the court may only initiate pretrial
detention if the accused has either violated the obligations of pretrial
supervision,31 6 or been brought to court under the "immediate appear-
ance" procedure.317
B. Arrest Rates
The most comprehensive measure of the extent of pretrial custody is
the proportion of suspects who are subjected to custodial arrest at some
point in the criminal process prior to conviction. French and American
"arrest rates" cannot be directly compared, however, since the French
use both police investigatory detention 318 and examining magistrates'
arrest and detention orders to place suspects in custody. Indeed, there
are no published French statistics on "arrests" as such. Instead, the fol-
lowing figures are reported: (1) the number of investigatory detentions
(gardes d vue); and (2) the number of pretrial detention orders issued by
examining magistrates, or issued in the course of the immediate appear-
ance procedure. Thus, estimates of French "arrests" must be based on
the combined totals of these figures.
In 1980 the number of persons placed in investigatory detention was
about 38% of the total number of suspects charged by French police
310. Id. art. 531. The defendant may also make a voluntary appearance. Id.
311. This three-judge court reviews all felony cases before they can be sent to trial in assize
court. It also hears appeals from certain orders of the examining magistrate. See FRENCH SYSTEM,
supra note 41, at 17; see also infra text accompanying notes 638 & 649-50.
312. Proc. Code arts. 181[2], 215[2]; A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 51-52 (detention almost
automatic for offenses classified as "crimes" (felonies, see supra note 132)).
313. Proc. Code art. 179[3]-[4].
314. Id. art. 464-1.
315. Id. art. 141-1 (conferring on the correctional court power to impose, modify, or withdraw
pretrial supervision).
316. Id. art. 141-2[2].
317. Id. arts. 395 to 397-7. Upon appearance in correctional court, if the defendant does not
consent to be tried (or if the case is not ready for trial), the case is continued for two to six weeks.
Judgment on the merits must occur within two months of initial appearance in court, or else the
accused will be released. Id arts. 397-1, 397-3[3].
318. See supra note 161. The express statutory approval given to identity checks under the law
of February 2, 1981, may encourage French police to use this procedure rather than investigatory
detention. If so, this will complicate statistical comparisons for later years, since there are no
published nationwide statistics on the use of the identity check procedure (which, unlike American
Terry stops, can lead to detention for up to four hours, see supra note 163).
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with felonies and nontraffic delicts.3 9 The number of persons jailed by
examining magistrates in that year was approximately 7% of the total
number charged by police,320 thus yielding an overall estimated arrest
rate of 45%.321 The true figure is lower, however, since the statistics
above exclude all contraventions, many of which are offenses that are
included in American arrest statistics (for example, minor assaults, disor-
derly conduct, and pimping).322 While there are no published French
statistics on persons "charged by police" with contraventions, using the
available contravention conviction statistics as a proxy lowers the esti-
mated French arrest rate to 37%, and the true rate is probably even
lower.323
American statistics pose further problems. "Arrest" figures include
both custodial arrests and persons issued citations or summonses to
appear.324 Moreover, although the FBI used to publish statistics for
selected cities on the proportions of persons "arrested" and "summoned"
by court summons or police citation to all persons "charged" by the
police, no source reports the relative proportions of these methods on a
national level. However, the available partial data suggest that custodial
arrest is far more frequently imposed in the United States than in France.
319. LA CRIMINALITt EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 64 (262,289 persons detained out of
686,354 persons "charged"). The definitions used in this source are discussed at supra notes 133 &
161.
320. COMPTE GPNPRAL, supra note 39, at 21 table 7 (65,784 persons jailed, of whom 47,179
were detained by examining magistrates and 18,605 involved the immediate appearance procedure
applicable to "flagrant" offenses, see supra note 301). The immediate appearance statistics are
excluded here because they are reflected in the numbers of persons held in investigatory detention.
The statistics on examining magistrate detentions do not explicitly exclude traffic cases, but judicial
investigations are probably rare in such cases.
321. This figure is only approximate. On the one hand, some suspects placed in pretrial
detention had undoubtedly already been subject to investigatory detention in the same case and thus
are counted twice. On the other hand, the French statistics do not include defendants who are
detained pending interrogation by the examining magistrate and then released without ever having
been placed in investigatory or pretrial detention. See Proc. Code arts. 122, 125 to 133.
322. For a discussion of the legislative and administrative downgrading of these offenses in
France, see supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
323. In 1980 there were 152,137 convictions for contraventions of the fifth class, most of which
appear to be non-traffic offenses of the kind included in American arrest statistics. ANNUAIRE
STATasrIQUE, supra note 39, at 123. Adding these cases to the arrest rate denominator ("persons
charged by police"), supra note 319, yields a new total of 838,491 "suspects" and lowers the arrest
rate to 37%. As for the numerator ("persons arrested"), no adjustment is needed since neither
investigatory nor pretrial detention is authorized in contravention cases. See infra text
accompanying notes 360-61.
Another 1,952,246 convictions were reported for contraventions of the first four classes
(excluding parking), ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 121, and many of these cases
probably also involved non-traffic offenses included in American arrest statistics. Of course, the
number of convictions is undoubtedly lower than the number of "persons charged by police" with
contraventions.
324. See CRIME IN THE U.S.-1980, supra note 134, at 189. I assume that American arrest
statistics include virtually all suspects taken into custody.
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In 1977, the last year for which the FBI published this information,
about 68% of suspects charged with nontraffic offenses were arrested.325
The data were based on information for 1,380 cities with a 1977-esti-
mated population of 17,979,000,326 and it is possible that the arrest-ver-
sus-summons rates in those cities were not representative of the nation as
a whole.
The data available from individual American jurisdictions, however,
lend some support to the 68% national estimate. For example, a study of
law enforcement in New York City in the early 1970s found that about
60% of "police apprehensions" for felonies and nontraffic misdemeanors
were by arrest.327 This figure is not significantly lower than the FBI's
national estimate, especially considering that New York City had pio-
neered broader use of police citation release beginning in the mid-
1960s. 328 Finally, a study of pretrial detention practices in eight jurisdic-
tions in the late 1970s found that 73% of defendants charged by police-
excluding charges in minor traffic cases-were not even eligible to be
released before their first court appearance. 329 Thus, although not defini-
tively shown, the available data indicate a substantially higher arrest rate
in the United States than in France.
C. Pretrial Detention Rates
The analysis above focused on law enforcement decisions to take the
suspect into custody for evidence-gathering and/or preventive purposes:
interrogation, identification, searches incident to arrest, interruption of
ongoing criminal activity, and prevention of flight or interference with
the evidence or witnesses. Once the initial investigation is completed,
however, the question arises whether the suspect should remain in cus-
tody pending trial or other court disposition. This later detention may
serve many of the same purposes as initial detention, but the emphasis
shifts from evidence gathering to the other concerns suggested above,
325. CRIME IN THE U.S.-1977, supra note 286, at 217. The percentage in the text excludes
drunk-driving cases in order to make the American figures more comparable to the French (which
exclude all traffic cases). Figures for individual offenses ranged from a high of 97% arrested (murder
and nonnegligent manslaughter) to a low of 39% (liquor violations). Many nonviolent offenses had
relatively high arrest rates. For example, the arrest rate for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle
theft combined was 69%.
326. Id.
327. See H. ZEISEL, supra note 286, at 101. In the same study, fully 100% of felony defendants
were arrested; 42% of misdemeanor defendants were arrested; and 18% of violators in lesser offenses
(infractions and violations) were arrested. Id.
328. See W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 7-8, 202, 251 (1976).
329. M. TOBORG, PRETRIAL RELEASE: A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF PRACTICES AND
OUTCOMES 8 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1981); see also D. WHrrCOMB, B. LEWIN & M. LEVINE,
CrrATION RELEASE 5 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1984) (citation utilization rates after custodial arrest for
"all misdemeanors," presumably including traffic offenses, varied between 17 and 55% in five
jurisdictions reporting for varying time periods from 1975 through 1981).
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namely the prevention of fHight, further crime, and evidence-tampering.
This Section examines the available data on French and American "pre-
trial detention rates"-the percentage of all prosecuted defendants who
are held in custody pending initial or continued court hearings.
The most recent multijurisdictional study of American pretrial
detention rates331 found that, from 1976 to 1978, 77% of defendants who
appeared in court at least once had not been released prior to their first
appearance. Furthermore, 11% were not released before disposition of
the charges. 331
Comparable French pretrial detention rates are calculated by divid-
ing (1) the number of persons held in pretrial detention by order of exam-
ining magistrates or pursuant to the "immediate appearance"
procedure332 by (2) the total number of prosecuted defendants. One diffi-
culty with this approach, however, is that published French police court
statistics are not sufficiently offense-specific to permit calculation of a fig-
ure for total prosecuted defendants which would be comparable to the
base used for the American pretrial detention rates (that is, all defend-
ants except those in "minor traffic cases"). 333 Excluding all police court
prosecutions yields the following estimated French pretrial detention
330. M. TonoRG, supra note 329. This study covered 3,488 "arrests"-including field citations,
but excluding "minor traffic offenses"-in eight jurisdictions: Baltimore City; Baltimore County;
Washington, D.C.; Dade County (Miami, Fla.); Jefferson County (Louisville, Ky.); Pima County
(Tucson, Ariz.); Santa Cruz County (Cal.); and Santa Clara County (San Jose, Cal.). The time
periods covered ranged from mid-1976 to mid-1978. Id. at 3-5. These sites were chosen not only for
geographic dispersion, but also to reflect "a wide range of release types and broad eligibility for
program participation (especially in terms of criminal charges)." Id. at 3. Thus, release rates may
have been higher in these jurisdictions than for the country as a whole. On the other hand, certain
variations in statistical compilation may have affected the overall detention rates for the eight-site
sample: One site included only felony cases, and another excluded field citations. Id. at 64 n.3.
331. Id. at 8 fig. 1. The percentages in the text are computed by excluding the 3.8% of
defendants whose charges were dismissed without any court appearance. This makes the American
figures more comparable to the French data, reported at infra text accompanying notes 334-37. If
these defendants were included, the percentages would be: 74.5% not released prior to first
appearance (not eligible (73.3%), or failed to post scheduled bail (1.2%)); and 14.7% never released
prior to disposition (3.8% dismissed prior to first court appearance, 3% no release conditions set,
4.5% held without a bail revision hearing, and 3.4% held after such a hearing).
The percentages in the text were computed as follows. First compute the adjusted total (the
denominator-those defendants appearing in court at least once): 100% - 3.8% = 96.2%. The
77% figure in the text (percent not released prior to first appearance) equals the 74.5% figure cited
above divided by 96.2% To compute the 11% figure in the text (percent not released prior to
disposition), remove the 3.8% precourt dismissals from the 14.7% figure cited above, and divide the
result (10.9%) by 96.2%.
332. See supra note 301 and accompanying text. These figures thus exclude investigatory
detention (garde d vue), making them roughly comparable to American statistics for suspects
detained until their first court appearance.
333. M. TOBORG, supra note 329, at 5. The Toborg study does not define "minor traffic
offenses." The offense-specific tables provided for the study do not list any traffic offenses other than
"driving while intoxicated" (545 defendants). Id. at 70. Other categories not defined are "minor
local offenses" (66 defendants) and "other offenses" (97 defendants). Id.
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rates for the same period (1976-1978): The number of persons subject to
any pretrial detention represented about 18% of defendants prosecuted
in correctional or assize court (excluding minor traffic cases);334 less than
10% of such defendants had not been released by the time of disposi-
tion.3 35  However, police court prosecutions are quite numerous and
never involve pretrial detention,336 so the true detention rates for all
prosecuted defendants (excluding only minor traffic cases) are undoubt-
edly much lower. Only about 10% are ever held in pretrial detention,
and only about 5% are not released by the time of disposition.337
D. Discussion
Although each of the statistical comparisons considered above has
its problems, the available data suggest that the French impose custodial
arrest and pretrial detention much less often than we do in the United
States. Several key aspects of French procedure serve to reduce unneces-
sary pretrial custody, and each of them suggests possibilities for useful
reform in the United States.338
334. During this three-year period in France, a total of 179,591 defendants were detained, of
whom about one-fourth were held pursuant to the immediate appearance procedure. See COMPTE
UfiNtRAL, supra note 39, at 21 table 7. For the same three-year period, the total number of
convictions and acquittals in assize and correctional courts was 1,301,213. Id. at 25 table 11.
However, many of these cases may have been "minor traffic offenses" and thus excluded from the
Toborg study. See supra note 333. Traffic offenses other than drunk driving accounted for about
one-fourth of all assize and correctional court convictions during the same three-year period. See
ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 109-19. The 18% estimated detention rate cited in the
text-179,591 divided by 975,909 (1,301,213 multiplied by 0.75)-assumes that minor traffic offenses
comprised about one-fourth of convictions in assize and correctional courts, and further assumes
that the proportion of defendants convicted for such offenses provides a sound estimate for the
proportion of defendants prosecuted for the same offenses.
335. Fifty-two percent of all releases from pretrial detention in 1978 occurred at final
disposition by dismissal, acquittal, or conviction. COMPTE GtNfiRAL, supra note 39, at 98 table A.7.
Assuming this figure to be representative of the 1976-1978 period, 18% of these releases multiplied
by 0.52 yields a figure of 9.4% of defendants never released prior to dispostion.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 309-10.
337. Adding the number of convictions for fifth class contraventions (excluding traffic) plus the
number of jail sentences imposed for first to fourth class contraventions to the denominator
("prosecuted defendants") yields a new total of 1,360,728 defendants, which lowers the estimated
detention rates to 13% detained and 7% never released. See ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note
39, at 123. With this adjustment, the denominator still excludes all acquittals for fifth class
contraventions, and all first to fourth class contravention defendants not sentenced to jail. Many of
the latter are comparable to American defendants in non-"minor traffic" cases such as disturbing the
peace, passive soliciting, and brawling, all of which are contraventions under French law. C. PEN.
arts. R.34(8), (13), R-38(1). For the period 1976-78, almost 6,000,000 defendants were sentenced to
a fine only for first through fourth class contraventions (excluding parking). ANNUAIRE
STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 121-23 (penal orders plus trial convictions). The estimated French
pretrial detention rates are further overstated as compared to American rates in that the numerator
used to compute the French rate includes an unknown number of suspects who were neither
prosecuted nor did they ever appear in trial court.
338. Another feature of the French system which may discourage pretrial detention is that
defendants who eventually obtain dismissal or acquittal may receive compensation if their pretrial
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L Prosecutorial Screening and Supervision
As noted in Part II, French prosecutors have more authority to
supervise police investigations than do most American prosecutors.339
Such supervision reduces the incidence of unnecessary arrest and deten-
tion by allowing the prosecutor to stop an investigation, prevent investi-
gatory detention, or order release of suspects already detained.3"
Moreover, French prosecutors apparently decline or reduce charges at
least as often as do their American counterparts. 34 1 However, since their
declination authority is often exercised before any suspect has been taken
into custody-or at least before imposition of any extended period of
detention-French prosecutors can prevent unnecessary arrest and
detention of suspects who will not be prosecuted. Similarly, French pros-
ecutors generally exercise their broad discretion to reduce the level of
charges (for example, by "correctionalizing" a case charged by the police
as a felony) prior to the imposition of any pretrial detention. 342 As dis-
cussed more fully below and in Part VI,343 Americans may be able to
create analogous detention and screening procedures that would more
effectively balance the competing interests of justice at this stage: the
need for some investigatory detention; the goal of minimizing pretrial
detention; and the values of early but well-informed screening.
2. An Explicit, Functional Approach to Detention Authority
Although French law enforcement officials are not subject to general
probable cause and warrant requirements, their arrest and detention
authority may actually be more limited than similar powers in the United
States. French police have no general power to make warrantless arrests;
rather, they have a series of specific, time-limited powers to detain for
identification or interrogation. 3 " Judicial arrest powers only apply dur-
ing judicial investigation, which is infrequently employed, and pretrial
detention is also primarily confined to defendants subject to such an
detention caused them "a manifestly abnormal harm of particular gravity." Proc. Code art. 149.
The award is charged to the State as "a cost of criminal justice." Id. art. 150. However, it is not
known how often or in what amounts such compensation is awarded.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 64-76.
340. Such powers are not alien to the United States, see, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02(2)-(4)
(following warrantless arrest, prosecuting attorney may order defendant to be released from custody;
police must notify prosecutor of the arrest "as soon as practical"), but it is unknown how frequently
they are actually exercised.
341. See infra text accompanying notes 396-405 & 438-57.
342. Correctionalization (and the analogous procedure of "contraventionalization") are
discussed more fully at infra text accompanying notes 483-506. Such charge reductions must take
place prior to the opening of a judicial investigation and, thus, prior to the imposition of any pretrial
detention. Once made, such reductions preclude subsequent pretrial detention except under the
"immediate appearance" procedure, described at supra note 301.
343. See infra text accompanying notes 409-21.
344. See supra notes 161-63.
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investigation.34
Given these limited powers and the limited actual use of pretrial
custody, how do the French achieve all the important investigative and
preventive purposes of arrest and pretrial detention?346 The answer may
be that, unlike American arrest and detention powers, the French powers
are more explicitly tied to the functions that custody serves at the differ-
ent stages of investigation and prosecution. Whereas American police
have a general power to arrest on probable cause-usually without a
warrant347-- but no express power to detain unarrestable persons for
interrogation348 or identification, 349 French police have explicit but time-
limited authority to detain suspects for each of these purposes through
the investigatory detention and identity check procedures.
From the citizen's perspective, French arrest rules have at least two
major advantages over U.S. rules. First, arrest in the United States is
seen as the first stage of prosecution; it therefore has no fixed and limited
duration. Thus an American suspect who is arrested for purposes of
interrogation or positive identification ("booking") is likely to be held,
often overnight and in jail, after these purposes have been achieved.3
American police have authority to release suspects at this time, uncondi-
tionally or on citation, but the police may be reluctant to do so, either
because this would suggest that the arrest was illegal, or because they
hope that further detention will yield additional evidence from the
accused.
345. About three-quarters of defendants subject to pretrial detention are ordered held by
examining magistrates; the remainder are held pursuant to the "immediate appearance" procedure.
See supra note 334.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 298-300 & 330 (discussing the purposes of arrest and
pretrial detention).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 175-207.
348. Detention for interrogation generally requires either the consent of the detainee, or formal
arrest. See supra text accompanying note 242. But see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-42
(1984) (brief detention during "routine traffic stop" allowed questioning without Miranda
warnings).
349. It is still unclear whether the police may insist on proof of identity, or at least interrogate
the suspect for that purpose, during an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Justice White's concurring opinion in that case suggested that "the person stopped is not obliged to
answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest." Id.
at 34 (White, J., concurring). More recently, the Supreme Court invalidated a California "stop and
identify" statute on vagueness grounds but declined to decide whether a person lawfully stopped
under Terry can be forced to identify himself. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 (1983). But
cf Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816-17 (1985) (dictum that on-the-scene fingerprinting might be
permissible during a Terry stop).
350. Requirements of "prompt appearance" in court and charging at the first appearance place
some limits on postarrest detention. However, certain U.S. rules still allow substantial periods of
preappearance detention, see supra note 247, and sometimes several days of postappearance,
precharging detention as well. See, ag., MINN. R. CraM. P. 4.02(5)(3) (no complaint required at
first appearance on misdemeanor charge; if complaint is then demanded, it must be filed within 48
hours if defendant is in custody).
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Second, an American arrest record may be more damaging to a sus-
pect than a French record of investigatory detention or an identity check.
French records appear to be more limited in detail and dissemination.35
Moreover, because probable cause is not required, and because witnesses
as well as suspects may be detained, neither procedure implies the degree
of police suspicion inherent in an American arrest record. If further
research on American and French detention practices and records con-
firms these hypotheses, we should consider restructuring American pro-
cedures to allow more explicitly for a period of investigatory detention
which would be time-limited 352 and not recorded as an "arrest."
Similar to investigatory detention and identity checks, French pre-
trial detention authority is more explicitly tied to the purposes underly-
ing such detention. On paper, American rules are restrictive: In most
states, defendants in noncapital cases have the right to have nonexcessive
bail set,353 and courts have limited authority to order "preventive deten-
tion" of defendants believed to be dangerous.354 In practice, however,
judges can and do achieve de facto preventive detention-as well as other
less legitimate purposes, such as punishing the offender before trial-sim-
ply by setting money bail at a figure higher than the defendant can
afford. 55 Thus, it may very well be that we would detain fewer defend-
ants if, like the French, we abandoned the money bail system,356 or at
351. During an identity check, fingerprinting and photographing are permitted only with
judicial or prosecutorial approval, and solely if they are "the only means" of establishing identity.
Proc. Code art. 78-3[4]. No permanent record of any kind may be kept unless further criminal
investigation results. Id art. 78-3[9]. In contrast, detailed local police records of investigatory
detention must be maintained. Id. arts. 64 to 65. It appears, however, that only statistical
summaries are transmitted to the national level. For example, there is a nationwide system (casier
judiciaire) for recording all convictions (excluding first through fourth class contraventions). Id.
arts. 768 to 781.
352. Cf. Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L.
REV. 11, 53 (1962) (proposing such a 48-hour period); see also infra text accompanying notes 409-21
(discussing the relationship between investigatory detention and the timing of the initial charging
decision).
353. This right is guaranteed under the constitutions or statutes of most states, at least in
noncapital cases. See D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964, at 2 n.8 (1964)
(working paper for National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice). However, the federal
constitutional prohibition of excessive bail does not necessarily create a right to have bail set in all
noncapital cases. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-55 (1987).
354. See B. GOTrLIEB, PUBLIC DANGER AS A FACTOR IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS 9-12 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1985) (15 states plus District
of Columbia authorize preventive detention based on current (noncapital) charge, prior conviction,
or judicial finding of dangerousness; another 9 states only allow such detention when the current
offense was committed while on bail).
Since 1984, defendants charged with federal crimes may be preventively detained under
provisions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3143 (1988).
355. The problems of bail and its reform are analyzed extensively in F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE,
supra note 34, at 296-349 (reviewing history, underlying rationale, and problems that accompany use
of money bail, and exploring possible alternatives).
356. The French have not entirely abolished money bail, but it is imposed on less than 2% of
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least limited bail to what each defendant could afford,3" 7 and gave
American judges express but narrowly defined 58 authority to order pre-
ventive detention in high-risk cases. Such explicit authority might be less
frequently invoked and easier for appellate courts to review than the
highly discriminatory "right to bail" traditionally recognized in the
United States. The continued use of high-money bail to prevent the
release of persons who might be dangerous-with no evidence, argu-
ment, or trial court findings directed to that issue-may even result in
the detention of only the poorest defendants, not necessarily the most
dangerous ones.
3. No Arrest or Pretrial Detention in Minor Cases
Although American rules sometimes seem designed to discourage
arrest and continued detention in less serious cases, 59 the French rules
reach further: Where the most serious charge is a contravention (maxi-
mum sentence of two months), investigatory detention is not author-
ized."c° Pretrial detention is limited to felonies and delicts punishable by
at least one year's imprisonment.361 Adoption of a similar approach in
the United States would substantially reduce arrest and detention rates
defendants subject to a judicial investigation (and, necessarily then, a far lower percentage of all
prosecuted defendants). See COMPTE GIfNtRAL, supra note 39, at 21-23 (in 1980, 937 cases of bail,
compared with 47,179 suspects detained, plus another 14,490 held under pretrial supervision with no
detention).
357. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 grants federal judges explicit preventive detention authority,
but it also purports to create a statutory "right to affordable bail": Federal magistrates and judges
"may not impose a financial condition [of release] that results in the pretrial detention of the
[defendant]." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (1988).
358. Although upheld against facial attack in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the
Bail Reform Act is not necessarily good policy, and it may not be constitutional as applied. In
particular, the Act's broad eligibility rules, limited standards of procedural due process, and
ambiguous right to "affordable bail" appear to have caused an increase in detention rates. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL BAIL: How BAIL REFORM IS WORKING IN SELECTED
DISTRICT COURTS 3-4 (1987).
359. See, eg., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.01(3) (upon filing of a formal complaint, a summons rather
than arrest warrant must be issued if offense is punishable by fine only); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01,
subd.l(l)(a) (officer making warrantless arrest for fine-only arrest must "ordinarily" release
defendant on citation); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01, subd.l(l)(b) (if such a defendant is brought to the
police station or county jail, he must then be released on citation). The Minnesota rules applicable
to jailable misdemeanors (maximum term of 90 days) express a strong presumption in favor of
summons or citation, but permit arrest and continued detention if there is a risk of nonappearance,
bodily harm to the accused or another, or further criminal conduct. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 3.01, 6.01,
subds.l(1)(a)-(b). At the first court appearance in all cases, including felonies, there is a presumption
of release on recognizance unless the court finds such release "will be inimical of [sic] public safety or
will not reasonably assure" defendant's appearance. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02, subd.l.
360. Unless the suspect is already in custody, investigatory detention generally applies only to a
"flagrant" felony or delict. See supra notes 161-62.
361. See supra text accompAnying notes 30408. In cases initially charged as felonies or delicts,
any detention terminates upon referral of the matter to police court. See supra text accompanying
note 309.
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and would solve two specific problems. First, it would eliminate situa-
tions inherently likely to result in conviction of the factually or legally
innocent: those in which persons charged with relatively minor offenses
are detained for a few weeks or months and then are offered immediate
release in return for a guilty plea.362 Second, a prohibition on arrest and
detention for minor offenses would greatly reduce the number of cases in
which detention exceeds the sentence likely to be imposed upon convic-
tion. Such cases are quite common in some jurisdictions,3 63 and along
with detention of unconvictable defendants, these cases result in the glar-
ing injustice of undeserved imprisonment.3 4
4. Possibility of Trial in Absentia
In all delict and contravention cases, when the accused has received
proper notice of the trial date and fails to appear without a valid excuse,
he or she may be tried and sentenced in absentia; the results will be as
binding on the defendant as if he or she had been present.365 There are
no published statistics on the exact frequency of trials of this kind, but
they seem to occur with some regularity. 366
362. See H. ZEISEL, supra note 286, at 47-48, 225-27 (plea of guilty in exchange for sentence of
"time already served"). Some states try to avoid this problem by means of strict speedy trial rules
applicable to detained misdemeanor defendants. See, eg., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.06 (defendant in
custody must be tried within 10 days of his demand; if not, he must be released on nonmonetary
conditions). However, such rules often permit a longer period of total detention. See MINN. R.
CRIM. P. 4.02 (36 hours from arrest to first appearance in court, excluding day of arrest, Sundays,
and legal holidays, followed by 48 hours to file the complaint-after all of which speedy trial may be
demanded); MINN. R. CRIM. P. rule 34.01 (if time limit expires on Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, it extends to end of next court day). Moreover, since most misdemeanor sentences involve
no actual jail time, even the shortest speedy trial limit fails to eliminate pressures to plead guilty in
exchange for release from jail. M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES
IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 186-87 (1979) (over 90% of those convicted in New Haven Court of
Common Pleas do not receive a jail sentence).
363. See H. ZEISEL, supra note 286, at 219 (in New York City 25% of convicted defendants
who did not make bail received probation or other noncustodial sentences).
364. The New York City study, id., found that about half of detained defendants were never
found legally deserving of custodial punishment, either because they were not convicted or because
they received a noncustodial sentence. See supra note 296.
365. Proc. Code arts. 410, 544. If proper notice was not received, or felony charges are
involved, a default judgment may be entered which allows the defendant under certain conditions to
relitigate all the issues determined in his absence. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 23, 27, 29-
30.
366. I observed several trials of this kind during my trips to the city of Lyon in 1982 and 1986.
Published statistics group most nonvoidable trials in absentia together with those where the
defendant is present, but separate figures are provided for each of the following: 1) voidable
"default" judgments (defendant not properly notified, see supra note 365); 2) rehearings of such
default judgments; and 3) repeated default judgments (failure to appear at rehearing). Repeated
default has the same binding effect as trial in absentia, since the defendant, in having requested a
rehearing, is deemed to have had notice of the trial date.
In 1978, out of all convictions for felony, delict, and contraventions of the fifth class, 21% were
voidable defaults, 4% were rehearings of defaults, and 2% were repeated defaults. COMPTE
GANfRALE, supra note 39, at 28 table 14. Defendants who do appear seem to receive lighter
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The availability of such a procedure significantly undercuts one of
the major justifications for pretrial detention: flight risk. This especially
applies in minor cases, where flight risk (as opposed to dangerousness) is
usually the only reason for detention. Americans may feel that trial in
absentia is unjust, but we should ask ourselves: Is pretrial detention
really better?367 We may not wish to adopt all the French rules here,36
but we should seriously consider loosening the requirement that the
defendant be present, especially in less serious cases. Such reforms might
necessitate revisions in applicable riules of criminal procedure, 369 but
would not require reinterpretation of constitutional doctrines.37 °
sentences than those who do not. Overall, 17% of the above convictions involved an executed
custody sentence, but the custody rates for defaults, rehearings, and repeated defaults were 27, 24
and 51%, respectively. Idi at 29 table 15.
367. Of course, there is a third alternative: Release the defendant, continue his trial if he fails to
appear, and issue a bench warrant for his arrest. In addition to the cost and inconvenience to
witnesses, attorneys, and court personnel, this "solution" results in delayed justice, trials based on
stale evidence, and even dismissal of some or all charges.
368. In particular, it does not seem either necessary or fair to provide that the defendant's
counsel may not be heard in cases of unexcused failure to appear. See, eg., Proc. Code art. 411[2]
(in case of minor offense, written demand to be tried in absentia permits defense counsel to be heard);
Idi art 417[l] (defendant who appears has the right to counsel); see also Judgment of Oct. 29, 1970,
Bull. Crim. No. 284 (applying article 411[2]); Judgment of May 5, 1970, Bull. Crim No. 153 (same).
Americans might also wish to limit trials in absentia to less serious cases than do the French (for
example, to misdemeanors only). We might further choose to provide that defendants may be tried,
but not sentenced, in absentia. This distinction has long been recognized under the federal rules, see
infra note 369, apparently because there is less need to allow sentencing in absentia. Sentencing is
often postponed even when the defendant is present, and delayed sentencing causes fewer problems
than delayed trial due to the limited number of witnesses at sentencing, greater use of documentary
evidence, and so on.
369. See, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (providing that "It]he further progress of the trial to and
including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented... whenever a defendant, initially present,
is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced"). Virtually all federal appellate courts have
interpreted rule 43 to prohibit sentencing in absentia. See, eg., United States v. Songer, 842 F.2d
240, 241 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir. 1987)
(defendant's right to be present at sentencing under rule 43 is "fundamental to the entire law of
criminal procedure")). The rule might also be read to bar trial in absentia if the defendant was not
present at the start of trial, but some courts have upheld trial in absentia in such cases. See, eg.,
United States v. Schocket, 753 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1985) (defendant was told of trial date at
arraignment two months earlier, and no evidence indicated that absence from trial was involuntary).
370. The right to be present at trial is most closely associated with the sixth amendment right of
confrontation, U.S. CONST. amend. VI, but trial in absentia may also involve waiver or "forfeiture"
of general due process rights or of other specific rights which are inevitably exercised at the trial
itself (for example, the right to testify and the right to effective assistance of counsel). Although the
Supreme Court has not yet ruled on a case where the defendant failed to appear at the start of trial, it
has upheld trial in absentia when the defendant failed to return to a trial in progress. In Taylor v.
United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973), the Court declined to require a showing that the defendant had
been expressly warned of his right to be present and notified that the trial would continue in his
absence, saying that it was "wholly incredible" that a defendant who was present for the opening of
the trial would have any doubts on either score. Id. at 20. The same could be said of many
defendants who fail to appear at the start of trial, at least if they were expressly warned at their
arraignment and in any subsequent notice to appear of their rights and of their obligations to appear.
For general discussions of these issues, and the cases upholding trial in absentia under various
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5. Broader Admissibility of Documents and Depositions
Another justification for pretrial detention in the United States is to
prevent the defendant from threatening important prosecution witnesses
or tampering with the evidence.371 The French seem to avoid these
problems by means other than pretrial detention-in particular, by trial
evidence rules permitting liberal introduction of witnesses' pretrial state-
ments.372 American constitutional rules and evidence codes do not nee-
essarily exclude such statements, 373 especially where threats by the
defendant can be shown. 374 Thus we can potentially move further in this
direction so that no defendant is detained on the basis of protecting wit-
nesses and evidence alone, at least absent risk of serious bodily harm. As
with trial in absentia, we must ask ourselves whether the loss or limita-
tion of confrontation and cross-examination rights outweighs the costs of
pretrial detention, particularly in less serious cases where such detention
may equal or exceed any sentence likely to be imposed.37
6. Less Severe Sentencing Laws and, Practices
The risks of flight and witness intimidation are likely to be lower in
cases where the defendant expects to receive only a fine, a term of proba-
tion, or a short custody sentence if convicted. This relationship between
probable case disposition and the risks of release is presumably one of the
reasons why we rarely impose pretrial limitations on civil defendants,
and it provides an additional basis for prohibiting detention entirely in
minor criminal cases. This relationship, however, has implications for
more serious cases as well. 3 76 As discussed in Part VIII, French sentenc-
ing laws and practices seem generally less severe than in most American
circumstances, see Cohen, Trial in Absentia Re-Examined, 40 TENN. L. REv. 155 (1973); Starkey,
Trial in Absentia, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 721 (1979); Note, Criminal Trials in Absentia: A Proposed
Reform for Indiana, 56 IND. L.L 103 (1980) (authored by Myra L. Willis). See also Brewer v.
Raines, 670 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding Arizona procedure under which defendant,
expressly warned at arraignment, was both tried and sentenced in absentia).
371. See, eg., United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (trial court
may detain suspect to protect future witnesses, as long as afforded opportunity at a hearing to refute
allegations that he may threaten witnesses).
372. Trial evidence rules are discussed at infra text accompanying notes 703-36.
373. See generally Graham, Witness Intimidation, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 239 (1984)
(discussing the major constitutional and evidence code requirements and proposing additional rules
and procedures to deal with witness statements).
374. See, eg., State v. Black, 291 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Minn. 1980) (defendant who threatened
and thus caused absence of witness forfeited right to confront that witness; trial court properly
admitted witness' unsworn pretrial statements to police, as well as her testimony at her own trial).
375. See supra text accompanying note 296 (discussing the public costs of arrest and pretrial
detention).
376. At the other end of the continuum of severity, the relationship between the likely sentence
and the risks of release has been offered as one justification for the traditional rule denying bail to
defendants charged with a capital offense. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 12.4(a).
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jurisdictions,377 and this may be another reason why overall French pre-
trial detention rates are lower. Long statutory maximum sentences are
significant even if the maximum is rarely imposed (or if imposed, is rarely
served in its entirety); misinformed or anxious defendants may fear the
worst, and may thus be encouraged to flee or tamper with the evidence.
Given the well-established American tradition of authorizing and
imposing substantial custodial sentences, it may be unrealistic to hope
that we could soon reduce the average severity of our sentences, particu-
larly during the current era of "determinate sentencing," '378 in which
substantial prison terms are viewed as a convenient means of defining
and uniformly imposing "just deserts." However, determinate sentenc-
ing reforms may still help to reduce the risks of pretrial release, and con-
sequently the need for pretrial detention, by making clear to defendants
the actual and relatively short "real time" they would serve if convicted.
In addition, such sentencing reforms can specify that certain classes of
offenders may not, or presumptively should not, receive any custodial
sentence; in such cases, arrest and pretrial detention would also be pre-
sumptively inappropriate.379
7. Other Explanations
Future research should explore other differences between the
French and American systems that may help to explain the apparently
lower rates of arrest and pretrial detention in France. For example, the
American system seems to process a much higher proportion of violent
crime and drug offenders, who arguably must be detained for reasons of
public safety. The limited available data suggest that such differences in
"offense mix" do not explain the observed custody rate differences, 380 but
377. See infra text accompanying notes 563-629.
378. See generally von Hirsch & Hanrahan, Determinate Penalty Systems in America: An
Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 289 (1981) (overview and assessment of the various approaches to
determinacy); Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime" A Consumers' Guide to Sentencing
Reform, 6 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 3, 13 (Dec. 1976) (summarizing and discussing the implications
of proposed structural reforms in sentencing).
379. Cf MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.06 advisory committee's comment ("[A] person should not be
taken into custody for an offense for which he could not be incarcerated even if found guilty.").
380. See supra table at notes 133-36 (showing that 9.3% of persons charged by French police
with felonies and non-traffic delicts were charged with violent offenses, including arson and weapons,
whereas such offenses accounted for about 12.8% of American non-traffic arrests). However, the
most violent offenses (murder, rape and robbery) accounted for about equal proportions of persons
charged in France and the United States (2.3 and 2.2%, respectively). See LA CRIMINALITf EN
FRANCE, supra note 39, at 59-61; CRIME IN THE U.S.-1980, supra note 134, at 191. The
denominators used in these comparisons are not strictly analogous since the French statistics exclude
all contraventions, some of which correspond to offenses included in American arrest figures.
However, French arrest and detention rates for felonies and non-traffic delicts are lower than
American rates based on arrests. See supra text accompanying notes 320-23 & 334-37. Thus, for a
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further research using offense-specific arrest and detention data38' is
needed to resolve the issue.
VI
PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING DISCRETION
38 2
The aspect of continental criminal procedure that first attracted the
attention of recent American reform-oriented scholars was the limitation
on the European prosecutor's decision whether to file charges.383 Deci-
sions not to charge are particularly problematic in the United States384
because they are less likely to be successfully challenged by courts or by
interested parties (police, complainants, or other suspects who were
denied similar leniency).385  Thus, American scholars took particular
interest in the "rule of compulsory prosecution" found in West
group of French cases containing an equal proportion of the most violent offenses, the arrest and
detention rates are lower.
As for drug cases, which are clearly much more numerous in the United States than in France,
see supra table at notes 133-36, American pretrial detention rates are actually lower than for many
property crimes, and much lower than for violent crimes. See M. ToBORG, supra note 329, at 70
table A-1.
381. See infra text accompanying notes 600-08 & 627 (discussing examples of the
methodological problems that remain even when statistics are analyzed within seemingly
comparable offense categories).
Another possible explanation for low arrest and detention rates is harder to analyze empirically.
It is perhaps much more difficult for suspects to "disappear" in France as a result of the greater
degree of government regulation, a less transient population, the centralized national police forces,
and the simpler extradition procedures within the country. On the other hand, American police may
have equal or better access to nationwide, computerized records of "wanted" persons, thus making it
equally difficult for an American suspect to "disappear." To clarify these issues, future research
should examine the precise steps taken in each country to deal with persons who fail to appear as
required, and should calculate the proportions of such persons who succeed in avoiding recapture.
382. Although closely related to the charge-bargaining issues discussed in Part VII, "Plea
Bargaining and Its Analogues," infra notes 467-562 and accompanying text, this Part focuses on the
discretion of prosecutors to file or dismiss charges independent of the defendant's willingness to
cooperate. Even unconditional charging discretion raises problems of discriminatory enforcement,
underenforcement, and overenforcement (failure to promptly screen out weak or inappropriate
charges).
383. See K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 191-95 (discussing American assumption that prosecutorial
discretion must be discretionary, and offering the West German system of compulsory prosecution
as a viable alternative); Herrmann, supra note 7 (discussing theoretically and practically the extent,
limits, and patterns of prosecutorial discretion in the United States and Germany); Langbein,
Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 2 (discussing the West German system of controlling
prosecutorial discretion and suggesting criteria for the adoption of parts of that system into
American procedure).
384. K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 188-91 (arguing that American prosecutors' discretionary
power is excessive and uncontrolled, and should be subject to public review); Abrams, Prosecutorial
Charge Decision Systems, 23 UCLA L. REv. 1, 47-48 (1975) (suggesting limited judicial review of
decisions not to charge).
385. K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 170-72; Frase, supra note 38, at 246-47, 299-301.
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Germany,3"6 and in the active role in the charging process given to vic-
tims and/or judicial authorities in many European countries.3" 7
Despite perceptions to the contrary, French prosecutors are granted
and appear to exercise broad discretion to refuse to invoke the criminal
law, or to charge fewer or less serious crimes than the evidence would
permit.388 In practice, they may also exercise some control over drop-
ping charges in the trial court. At the same time, though, it appears that
prosecutorial charging discretion is significantly more restrained in
France than in the United States, and that some of the rules and proce-
dures used to achieve this restraint in France could be adapted to the
American context. Indeed, the "failure" of French procedures to con-
trast sharply with our own is not, from a reform perspective, cause for
disappointment, but rather for optimism: It is much easier to "borrow"
small differences than big ones.
Although prosecutorial charging discretion is often discussed as if it
were a single decision at a single point in time, prosecutors actually make
a variety of charging decisions in each case. Initial decisions include
whether even to file charges, and if so, how many and at what level of
severity. Later decisions may also involve the possibility of dropping all
or some charges, or reducing the severity of charges. The following dis-
cussion examines each of these forms of prosecutorial charging discre-
tion, describing the procedures used in France, the implications of these
findings for reform of American procedures, and the areas in which more
research is required. The first three Sections below examine decisions not
to prosecute. Decisions made at different stages of the charging process,
but having the same effect-for example, rejections of all charges-are
discussed together because they raise similar policy issues and are subject
to analogous methods of control in France. Moreover, analysis of the
French system suggests that stricter controls over later charging deci-
sions may indirectly serve to improve the quality of earlier decisions.
386. See Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 272-76. For
example, West German prosecutors have no discretion to decline prosecution of felony charges "in
cases where adequate incriminating evidence is at hand," and may decline provable misdemeanors
only if the accused's guilt is "minor" and "there is no public interest in prosecuting." J. LANGBEIN,
supra note 7, at 89-98 (quoting German rule of compulsory prosecution, STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG
[STPO] § 153(I) (W. Ger.)). Although misdemeanor declinations theoretically require court
approval, in practice this requirement has proven to be a mere formality. Id. at 99. However, crime
victims in West Germany may themselves prosecute for a narrow class of misdemeanors if the
prosecutor has exercised his discretion under STPO § 153 and refused to act. J. LANGBEIN, supra
note 7, at 101-02.
387. K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 194-95 (victim's role); Pugh supra note 2, at 959-61 (judicial
role); id. at 966 (victim's role).
388. Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 247, 277.
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A. The Decision Not to File Any Charges or to Dismiss All Charges
The American prosecutor has broad discretion both over initial
decisions to decline to file charges, and over postfiling decisions to drop
all charges. Some states retain the common law nolle prosequi power,
giving the prosecutor complete discretion to drop charges at any time
before trial.38 9 Other states and the federal system nominally require
leave of the court to dismiss serious charges, 390 but permission is rarely
denied.391 The American prosecutor's ability to "change his mind" at
virtually any point prior to trial causes American declination decisions to
occur either too early or too late. They may occur too early and too
hurriedly when prosecution is declined at the initial case screening stage,
which is usually shortly after arrest but before the detained suspect first
appears in court.392 At this point, the prosecutor may know too little
about the suspect or the offense to justify making a final screening deci-
sion, 393 yet declinations entered here are rarely reexamined. On the
other hand, declination decisions may occur too late when the original
decision to file a complaint was made simply to retain the option of pros-
ecution or to extend investigatory detention. In such cases, declinations
are often delayed until shortly before trial, as part of the plea bargaining
process. The delay is especially likely to occur in misdemeanor cases,
since they are generally not subject either to initial screening or to later
preliminary hearing and formal charging procedures requiring
prosecutorial attention,3 94 but delay can also occur in felony cases.395
Like the American prosecutor, the French prosecutor is granted
389. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 13.3(c).
390. See, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (dismissal of indictment, information, or complaint
requires leave of court); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 30 (dismissal of indictment requires leave of court); see
also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 13.3(c).
391. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE
GUILTY PLEA 14-24 (1981).
392. See also infra note 420 (examples of state and federal rules of procedure). See generally F.
MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 24-43 (1969) ("The
Warrant Standard"); Abrams, supra note 384, at 2-4 (discussing the impact of initial decision to file
a complaint).
393. Cf. W. McDONALD, PLEA BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACTICES 48
(U.S. Dep't of Justice 1985) (screening may be more effective when conducted at later stage and
based on fuller investigation-for example, 3 to 10 days after arrest-rather than between arrest and
initial charging). See generally Abrams, supra note 384, at 11-29 (discussing the trade-offs between
early versus high-quality screening).
394. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 1.4(f)-(i).
395. In Minnesota, for example, the Rules of Criminal Procedure abolish separate preliminary
hearings in felony cases, rarely require prosecution.by indictment, and allow the initial complaint to
serve as the formal charge at trial. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 8, 10, 11, 17. Thus felony and gross
misdemeanor cases are initially reviewed when a complaint is filed, at or prior to the first court
appearance, MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02(5)(2), and need not be reviewed again until the omnibus
hearing if defendant files a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, MINN. R. CRIM. P. 11.03, or
just before trial if no such motion is filed.
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broad power over initial charging decisions. Article 40 of the French
Code of Criminal Procedure states simply that "[t]he prosecuting attor-
ney shall receive complaints and denunciations and decide what to do
with them."3 96 This language is jnterpreted to permit nonprosecution
even in cases of provable guilt.397 In theory, prosecutorial discretion is
limited by the rights of crime victims to file charges directly in police or
correctional court, or to file with an examining magistrate.398 Further-
more, the victim can appeal the magistrate's refusal to investigate or dis-
missal on the merits. 399  However, crime victims do not appear to
exercise these rights frequently.'
On the other hand, postfiling decisions to dismiss all charges are
much more limited in France than in the United States. French prosecu-
tors have no formal nolleprosequi power to drop charges once the matter
has been sent to a trial court or examining magistrate. Rather, the court
or magistrate has sole discretion to decide whether the charges fit the
facts alleged by the prosecutor or disclosed by further investigation."
In 1980 French prosecutors screened over 15,000,000 matters
involving charges of felony, delict, or contravention (including traffic)
and made the following dispositions:4°2
396. Proc. Code art. 4011].
397. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1096, at 343-44; J. PRADEL, supra note 40,
§§ 344-346; G. STEFAN, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BOULOC, supra note 40, at 539-41.
398. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 20. A third limitation on the discretion to drop
charges arises when the prosecutor concludes that a screening decision cannot be made immediately
and that the case must be transferred to an examining magistrate to obtain pretrial detention or to
gain access to the greater investigatory powers of the magistrate. Opening a judicial investigation
terminates the prosecutor's power to decline prosecution, as well as his power to file fewer or less
serious charges. See infra text accompanying notes 401, 412 & 441-45.
399. Proc. Code art. 18612].
400. One study found that in 1970 only about two of every 1,000 criminal prosecutions in Paris
were initiated by such a "partie civile" but about 20% of all criminal actions had civil actions joined
to them. A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 21 n.34, 22 n.38. One reason more cases are not instituted
by civil parties may be the requirement of an advance security deposit for the costs of the
proceedings (unless the magistrate decides to dispense with the deposit requirement for destitute
parties). If the case is subsequently dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence, the civil party may be
required to pay costs, and even damages, to the accused. Proc. Code arts. 88, 91[1].
401. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1097, at 344-45; J. PRADEL, supra note 40,
§ 345, at 399-400; G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BouLoc, supra note 40, at 541-42.
Notwithstanding these formal barriers, one study indicates that trial courts never continue a case if
the prosecutor asks that it be dropped. See A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 18. Trial courts,
however, appear to have very limited formal power to dismiss charges, and the rules of procedure
contemplate that most cases, once filed, will proceed to trial and a verdict of conviction or an
acquittal. See Proc. Code art. 363 (assize courts); 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1451, at
757 (except where correctional or police court lacks personal or subject matter jurisdiction, the final
decision of the court is an order of conviction, acquittal, or absolution).
402. ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 107.
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Number Percent
Prosecution Declined 4,164,000 27.3
Referred to Examining Magistrate 67,000 0.4
Referred to Juvenile Court 62,000 0.4
Referred to Correctional Court 557,000 3.7
Referred to Police Court 10,393,000 68.1
TOTAL 15,243,000 100.0
If contraventions of the first four classes are excluded (since none are
actively screened, and many are parking violations), the percentage of
cases in which prosecution is declined increases to about 80%.4o3 This
figure is similar to the American declination rate of 75 to 80% for fed-
eral criminal matters, which, like French matters, are most often
declined without any arrest being made.' Comparable figures for state
criminal matters are not available, but the declination rates for felony
arrests tend to be lower-usually between 30 and 50%.4° s
The French appear to have conducted relatively little detailed
research on the specific reasons for declining prosecution. One study
reported that in Paris in 1970, 28% of complaints received (excluding all
contraventions) involved unknown subjects,"°6 and presumably a large
number of cases were also screened for other types of evidence insuffi-
ciency, such as missing or reluctant witnesses and inadmissible evidence.
Observers of the French system seem to agree that the following factors
also account for substantial proportions of declinations: restitution or
other compensation to the victim; cessation of illegal activities by the
defendant; absence of any legally proscribed conduct; existence of
403. See COMPTE GtNPRAL, supra note 39, at 18 (declination rate for 1978). The CoMPTE
GfNARAL does not give a figure for 1980, but the rate can be estimated as follows: Start with the
1980 overall declination data shown in the table above (number declined divided by total matters);
exclude all police court referrals from the denominator and add back in the 152,000 convictions for
fifth class contraventions in 1980. ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 121. The result is an
83.2% declination rate. See also A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 42 (1970 declination rate in Paris,
excluding all contraventions, was 86% (81% excluding unknown-subject cases)).
404. See Frase, supra note 38, at 251.
405. See, eg., K. BRoSI, A CRoss-Crry COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 7 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice 1979) (1977 declination plus dismissal rates in five U.S. jurisdictions were 29%,
44%, 49%, 52%, and 55%); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: TRACKING OFFENDERS, 1984, at 2 tables I & 2 (1985) [hereinafter TRACKING
OFFENDERS] (in 11 states representing about 38% of the U.S. population, 16% of felony arrests did
not result in any prosecution, and another 19% (23% of prosecuted cases) were later dismissed, for a
total declination-plus-dismissal rate of 35%).
Although the figures above include dismissals as well as initial declinations, they are
comparable to the French declination rates cited in the text because later dismissals are relatively
rare in the French system. See infra text accompanying notes 441-45 & 455-57.
406. A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 42. Unknown subject cases comprised about one-third of
the cases in which prosecution was declined. Id. Another 40% of declined cases involved bad
checks. Id at 43.
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amnesty or statute of limitations; triviality of the offense; sufficiency of
informal sanctions, treatment, or warnings; and other circumstances
leading to the conclusion that the overall "cost" of criminal prosecution
outweighs any potential benefits."°7 These factors are very similar to the
reasons for declination found in studies of American prosecutors. 4°
French declination decisions are the product of a multistage screen-
ing process inherent in the structure of the rules governing investigation,
arrest, and detention. Throughout these processes, French prosecutors
must make a series of decisions tailored to specific issues and the availa-
bility of information relevant to those issues. I will present these deci-
sions in the order they arise.
(1) The earliest decisions generally involve police requests to con-
tinue investigatory detention for a second twenty-four-hour period;4°9
(2) at the end of the initial or extended investigatory detention, the
prosecutor must decide whether to invoke the "immediate appearance"
procedure410 or to release the suspect. In the latter case, the prosecutor
may give the suspect a notice to appear in court,4 1 or the prosecutor
may decline prosecution or defer the screening decision;
(3) whether or not investigatory detention is involved, prosecutors
must often decide at an early stage whether to request the immediate
opening of a judicial investigation to obtain an arrest or pretrial detention
order, to invoke the additional investigative powers of the examining
magistrate, or to make those felony charges that seem warranted.41 2 A
large number of screening decisions probably involve police referral of
unsolved cases, as to which the prosecutor must either request further
police investigation, order a judicial investigation, or decide to decline
prosecution; and
(4) finally, when neither the immediate appearance nor the judicial
investigation procedure has been invoked at an early stage, the prosecu-
tor must eventually make a final screening decision either to decline all
prosecution, to prefer felony charges (which requires opening a judicial
investigation), to request such an investigation to obtain further informa-
tion, or to send the case directly to trial in correctional, police, or juve-
nile court.
407. See 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, §§ 1092-1097; A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at
42; see also id. at 196-98 (examples of screening examinations in I 1 "flagrant offense" cases).
408. See PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS, supra note 38, at 63-68; Frase,
supra note 38, at 248, 256, 262-69.
409. See supra note 161.
410. See supra note 301.
411. Proc. Code art. 394 (procedure known as "convocation by official reports"). Defendant's
first appearance in correctional court must occur within 2 months, but no sooner than 10 days. Id.
412. See supra note 164.
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What can Americans learn from these French practices and proce-
dures? The similarities between French and U.S. declination rates and
reasons suggest that the two systems are not so fundamentally different
as to preclude reform borrowing. At the same time, these similarities do
not necessarily mean that screening decisions are identical in both coun-
tries. Indeed, there are several reasons to hypothesize that French deci-
sions are more rational and uniform than in most American jurisdictions.
First, as discussed more fully in Part II, the hierarchical, career-oriented
nature of the French prosecution system suggests that French screening
decisions are likely to be made in a more consistent manner, based on
established prosecution policies and subject to internal, supervisory
review.413 Some American prosecutors follow similar practices, requir-
ing a combination of written internal prosecution policy, written reasons
for declination, and supervisory review of files and/or reasons for decli-
nation.414 Since such practices can improve the quality of screening deci-
sions, they warrant wider application. Further research on the French
system may also reveal other effective administrative procedures which
could be adapted to the American context.
Second, the crime victim in France plays a role-albeit a limited one
in practice-that serves as a useful check on actual or perceived abuses of
the discretion to decline prosecution. We should consider giving
American crime victims a greater opportunity to participate in these
decisions. While it is neither feasible nor desirable to give American vic-
tims all the benefits accorded to French victims (for example, rights to
compel or join the prosecution as a party; the possibility of combining
criminal and civil cases), it would be fairly easy to create an administra-
tive review mechanism whereby dissatisfied* victims (and perhaps also
police officers) could be given more formal or explicit rights to appeal
declination decisions to a supervising prosecutor.
Third, the multistage screening process described above appears to
give French prosecutors more time for careful selection or rejection of
charges, without unduly prolonging detention of suspects.415 Final
screening decisions are made several weeks after the suspect is initially
identified by the police;4 16 earlier decisions are limited to the need for
413. See supra text accompanying notes 77-103.
414. See generally Frase, supra note 38 (U.S. Attorney's office in Chicago consistently applied
reasonable albeit unwritten declination policies by means of a "reasons and review" approach).
415. See generally Abrams, supra note 384, at 14-20 (discussing the conflict between the goals
of encouraging careful-and therefore slower-screening, and minimizing unnecessary detention of
suspects who will not be prosecuted, which requires the earliest possible screening).
416. See COMPTE GtNgRAL, supra note 39, at 17 table 2 (chart showing by year the estimated
average duration of prosecutor screening). For the years 1979 through 1981, respectively, the figures
were 1.09, 0.95, and 1.11 months. Id. Screening by examining magistrates appears to take even
longer. See id. at 19 table 5 (average duration of judicial investigations for the years 1979 through
1981, respectively, was 8.88, 9.08, and 9.18 months).
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continued custody rather than the issue of prosecution.417 Allowing
more time for screening allows for decisionmaking based on more com-
plete information about the suspect and the offense, and reduces the need
for subsequent reappraisal of decisions in favor of prosecution. More-
over, because French prosecutors lack the power to drop charges that
have been filed in court,41 they have a strong incentive to make careful
screening decisions prior to that point.
The French charging process suggests several means for improving
American screening practices. The possibility of limiting the American
prosecutor's power to drop filed charges is discussed in a later section of
this Article.419 A system allowing more time for initial screening deci-
sions could be implemented in several ways. The easiest method would
be for prosecutors and police to establish a two-step declination process:
Cases in which complaints are not issued initially would be held open by
the police and "re-screened" by a different prosecutor several weeks
later. A second approach designed to minimize the duration of
precharge detention might require that the prosecutor's complaint be
filed at the first appearance if the defendant has not yet been released; if
he or she has been released, the complaint would not have to be filed for
another thirty days. A third approach is to change the rules of procedure
to provide that the complaint need not be filed at the first appearance in
court,42 but that it must be filed within forty-eight hours thereafter if the
defendant remains in custody, or within thirty days if released.42 Such a
rule would achieve a workable compromise between the three interre-
lated interests of criminal justice at this stage: the need for some period
of investigatory, precharge detention; the goal of limiting the duration of
such detention; and the value of less hurried, more well-informed initial
charging decisions. Allowing more time to file the complaint also
reduces the incentive for police and prosecutors to delay the suspect's
initial appearance (and release) in order to gain extra time for charging.
B. The Decision to Decline or Drop Additional Counts or Charges
In addition to the discretion to decline prosecution entirely,
American prosecutors also have broad discretion to decline to file or
drop additional counts or charges ("horizontal" charging discretion).
This discretion is implicit in the power to decline or dismiss all charges,
417. See supra text accompanying notes 409-11.
418. See infra text accompanying notes 441-42 & 455-57.
419. See infra text accompanying notes 502-06.
420. Cf. FED. R. CRiM. P. 5 (when person arrested without a warrant is brought before a
magistrate, complaint must be fied "forthwith"); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02(5)(2) (in felony and gross
misdemeanor cases, complaint must be filed at or before first appearance).
421. Cf. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 4.02(5)(3) (providing similar time limits in misdemeanor cases,
although the defendant may waive the filing of a formal complaint).
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discussed above, and raises similar problems.422
Horizontal charging discretion is somewhat more limited in France,
at least in theory. The discretion to decline all charges gives French
prosecutors broad power to decline to file additional counts or
charges.4 2 3 On the other hand, the lack of formal nolleprosequi power to
dismiss all fied charges means that French prosecutors also lack formal
power to dismiss selected counts or charges. However, it is not known
whether practice conforms to theory in this respect. Since published sta-
tistics contain no information on the disposition of specific counts or col-
lateral charges, it is possible that some charges are dropped in the trial
court, with or without the prosecutor's recommendation.
Even if substantial post- as well as prefiling screening of collateral
charges does exist in France, these discretionary decisions probably cause
fewer problems than in the United States. The screening is likely to be
more consistent in France for many of the reasons previously discussed:
the hierarchical prosecution function; the victim's right to participate in
charging and disposition; the multistage screening procedures, allowing
more time for careful selection of charges; and the absence of a formal
nolle prosequi power to discourage initial overcharging.
Moreover, even if collateral charges are declined or dropped incon-
sistently or excessively, the results are less problematic than in the
United States because French sentencing law provides that the number of
collateral charges has little effect on the defendant's present or future
sentence. Under the "rule of noncumulative punishments," consecutive
sentences are almost never allowed; nor may charges be serialized to
evade this rule. Only one sentence for the most serious current or previ-
ously sentenced offense may be pronounced.424 Furthermore, the maxi-
mum sentence for the most serious current offense may not be enhanced
on the basis of another current charge; the allowable enhancements only
apply where a second offense is committed after the defendant has been
convicted of the first offense.425
The reasons for these rules are twofold. First, like the more limited
American rules forbidding consecutive sentences for offenses arising out
422. See supra notes 382-85 and accompanying text.
423. Note that French courts and examining magistrates have no independent power to expand
the scope of the prosecution to new offenses unrelated to the criminal acts alleged in the petitions
filed by the prosecutor. In order to expand the prosecution in this manner, the prosecutor must
submit a new petition. Proc. Code art. 80; 2 R. MERLE & A. ViTu, supra note 40, § 1143; A.
SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 44; G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BOULOC, supra note 40, at 765-
67. The jurisdiction of trial courts-but not of the examining magistrate-is also limited to the
persons named in the prosecutor's petitions. Id. at 767.
424. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 32.
425. Id. (discussing concept of "legal recidivism").
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of a "single behavioral incident," '426 the French rules recognize that con-
secutive sentencing can easily exaggerate the offender's culpability.427
Second, the requirement of an intervening conviction before the applica-
tion of recidivism enhancements is based on the idea that such a convic-
tion serves as a solemn, formal warning to the accused, the disregard of
which increases the defendant's culpability for subsequent offenses. Con-
versely, the absence of an intervening conviction may have served to
encourage the defendant to continue his or her criminal activities.428
Conviction on multiple charges also has a limited impact on the
defendant's future sentences. Although the maximum (and sometimes
the minimum) penalty for subsequent offenses may be enhanced under
the rules for legal recidivism,429 these rules are based solely on the sever-
ity, not the frequency, of the defendant's prior convictions; the same is
true of the rules that allow prior crimes to limit future eligibility for pro-
bation, parole, or expungement of conviction.430 In this respect, French
recidivism rules operate less harshly than do American rules and stat-
utes, which often enhance subsequent sentences based solely on the fre-
quency of prior convictions.43'
In France, collateral charges can affect current or future sentences
426. Cf. MIN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (West 1987) (barring both serial prosecution and
cumulative punishment when "a person's conduct constitutes more than one offense"). This
provision covers not only single acts violating several statutes, ia, but also multiple acts
"'manifesting an indivisible state of mind or coincident errors of judgment,'" or motivated by a
"single criminal objective." State v. Zuehlke, 320 N.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Minn. 1982) (quoting State v.
Sailor, 257 N.W.2d 349, 352 (Minn. 1977)) (conviction for open bottle in car barred later
prosecution for furnishing liquor to minors in the car). But see State v. Gartland, 330 N.W.2d 881
(Minn. 1983) (upholding consecutive sentences for two counts of criminal negligence where drunk
driver caused death of two persons in another vehicle).
Except where limited by such statutes, American sentencing judges have broad discretion to
choose between concurrent and consecutive sentences. See infra note 434. Although consecutive
sentences appear to be the exception, they substantially increase sentence duration when they do
occur. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: FELONY
SENTENCING IN 18 LOCAL JURISDICTIONS 8 (1985) [hereinafter FELONY SENTENCING] (only one
out of nine multiple conviction cases involved consecutive sentences, but average prison durations in
these cases were over twice as long).
427. See 1 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 145, § 790, at 946-47; G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR
& B. BOULOC, DRorr PfNAL GINtRAL 581 (12th ed. 1984) [hereinafter G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR
& B. BOULOC, DROIT PfNAL].
428. See G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BOULOC, DROIT PtNAL, supra note 427, at 581.
429. C. PEN. arts. 56 to 58, 474.
430. Proc. Code arts. 734-1, 735, 720-2, 729 to 733-1.
431. See, eg., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding mandatory life sentence for
felon with two prior felony convictions for fraud totaling $108.36); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 6.07,
7.03, 7.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (extended terms for repeat offenders); MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY
at II.B, IV (1988) [hereinafter MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (duration of prison term and
presumptive prison commitment both depend in part on "criminal history score," which is based
primarily on the number of prior convictions at time of sentencing, including convictions entered
earlier that day).
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by encouraging judges to sentence more harshly within the maximum
range of penalties authorized for the most serious current or subsequent
offense. However, the absence of consecutive sentencing powers and the
limited availability of extended term and mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing powers significantly reduce the "worst case" sentencing impact of
collateral charges. Moreover, it appears that the basic maximum
sentences for French offenses are lower than for their American counter-
parts (for example, three years for simple larceny, regardless of the value
or nature of the property stolen).432 In fact, French sentences in general
may be more lenient than those in this country.433
These sentencing rules and practices suggest important directions
for further research and reform efforts in this country. By reducing the
sentencing impact of multiple convictions as the French have done, we
could substantially eliminate the injustices caused by variations in hori-
zontal charging over time, between different prosecutors, and across geo-
graphic regions. Such reforms-general prohibition of consecutive
sentences,434 less severe habitual offender and mandatory minimum sen-
tencing lawsa3 5-would also simplify trials and sentencing proceedings.
Furthermore, we might even conclude that the sheer frequency of viola-
tions--especially when committed in "sprees" or pursuant to a "common
scheme"-is not sufficiently linked to our sentencing goals to justify the
432. C. PEN. art. 381 (penalty for "simple" larceny); cf. id., arts. 382 to 398 (providing higher
penalties for theft accompanied by violence, entry into various structures, or carrying a weapon).
For a comparison of maximum French and American sentences for other crimes, see infra notes
569-71 and accompanying text.
433. See infra text accompanying notes 563-617.
434. The "common law" rule applied by federal and most state courts gives trial courts broad
discretion to impose consecutive sentences. See, eg., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692
(1980) (under double jeopardy clause, whenever two charges are not the "same offense," courts
assume that Congress intended to permit consecutive sentences); see also Cirillo, Windows for
Discretion in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1309, 1334 n.91 (1986)
(citing illustrative Pennsylvania cases); Robinson, Legality and Discretion in Criminal Sanctions, 25
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 393, 407-08 (1988).
A few jurisdictions have attempted to limit consecutive sentences. See, ag., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.035 (West 1987) ("single behavioral incident" rules); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES app. A, §§ 3D1.l-3D1.4 (Supp. 1988) [hereinafter FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (multiple conviction offenses are first placed in groups of "closely related
counts"-for example, same victim or transaction; the offense severity level for each group equals
the highest level applicable to any offense in the group, or the highest level produced by aggregating
the amounts for offenses in one group; the combined offense level for all groups increases according
to a formula, with a maximum increase of five levels above the group with the highest offense level);
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 431, at II.F. (presumptive requirement of
concurrent sentences for multiple felonies except in cases of escape or multiple "person" (violent)
offenses involving different victims); see also FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra, at app. A,
§ 1B1.3(a) commentary at 1.18-1.20 (in determining severity levels, "relevant conduct" includes all
acts in furtherance of the conviction offense, all aggregable theft, etc. amounts which were part of the
same course of conduct, and all resulting harms or risks caused at least negligently-even if
defendant was not formally charged with any of these acts or results).
435. See supra text accompanying notes 429-433.
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problems caused by imposing significant current and future sentencing
enhancements on such defendants.
Of course, any such sentencing reforms must overcome a major bar-
rier: the chronic inability of American legislators ever to reduce, or even
appear to reduce, criminal sentences.436 However, this barrier could per-
haps be overcome by a reform "package" that also included proposals
likely to increase certain sentences. One such reform proposal, discussed
below,437 would involve sharply restricting the ability of prosecutors to
dismiss provable, more serious charges, in return for a guilty plea.
C. The Decision Not to File More Serious Charges or to Reduce
Charge Severity
As they do with other charging decisions, American prosecutors
exercise broad pre- and postfiling discretion over the level of charge
severity ("vertical" charging discretion). American prosecutors can
reduce postfiling charge severity43 by moving to amend the complaint or
information43 9 or by filing a nolle prosequi and refiling with less serious
charges.
The availability of such reductions inevitably leads to initial
overcharging because it eliminates any need to screen cases carefully at
the outset; indeed, American prosecutors actually have an incentive to
exaggerate initial charges so as to leave more room for later plea bargain-
ing concessions. Overcharging, in turn, distorts arrest and pretrial deten-
tion decisions and adds to caseload pressures in those courts handling the
most serious offenses against persons and property. At the same time,
postfiling charge reductions also raise a risk of eventual undercharging, if
initially correct and provable charges are routinely reduced in return for
a guilty plea. Routine reductions seriously undercut the consistency,
rationality, and effectiveness of criminal sentences in three ways: They
understate the seriousness of the defendant's crimes and distort criminal
history records; they allow prosecutors to exercise sentencing power
directly, often without benefit of any independent presentence investiga-
tion; and they evade sentencing and parole rules tied to specific convic-
tion offenses. 440
436. See, ag., Zimring, supra note 378, at 13-14 (political considerations prevent legislators
from endorsing low presumptive sentences, even where actual time served in prison would not be
reduced).
437. See infra text accompanying notes 441-57 & 500-06.
438. See A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 391, passim.
439. See W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 19.2(g) (prosecutor may amend pleadings
to charge lesser included offense).
440. See sources cited at infra note 479; see also Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U.
PA. L. REv. 733, 757-72 (1980) (arguing that unfairness, inefficiency, and other problems point
"definitively" to unsoundness of any attempt to base guideline sentences on "real" rather than
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French prosecutors have much less vertical charging discretion.
They have no formal postfiling charge reduction power; nor do they
appear to exercise any such power in practice, at least not in cases ini-
tially filed as felonies." 1 Further research is needed to determine
whether charges are often reduced in correctional and police courts, but
it seems unlikely for several reasons. First, that practice has not been
noted in the literature, despite extensive discussions, by both French- and
English-speaking authors, of prefiling charge reductions." 2 Second, the
absence of explicit plea bargaining" 3 makes postfiling charge reductions
less valuable to French prosecutors than to their American counterparts.
At the prefiling stage, however, it appears that French prosecutors
often do decline to fie the highest charge supported by the evidence, even
though the practice is said to be illegal. 4 " Thus, the French prosecutor
often chooses to treat as a delict an offense that could have been prose-
cuted as a felony (a process known as "correctionalization"). The case is
then sent directly to correctional court, thereby avoiding judicial investi-
gation, review by the indicting chamber, and the more formal trial proce-
dures of the assize court. An analogous procedure-
"contraventionalization"-allows provable delicts to be sent to police
court and tried as contraventions. 445
It is difficult to estimate the quantitative significance of these prac-
tices, since there are no published statistics on the levels of offenses
charged by the police in cases sent to correctional and police courts.
Furthermore, the police may overcharge some cases. French observers
report, however, that correctionalization of aggravated theft offenses is
particularly common. 46 The practical reasons favoring correctionaliza-
tion and contraventionalization are varied: the desire not to inundate the
conviction offense). But see FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 434, § IB1.3(a)
(adopting concept of "relevant conduct" substantially broader than conviction offense).
The dropping of provable collateral charges ("horizontal" charge reductions) can cause many
of the same problems noted in the text, but the problems can also be addressed by means of the
French-inspired sentencing reforms discussed at supra text accompanying notes 424-37.
441. See 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1096, at 344-45; see also id. § 1395, at 682
(reduction of charges by the assize court was more common prior to a 1960 reform of the Penal
Code broadening that court's power to impose a delict sentence based on "extenuating
circumstances" upon conviction for felony).
442. See, eg., sources cited at infra note 444; A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 6-7, 18; Goldstein
& Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 251-53.
443. See infra text accompanying notes 467-76.
444. See 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, §§ 1393, 1396 (correctionalization violates
principles of subject matter jurisdiction since it effectively allows correctional courts to try felony
cases); accord G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BOULOC, supra note 40, at 497; see also J. PRADEL,
supra note 40, §§ 91-92 (better for legislature to reduce commonly correctionalized felonies to
delicts, but need for some individualized decisions by prosecutors remains).
445. See COMI'E GtNtRAL, supra note 39, at 26 n.5.
446. Id. at 26 n.4; see also id. at 41; M. VERON, DROIT PtNAL SPtCIAL 22 (1976) (increased use
of correctionalization in theft cases is implied by statistics showing that the number of convictions
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assize courts with excessive numbers of felonies, (many dating from the
1810 Penal Code and no longer considered serious); the expectation that
the assize court, viewing felony penalties as excessive, would refuse to
convict or at most would impose no more than a delict sentence; the
prosecutor's own belief that a felony conviction or sentence would be
excessive under the particular circumstances or in light of the defend-
ant's prior record;' 7 and the desire to speed up the process of conviction
and punishment as well as to avoid the inconsistencies of assize court
sentences." 8
The limitations on French prosecutorial discretion discussed
above" 9 would probably not effectively prevent the practices described
above. First, hierarchical controls may make undercharging more uni-
form, but they do not prevent it since the decisions are widely viewed as
appropriate and also fiscally imperative. Second, crime victims may not
object if the undercharging generally operates in their favor, for example
by speeding up the award of damages, or by ensuring that the defendant
remains out of jail and can thus earn the money to pay the award.45 °
Third, while the multistage screening process does give prosecutors
plenty of time to consider filing more serious charges, it does not other-
wise encourage such filing. Fourth, the active role of the examining mag-
istrate in the investigation and charging processes may actually
discourage felony prosecution, since prosecutors conceivably prefer to
retain complete control over these decisions, thus minimizing outside
scrutiny of their work. Fifth, once the case has been filed in assize, cor-
rectional, or police court, those courts have very limited power to expand
the scope of the prosecution to include more serious charges.451 Finally,
the French sentencing rules do not serve to minimize the importance of
for aggravated theft (vol qualifie') in the assize courts fell steadily in the late 1960s, while the number
of convictions for simple theft in correctional courts continued to rise).
447. In 1978, the last year with complete data, the proportion of convicted defendants in each
court with at least one final conviction prior to the date of the current offense was 49.6% in assize
courts, 36.4% in correctional courts, and 23.6% in police courts. ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra
note 39, at 111, 119, 125.
448. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1394; J. PRADEL, supra note 40, § 92, at 95-96;
G. STEFANI, G. LEVASSEUR & B. BoULoc, supra note 40, at 498.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 77-103 & 408-15.
450. Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 253. To the extent that
standards of proof are looser in police court than in correctional court, see FRENCH SYSTEM, supra
note 41, at 27-31, contraventionalization also serves the victim's interests by making conviction-
and therefore, the award of damages-more certain. However, correctionalization does not have
this benefit, since assize court rules, unlike those in correctional and police courts, permit damages to
be awarded even if the accused has been acquitted. Id. at 26, 29.
451. Trial courts have in rem jurisdiction over all criminal acts alleged in the petitions filed by
the prosecutor, see supra note 423. However, if the prosecutor fails to cite a specific aggravating
circumstance, the trial court may not, without the defendant's consent, expand the prosecution to
include that circumstance. See Judgment of Oct. 1, 1987, Cass. crim., Fr., 108 G.P. No. 3, at 395. If
the circumstance increases the level of the crime, the correctional or police court would lack
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the level of conviction offense; on the contrary, the rules governing recid-
ivism enhancements and eligibility for probation, parole, and expunge-
ment of conviction depend directly on the severity of current or prior
convictions.452
In spite of these apparent failures of the French system to fully
enforce the criminal law, undercharging may not, in fact, pose a serious
threat to that system. For one thing, rejection of more severe charges
does not necessarily result in a less severe sentence: Even when felony
charges are retained, about one-half of all defendants found guilty in
assize court receive sentences no more severe than they could have
received if they had been tried in correctional court.45 3 Perhaps even
more importantly, the timing and the unconditional nature of French
vertical charge reductions probably make these decisions more consistent
than analogous decisions in the United States. The absence of formal
"vertical" charge bargaining in France, discussed in the next Section,454
means that French charging is not distorted by extraneous plea bargain-
ing pressures. Prosecutors are free to focus exclusively on charging con-
siderations-the seriousness of the offense, the availability of the
evidence, and the resource limitations. At the same time, the French
prosecutor's limited power to reduce filed charges, even uncondition-
ally,45 5 serves to discourage overcharging, with its serious potential for
abuse.456 Finally, the rules allowing more time for initial charging45 7
permit well-informed selection of charge severity, which, in turn, allows
the system to impose strict limits on later charge reductions.
If further research on the French system confirms these features of
the vertical charging process, this aspect of French procedure certainly
merits consideration for adoption in the United States. Specifically,
American prosecutors, like their French counterparts, should be denied
the power to reduce charges after a given point in the pretrial process.
However, because this aspect of charging discretion is so closely related
to the problems of plea bargaining, my proposed limitations on vertical
charge reduction are reserved for discussion in Part VII. 45 8
jurisdiction to try it. The court would thus have to declare itself incompetent and remand the case to
the prosecutor, who might very well decide to dismiss all charges. Proc. Code arts. 469, 540.
452. See supra text accompanying notes 424-30.
453. In 1980, 51% of sentences in assize courts were to "correctional" imprisonment (that is,
five years or less, see FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 2 n.4). ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra
note 39, at I 11. Correctional sentences may be imposed either because the assize court convicts only
on delict charges, or because it finds "extenuating circumstances," thus shortening the prison term to
as little as one year. FRENCH SYsTEM, supra note 41, at 34.
454. See infra text accompanying notes 483-506.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 441-42.
456. See supra text accompanying note 440.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 415-18.
458. See infra text accompanying notes 483-506.
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D. Decisions to Prosecute
Although decisions to forego or drop charges have been especially
difficult to regulate in the United States,45 9 decisions to go forward with
prosecution also raise important problems. If weak or baseless charges
are not promptly reviewed and dismissed, defendants may face unneces-
sary hardship and embarrassment, and everyone involved-witnesses,
parties, and public officials-is subjected to needless expense. Insufficient
screening and intentional overcharging also aggravate the problems of
plea bargaining: Extra cases and counts add to the court congestion tra-
ditionally seen as necessitating plea bargaining, and additional charges
(even weak ones) increase the pressure on defendants to bargain rather
than to risk potentially far greater punishment by going to trial on the
original charges.
In France, the decision to prosecute on felony charges is strictly reg-
ulated. Decisions by French prosecutors to file felony charges are subject
to review by both the examining magistrate and the indicting chamber."
The examining magistrate may decide that the evidence will not support
any charges or will only support charges of delict or contravention, and
he or she may thus order dismissal or transfer for trial in correctional or
police court. 61 If the examining magistrate concludes that the facts con-
stitute a felony, the entire file is then sent for review to the indicting
chamber. The indicting chamber is also empowered to order a dismissal
or a trial on lesser charges, but the chamber usually approves the felony
charges.462 It then issues a decree of indictment, and the matter is set for
trial in assize court.
However, if the prosecutor decides to fie only delict or contraven-
tion charges, the matter is sent directly to the correctional or police court
with no judicial screening whatsoever. 463 For these cases-many of
which are comparable to Anglo-American felonies'--4 there is no coun-
terpart to the American preliminary hearing or grand jury review.
459. See supra text accompanying notes 384-85.
460. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 3.
461. In 1980, out of 64,786 decisions by examining magistrates, 20% were dismissals for
insufficient evidence, 6% were joinders and other procedural dismissals, 3% were referrals to the
indicting chamber, 65% were referrals to correctional court, 4% were referrals to juvenile court, and
1% were referrals to police or other courts. ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 107. The
prosecutor may appeal the magistrate's order to the indicting chamber. Proc. Code art. 185.
462. There are no published statistics on indicting chamber dispositions. However,
impressionistic studies and the statistics on overall caseloads of indicting chambers and assize courts
both suggest that the indicting chamber almost always approves the felony charges recommended by
the examining magistrate. See infra text accompanying note 650.
463. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 17, 27-31.
464. Delicts are punishable with imprisonment for up to five years (or longer, for recidivists).
See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at xix, 2. Many delicts-for example, "simple" theft, see supra
note 432-would be felonies under most American state laws, which define a felony as any offense
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Since felony trials constitute less than one percent of all contested
trials in France," 5 and all other decisions to prosecute are unreviewed
prior to trial, how do the French avoid the problems of insufficient
screening and intentional overcharging? Again, the answer may lie in the
combination of structural safeguards-hierarchy and a multistage
screening process-and the absence of explicit nolle prosequi and plea
bargaining practices. The prosecution hierarchy makes possible degrees
of training, supervision, specialization, and accountability likely to pro-
duce maximum screening efficiency. Because decisions to prosecute are
often made weeks, rather than days, after the police identify the suspect,
these decisions are more likely to be based on a complete investigation
that may have revealed weaknesses in testimony and new evidence. Per-
haps most importantly, the lack of formal nolle prosequi powers gives
prosecutors maximum incentive to screen cases carefully before filing,
and the absence of explicit plea bargaining removes a major incentive for
prosecutors to overcharge when they do file.
Each of these mechanisms controlling prosecution decisions in
France suggests possibilities for useful reform of American procedures.
Reform would be particularly valuable in states where, whether by law
or by custom, large numbers of felonies and misdemeanors are not sub-
ject to either preliminary hearing or grand jury review prior to being filed
in the trial court. Indeed, even where review is available, there is reason
to question its effectiveness466 and to consider adopting alternative
screening controls.
VII
PLEA BARGAINING AND ITS ANALOGUES
The issue that has received the most attention in the reform-ori-
ented comparative criminal procedure literature of the past fifteen years
is the extent to which continental systems depend on practices analogous
to American plea bargaining. This focus is not surprising: Plea bargain-
ing is central to the American system and has been widely attacked by
liberals and conservatives alike. At times it has been accused of involv-
ing unfair coercion, prosecutorial overcharginig, imposition of penalties
for asserting constitutional trial rights, increased risk of convicting the
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126,
§ 1.2(c).
465. In 1980 there were a total of 1,029,432 convictions in contested trials (excluding parking
and penal orders). Of these, 2,255 were in assize courts, 472,397 were in correctional courts, and
554,780 were in police courts. ANNUAIRE srATSTIQUE, supra note 39, at 109, 115, 121.
466. See Arenella, supra note 3, at 482-84, 539; Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1537-38 (1981).
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innocent, or unjustified charge and sentence disparities.467
American reformers began to look to foreign systems in the hopes of
finding ways to cut back or to eliminate our dependence on plea bargain-
ing. Some scholars, notably Professors John Langbein and Albert
Alschuler, concluded that continental countries had indeed avoided the
overt form of this practice-explicit trading of charge or sentence con-
cessions for the defendant's guilty plea.4 6 8 Professor Langbein concluded
that West Germany has avoided both overt forms and implicit or tacit
analogues of plea bargaining.469 The West Germans avoid plea bargain-
ing by simplifying and streamlining trial procedures, thus reducing the
sheer economic necessity of negotiating with defendants to waive their
trial rights, and by sharply curtailing prosecutorial control over charging
decisions.470
Other scholars, however, claimed to have found both explicit and
implicit forms of plea bargaining in these continental systems.471 The
explicit forms consist of penal orders and other "fine-only" dispositions
offered to defendants on condition that they admit guilt and waive any
hearing or trial. One implicit form of sentence bargaining is the "uncon-
tested trial," in which defendant's confession before or at trial permits a
rapid "finding" of guilt at a proceeding that is hardly more probing than
an American court's hearing to determine the voluntariness and factual
basis of a defendant's guilty plea.472 The French practice of "correction-
alization" of felonies could also be viewed as a form of implicit charge
bargaining:47 By agreeing to a charge reduction, the defendant limits
both the maximum sentence he or she can receive and the collateral con-
sequences of conviction on felony charges.
As applied to France, both sides of this debate seem partially in the
right. On the one hand, it is clear that (1) there is no "plea" bargaining
as such because there are no defendant "pleas"; (2) there is also very
little explicit trading of leniency for admissions of guilt, at least in serious
cases; (3) French trials are simpler and quicker, thus reducing the need
to minimize trial adjudication; and (4) French prosecutors have less con-
trol over charges than do most American prosecutors. On the other
hand, it seems equally clear that (5) French trials can be made even more
467. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 20.1(d)-(f); Alschuler, supra
note 7, at 932-34.
468. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 970-75, 1010; Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining,
supra note 2, passim.
469. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 205.
470. See id. at 206-12.
471. See, e.g., Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 277-79.
472. See id. at 268.
473. Id. at 250-53.
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simple and rapid-and, in minor cases, be avoided entirely-if defend-
ants confess or otherwise cooperate; and (6) French courts and prosecu-
tors do retain substantial unregulated discretion to be lenient with
defendants who cooperate.
However, it also seems highly likely that some of the features of the
German and French systems that prevent or regulate plea bargaining and
its analogues are too foreign to American traditions to be successfully
"transplanted" in the near future. Such features include the German
rule of compulsory prosecution,474 and most of the specific devices used
to "streamline" trials in Germany and France: the limited role of lay
jurors; the use of nonadversarial, judge-run trials; the elimination of
many evidentiary and exclusionary rules; and the practice of calling the
defendant as the first witness.475
In the discussion below, I will identify each of the major forms of
explicit and implicit plea (or "cooperation") bargaining in the French
system, focusing separately on charging and sentencing concessions.
Most of these forms appear to be less susceptible to abuse than typical
American plea bargaining practices, but they are not so foreign to our
traditions as to make unrealistic the proposals for their adoption in the
United States. Some French practices already exist in American criminal
procedure in at least rudimentary form; others find counterparts in our
civil procedure and could be readily adapted to the criminal context.
Thus, reform can easily "build on what we [already] have. 476
A. French Charge Bargaining
To reform-oriented comparativists dissatisfied with the abuses of
American plea bargaining, one of the clearest examples of the superiority
of European procedures is the absence of most forms of charge bargain-
ing. All forms of plea bargaining may raise serious problems, 477 but
charge bargaining---especially "nonevidentiary" charge bargaining (the
dropping of provable charges in return for a plea)478"-is particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse. Charge bargains tend to understate the true severity or
474. STPO §§ 152-153; see also Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 211
("German law requires that all felonies... and all misdemeanors that cannot be excused under the
two statutory criteria of pettiness must be prosecuted whenever the evidence permits.").
475. These specific French trial procedures, and the problems of trying to adopt them in the
United States, are discussed at Appendix, infra text accompanying notes 678-736.
476. See Morris, supra note 3, at 1369 (arguing that reform proposals must recognize the
improbability of completely altering the American criminal system).
477. See supra text accompanying note 467.
478. Cf. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 434, § 6B1.2(a) ("Policy Statement")
(court may accept charge bargain if it finds, on the record, that "the remaining charges adequately
reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior, and that accepting the agreement will not
undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing"). Under a proposed Department of Justice plea
bargaining policy pursuant to these guidelines, federal prosecutors "may not stipulate away a true
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frequency of the defendant's crimes and distort his or her criminal his-
tory record. Furthermore, these bargains allow prosecutors to exercise
sentencing power directly-an authority properly belonging to the
court-often without benefit of any detailed, independent, presentence
investigation. Finally, charge bargaining effectively undercuts sentencing
and parole reforms linked to specific conviction offenses.47 9
Charge bargaining may also be more difficult for judges to control
than sentence bargaining. Sentencing decisions have traditionally been
relegated to judges, who must take primary responsibility for those deci-
sions, whereas charging decisions have traditionally been considered a
matter of prosecutorial discretion.48 0 Moreover, even if judges wanted to
place limits on nonevidentiary charge bargains, it is difficult for them to
identify those bargains. Given the limited means available to courts to
assess the strength of charges that the prosecutor wishes to drop, often a
judge's easiest course is to presume that the charges were not provable
and thus defer to the prosecutor's request.
The central reason for the absence of charge bargaining in Europe is
that continental prosecutors lack the common law prosecutor's nolle
prosequi power to drop pending charges. Moreover, in several countries,
notably in West Germany, prosecutorial discretion is also tightly con-
trolled prior to the filing of charges in court.48 l In France, however,
prosecutors enjoy broad charging discretion in the prefiling context.482
Furthermore, as discussed more fully below, there do appear to be ana-
logues of charge bargaining in France. Nevertheless, because these forms
are still preferable to those found in the United States, they merit further
study and efforts to move American practices closer to those of the
French.
fact or a readily provable fact." Justice Department Views, 42 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2340 (1988); see
also State v. Haner, 95 Wash. 2d 858, 631 P.2d 381 (1981) (affirming court's rejection of proposed
charge bargain); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.450(1) (1988) ("[D]efendant will normally be
expected to plead guilty to the charge or charges which adequately describe the nature of his or her
criminal conduct or go to trial.").
479. See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals
for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 550, 563-77 (1978); see also Frase,
supra note 295, at 231-32. While evidentiary charge bargaining-dropping weak charges in return
for a guilty plea-raises fewer of these problems, it is fundamentally dishonest, encourages initial
overcharging of the case, and probably produces the widest sentencing disparities. Id. at 232. As
suggested at infra text accompanying notes 503-06, weak charges should be dropped
unconditionally.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 438-39.
481. See Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 272-73; Langbein,
Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 210-11.
482. See supra text accompanying notes 396-400.
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1. Vertical Charge Bargaining (Correctionalization)483
Some commentators have argued that this French practice bears no
resemblance to American charge bargaining for three reasons: these
charge reductions do not affect the method of adjudication since defend-
ants still receive a trial;4 84 the reductions are not "bargained" for-
rather, they are made unilaterally and usually occur before the defendant
has an attorney;485 and they are not conditioned on either the defendant's
confession (which can be withdrawn later anyway) or on his or her
cooperation.486
Each of these points has some validity, but none should be over-
stated. First, although defendants in correctional court still receive a
"trial," they do not enjoy the greater procedural protections associated
with prosecution on felony charges. Specifically, the defendants lose any
chance that the examining magistrate will help uncover evidence in their
favor or will dismiss all charges.487 Defendants also subject themselves
to the looser evidentiary standards permitted in correctional court.488
Finally, defendants in correctional court forfeit the possible value of lay
participation in the assize court.48 9 Second, while it is true that French
prosecutors do not openly "bargain" for correctionalization, the possibil-
ity of less explicit "exchanges" is not ruled out. So-called "tacit bar-
gains"4 90 are well-known in the United States: Defendants cooperate
with the expectation that they will receive charging leniency, and they
are rarely disappointed. Thus the critical issue is whether French correc-
tionalization decisions are conditioned on a defendant's cooperation.
483. The following discussion disregards the analogous practice of "contraventionalizing"
delicts (sending provable delicts to police court to be tried as contraventions). This practice has
received less attention from both French and American commentators. To the extent that it involves
defendants' giving up the procedural protections available in one particular court in return for a
lower charge and sentencing range, the discussion of correctionaization in the text is applicable to
contraventionalization.
484. Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1557-58.
485. Id at 1558; Weigend, supra note 3, at 409.
486. Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1558; Weigend, supra note 3, at 408-09. The utility
of attempting to withdraw a confession is questionable, however, since the French trial court retains
broad discretion to evaluate and reject the retraction. See 2 R. MERLE & A. ViTu, supra note 40,
§ 976.
487. As noted in the previous section, these dismissals happen quite frequently during the
judicial investigation (although undoubtedly some of these dismissals involve unknown persons).
See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
488. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 23-30 (providing a description of trial
procedures and evidentiary standards in both assize and correctional courts).
489. Cf. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 7, at 185-91 (suggesting that German lay judges have a
slight prodefendant effect on determination of guilt, and a somewhat stronger mitigating effect on
sentence).
490. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 111-12 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (describing
the tacit bargain as it appears in the United States).
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There are at least two ways in which correctionalization could be
linked to the defendant's cooperation. First, cooperation, especially a
full confession, simplifies the case,4 9 ' often obviating the need to open a
judicial investigation (with the attendant possibility that the examining
magistrate will insist on felony charges). However, no research to date
has produced any evidence that a French defendant confesses in the hope
that the case will be correctionalized. Furthermore, as noted above,
defendants rarely have counsel at this stage, so a defendant may not nec-
essarily perceive his or her confession as a permissible bargaining chip.
Consequently, if there is any explicit or implicit inducement to cooperate
and thus avoid or minimize judicial investigation, it probably focuses
more on the defendant's desire to avoid further detention, and not on the
desire to avoid felony charges.
The second link between a defendant's cooperation and correction-
alization is stronger. The defendant's cooperation is necessary because
correctionalization cannot take place over the defendant's objection, once
he or she appears for trial in correctional court. Since that court lacks
jurisdiction to try a felony,492 the accused, by pointing out the facts of the
case which would justify felony charges, can force the correctional court
to declare itself incompetent.493 Although this is very rare in practice,494
it does occur. 495 Given that the defendant has this legal right, the mini-
mum elements of a tacit vertical charge bargain do seem to exist: The
defendant receives a charge reduction in return for his or her "coopera-
tion" in not insisting on the greater procedural protections associated
with felony charges.
In spite of these similarities, however, correctionalization is less sub-
ject to abuse than American vertical charge bargaining. As noted above,
French defendants do not give up nearly as much as American defend-
ants who plead guilty. While American defendants offered a charge
reduction must make a full, irrevocable confession of guilt, French
defendants still receive a trial at which they can fully contest the charges.
Moreover, the odds of conviction in correctional court are only slightly
higher than in felony court.49 6 In these respects, correctionalization
bears some similarity to another practice found in the United States:
491. Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 276-78.
492. Proc. Code arts. 381, 382, 469.
493. Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1552.
494. Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 253.
495. See, eg., Judgment of Feb. 9, 1984, Cour d'appel, Rouen, Fr., 104 G.P. Nos. 272-73, at 15-
16 (defendant refused correctionalization, preferring to raise his self-defense claim before a jury in
assize court).
496. For the years 1960 through 1978, median conviction rates for assize and correctional
courts were 92.7 and 95.2%, respectively. COMPTE GINfRAL, supra note 39, at 25.
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"jury-waiver bargaining." '497 However, correctionalization is still prefer-
able because it gives the defendant a charge reduction which, under
American constitutional principles, justifies the application of lower pro-
cedural standards.4 98 Jury-waiver bargaining, on the other hand, gener-
ally asks defendants to accept adjudication and conviction on serious
charges49 9 without the most important procedural protection normally
associated with such charges.
If correctionalization is similar but in some ways superior to its
American analogues, how can we adapt American procedures to make
them more like the French ones? I have two alternative proposals. First,
American prosecutors should be encouraged to examine charge severity
carefully and make any necessary charge reductions unilaterally, without
waiting for the defendant to agree to plead guilty. It is important to
stress that this would not necessarily require prosecutors to give defend-
ants "something for nothing." In many cases, reduction of charge
levels-for example, felony to gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor to
petty misdemeanor-will invoke less complex pretrial and trial proce-
dures, such as those involving grand jury, preliminary hearings, discov-
ery, jury size, voir dire procedures, and jury and counsel rights, thus
making it easier and/or cheaper to obtain a conviction even if the defend-
ant insists on trial. Moreover, the lower penalty range may itself per-
suade defendants not to insist upon a trial. Prosecutors could be
encouraged to use this approach if we took further steps, as the French
have done, toward "making the procedure fit the crime"-for example,
by eliminating jury rights under state law for misdemeanors not subject
to federal constitutional jury rights (punishable by six months' imprison-
ment or less).
One problem with the above proposal, however, is that it might
encourage some prosecutors to reduce the charges even where the higher
charge is easily provable, thus raising many of the problems of "nonevi-
dentiary" charge bargaining.5°° Also, the proposal would not prevent
American prosecutors from trading charge reductions for a defendant's
agreement to plead guilty. In France, these problems are less likely to
497. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1024-43 (describing implicit procedures in Philadelphia and
Pittsburgh whereby defendants generally receive substantially diminished sentences in return for
waiving their right to a jury trial); see also Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1037 (1984).
498. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (criminal offenses carrying a maximum
prison sentence of six months or fewer can be tried without a jury); cf Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979) (no right to appointed counsel because, although conviction offense was punishable by up to
one year in prison, defendant's actual punishment was only a $50 fine).
499. In most instances American defendants who waive their right to a jury trial simply receive
the probability of a more lenient sentence. However, such defendants occasionally receive a reduced
charge in exchange for waiver of a jury trial. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1029.
500. See supra text accompanying note 479.
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arise because prosecutors have limited power to reduce the charges once
they are filed with the court.
The broad power of American prosecutors to reduce pending
charges at any time before trial, with little if any judicial scrutiny,"'1 also
raises two related problems. First, such charge reductions are likely to
occur at a time when the defendant has an attorney and is prepared to
plead guilty, thus making charge bargaining almost inevitable. Second,
the closer to the trial stage that we permit charge reductions, the more
likely it is that the prosecutor doing the screening will be the trial prose-
cutor. The result may very well be a nonevidentiary charge bargain
caused by a sudden scheduling conflict, a particular defense attorney or
judge, laziness, lack of trial experience, or other penologically irrelevant
factors.
The solution to these problems is clear, although my second propo-
sal is more difficult to implement than the first. The American prosecu-
tor's power to reduce-or increase502- charges must, as in France, be
sharply limited after some stage of pretrial procedure. 0 3 On or before a
prescribed "charging cutoff" date-for example, after completion of dis-
covery and suppression hearings-the prosecution would be expected to
make its final screening decisions, reducing all charges that it does not
intend to pursue or cannot maintain at trial. After that, further charge
revisions could only be ordered by the court under strict standards (per-
haps supported by some system of costs or other incentives). Although
this rule would involve a major change in existing American practices, it
is by no means unprecedented. Existing rules of procedure in many juris-
dictions already recognize a fundamental distinction between pre and
postfiling prosecutorial discretion,5" and there is some evidence of a
501. See supra text accompanying notes 389-91.
502. A proscription on this power is necessary to prevent prosecutors from threatening to file
more serious charges if a defendant refuses to plead guilty. Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 362-65 (1978) (filing of habitual offender charge--carrying mandatory life sentence-after
defendant refused to plead guilty to forgery and receive a five-year sentence did not violate due
process absent showing of vindictiveness by prosecutor).
503. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 967-68 (proposing a 30-day waiting period between any
charge reduction and entry of guilty plea, to reduce the possibility of implicit agreements and assure
compliance by both parties); see also FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 434, § 6B1.2
commentary (court should review plea-contingent charge reductions and dismissals, but defer to
prosecutor on unconditional reductions); A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 391, at 66-67 (arguing that
courts should more actively review charge bargains and develop a "common law of prosecutorial
discretion"); Parnas & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 101, 119-
21 (1978) (proposing an early charge-setting hearing after which charges could only be reduced or
altered at the preliminary hearing, or under "exceptional circumstances" as a result of "significant
new information not previously available"); Schulhofer, supra note 440, at 772-98 (proposing that
judges should have greater formal power to limit or reject charge bargains, but not to order
unconditional charge reductions or dismissals).
504. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) (dismissal of charge requires leave of court); see also State
ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 128-30, 401 N.W.2d 782, 786-87 (1987)
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trend toward greater willingness of courts in these jurisdictions to exer-
cise their power to review postfiling dismissals.5 05
To prevent charge bargaining in the period before cutoff, it may be
necessary to prohibit the entry of a plea to reduced charges during that
period. This will ensure that, as in France, the prosecution will be bound
by its final charges before the defendant is in any way bound by his or her
plea. If the cutoff date were sufficiently in advance of trial, a defendant
could then make an informed plea decision, and it seems quite likely that
most defendants would continue to plead guilty.5 0 6 Unlike our present
system, however, the plea would be based on the "real" charges likely to
lead to conviction at trial and thus would not be influenced by charging
threats or offers. At the same time, the quality of charging decisions
before cutoff would substantially improve. If the decisions had to be
made on a "plea-blind" basis (and less subject to sudden calendar pres-
sures), prosecutors would be free to base their charging decisions exclu-
sively on the merits of the case-evidence, aggravating and mitigating
-factors, alternatives to prosecution, and so on-as well as on general
resource limitations. Under these circumstances, it would thus be possi-
ble to minimize the incidence of overcharging, undercharging, and incon-
sistent charging.
2. Horizontal Charge Bargaining
Another common form of charge bargaining in the United States
involves the prosecutor's agreement to drop or decline to file other
counts or charges in return for the defendant's cooperation. Horizontal
charge bargaining raises many of the same problems as vertical charge
bargaining.5 0 7 However, the proposal of a charging cutoff is less feasible
in the horizontal charging context, since the prosecutor can simply hold
(distinguishing between pre- and postfiling judicial review of decisions not to prosecute), overruled on
other grounds, State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989). See generally
supra note 390 and accompanying text (some states require leave of court to dismiss serious
charges).
505. See United States v. Bean, 564 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1977) (no abuse of discretion where
district court rejected defendant's plea of guilt to theft and agreement to cooperate in the
investigation of other suspects in return for dismissal of a burglary charge; the district court had
found the bargain did not impose a penalty commensurate with the offense); A. GOLDSmIN, supra
note 391, at 17-24 (illustrating trend in the federal courts and some state courts toward greater
judicial control over postfiling dismissals); Schulhofer, supra note 440, at 773-78 (arguing for formal
power vested in the courts to review and reject postfiling dismissals, and indicating state trend in this
area).
506. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 949-52 (arguing that, apart from bargained concessions,
most misdemeanor defendants plead guilty because of remorse, lack of defenses, and/or "process
costs" of trial which outweigh any benefits). The same is probably true in many felony cases. See id.
at 943-44 (suggesting that lack of defenses and process costs might lead to significant numbers of
guilty pleas in felony cases without plea bargaining).
507. See supra text accompanying note 479 (discussing problems associated with charge
bargaining).
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back collateral charges and threaten to bring them later if the defendant
refuses to plead guilty.50 8
The question whether French prosecutors engage in similar prac-
tices has received very little attention in the literature. American
researchers may have assumed that any form of horizontal charge bar-
gaining is impossible in European systems given the absence of formal
nolle prosequi powers and, in West Germany, the existence of the rule of
compulsory prosecution. However, as noted previously, it is not known
whether French practice conforms to theory in this context.509 If French
prosecutors and/or courts do retain some postfiling power to drop collat-
eral charges, this power could be used to reward defendants who confess
or otherwise cooperate at trial. In any case, the French prosecutor's
broad control over the filing of initial charges allows him or her to forego
collateral charges in return for prefiling cooperation (for example, confes-
sions given to the police), and to threaten to bring additional charges
later in retaliation for the defendant's failure to cooperate at the pretrial
or trial stages.
I am not aware of any reported research, in either French or Eng-
lish, suggesting that French prosecutors actually exercise their powers in
this way. But if they do-or if defendants and their lawyers think that
they do-the practice probably raises fewer problems in France than it
does in most American jurisdictions. As noted in the previous Sec-
tion, 10 French sentencing law significantly limits the "worst case"
impact which collateral charges can have on the defendant's current and
future sentences. As a result, French defendants have much less incen-
tive to cooperate in the hope of avoiding conviction on collateral charges,
and prosecutors have less incentive to drop or forego such charges to
induce cooperation. Thus, as Americans search for ways to control the
problems of horizontal charge bargaining, we should also look to the sen-
tencing laws of other Western nations. By reducing the sentencing
impact of multiple convictions as the French have done, perhaps we can
508. It might be possible to draft a broad compulsory joinder rule applicable to all offenses
"known" to the prosecution at the time of the charging cutoff date, but such a subjective standard
could prove difficult to enforce when the collateral charges do not arise out of the same incident,
scheme, or investigation.
In the vertical charging context, while prosecutors might argue that they were previously
unaware of the true seriousness of the offense, they cannot claim complete ignorance of it.
Moreover, double jeopardy rules also limit later filing of more serious charges based on the same
incident. See Schulhofer, supra note 440, at 788 n.218. In the horizontal charging context, existing
joinder rules tend to be permissive, see, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 8, except in the case where "a person's
conduct constitutes more than one offense." See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.035 (West 1987),
discussed at supra note 426.
509. See supra text accompanying notes 423-24.
510. See supra text accompanying note 424.
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at least ameliorate, if not eliminate, the problems of horizontal charge
bargaining.
B. French Sentence Bargaining
As with charge bargaining, sentence bargaining in the United States
may be either explicit or implicit."' 1 Explicit forms of sentence bargain-
ing include: prosecutorial agreements to recommend or not to oppose a
lenient sentence or sentence "cap"; "agreed" sentences that are jointly
recommended by prosecution and defense (usually with the understand-
ing that the defendant may withdraw his or her plea if the court refuses
to be bound by the agreed-upon sentence); and judicial agreements on a
particular sentence or sentence cap. Implicit or tacit sentence bargains
involve unbargained-for expectations that the defendant's cooperation
will be rewarded with a more lenient sentence. Such leniency is extended
for the same reasons that judges and prosecutors explicitly offer lenient
treatment to defendants who cooperate: the perception that such defen-
dants deserve less punishment, that lesser punishment is necessary to
induce an acceptable number of guilty pleas, or for both these reasons.5 12
Sentence bargaining circumvents some of the problems associated
with charge bargaining.513 It does not distort the seriousness or fre-
quency of the defendant's crimes; nor is it as likely to encourage
overcharging or prosecutorial usurpation of judicial sentencing power.
Sentence bargaining is also easier for judges to control, and it is more
susceptible to regulation by means of sentencing or parole reforms based
on conviction offense. Still, sentence bargaining can produce unjustified
sentence disparities and penalties for the assertion of constitutional
rights. Extreme disparities between pleas and eventual trial sentences
may lead to conviction of the legally or factually innocent and may also
be perceived as unfairly coercive.
Although studies of the French criminal justice system have not yet
revealed any evidence of explicit sentence bargaining, several forms of
tacit bargaining seem to exist. However, as discussed more fully
below,"1 4 it appears that most of these forms are subject to fewer abuses
than typical American forms of sentence bargaining. At the same time,
511. See generally TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 490, at 108-12 (discussing the various
types of charge and sentence bargains).
512. See generally 3 A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 14-1.8(a) (2d ed.
Supp. 1986) (listing four reasons defendants who plead guilty might be found to deserve charge or
sentence concessions). The original version of these standards contained a slightly broader list of
justifications for such concessions, based both on presumed deserts and on the need to induce guilty
pleas. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.8(a) (Approved Draft 1968); see also
infra note 528.
513. See supra text accompanying notes 477-79.
514. See infra text accompanying notes 523-24.
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several of the French practices are similar enough to existing American
procedures that they may feasibly be adopted here.
L The (More or Less) Uncontested Trial
As noted at the outset of this discussion, skeptical American
researchers assert that the basic issues of a case are uncontested in most
European trials, and that such trials closely parallel tacit plea bargaining.
In a typical case, the defendant's confession before or at the outset of a
trial permits a rapid "finding" of guilt at a cursory proceeding. Empiri-
cal research on trials in West Germany supports the existence of this
phenomenon. German defendants made a "full confession" in 41% of all
trials (another 26% involved "partial" confessions), and full confession
reduced the adjudication phase of the trial by about 50%.15 Addition-
ally, the crucial quid pro quo of plea bargaining-sentencing leniency in
return for cooperation-is assumed by both skeptics and supporters of
the German system, for the defendant's cooperation is almost always
considered a mitigating factor in sentencing in continental systems.516
Similar empirical data are lacking for French trials, but the univer-
sal impression left with Anglo-American observers is that French trials,
particularly in correctional and police courts, are typically uncontested,
at least in part, 1 7 and that calling witnesses other than the defendant is
the exception rather than the rule.518 The uncontested nature of such
515. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 7, at 146-47, 151 table 20; see also Weigend, supra note 3, at
411 (citing study of lower court trials in which defendant's confession reduced the average trial from
70 to 50 minutes, or only about 30%).
516. M. DAMA9KA, supra note 25, at 193 (arguing that sentencing concessions are routinely
granted to cooperating defendants in all continental systems of criminal justice); Goldstein &
Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 272-73, 278-79 (asserting that cooperation
and confessions are considered in sentencing in both Germany and France); Langbein, Land
Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 221-22 (acknowledging that German courts "sometimes"
consider confessions as a mitigating factor in sentencing); Weigend, supra note 3, at 411; see also J.
LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 55 (example of a German formal judgment order treating defendant's
confession as a mitigating factor). But see Alschuler, supra note 7, at 986-87 (most civil law jurists
interviewed denied that confessions, especially late ones, are "systematically" rewarded).
517. See, eg., A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 202-10 (in summary of 11 correctional court
trials, of the 9 completed trials, only 2 involved total denials of guilt, 3 involved partial denials, and 4
involved complete confessions or the equivalent); see also S. BEDFORD, THE FACES OF JUSTICE: A
TRAVELER'S REPORT 303-08 (1961) (summarizing trials observed in correctional court).
518. In the Spring of 1982 and 1986, I observed about 50 correctional court trials in Lyon,
France's second largest metropolitan area, with a 1982 population of about 1 million. See A
POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1988, at 195 (A. Banks ed. 1988). Trials preceded by a
judicial investigation almost never involved live witnesses; other trials occasionally did. The few
police court trials I was able to observe involved no witnesses other than the defendant. See also
sources cited at supra note 517 (noting that in these summaries typically no witnesses other than
defendant were called).
Assize court adjudications resemble more closely what Americans think of as a "real" trial. All
available prosecution witnesses are summoned, if available, and defense witnesses are frequently
cited and heard. See S. BEDFORD, supra note 517, at 277-98 (summary of one assize court trial);
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trials, however, is apparently not due to the court's control over the call-
ing and questioning of witnesses, for French defendants clearly have the
legal right to insist that any or all prosecution or defense witnesses be
called and questioned at trial." 9 Rather, it appears that defendants and
their attorneys choose not to contest some or all of the state's case.
It is unclear why French defendants do not insist on the full mea-
sure of the adversary trial procedures available to them. In his observa-
tions of the West German system, Professor Langbein has suggested that
German defendants confess at trial for several reasons: many cases are
"open and shut"; "[p]eople do not like to be caught lying"; guilty defend-
ants prefer to focus the court's attention on the mitigating factors affect-
ing sentencing; and courts "sometimes" show leniency to defendants who
confess.520 Although French trials have not been studied as carefully,
similar factors may explain the willingness of French defendants to con-
fess to some or all of the charges against them. While French courts
clearly may, if they wish, treat a defendant's cooperation as a mitigating
factor in sentencing, 521 it is unclear how often and to what extent they
actually do so. This is certainly an area where further empirical research
is needed, and the research should also consider other factors encourag-
ing defendants to cooperate at trial.522
FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 24-26 (general description of trial in assize court); A. SHEEHAN,
supra note 41, at 211-19 (summary of three assize court trials). There is still some room for defense
"cooperation" in these trials (for example, defendant admissions, limited defense direct and cross-
examination), but much less so than in correctional and police court trials. The remainder of this
discussion focuses on correctional court procedures, since there the procedural differences and the
possibilities of useful borrowing seem greatest.
519. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 28 (prosecutors will normally cite any witnesses
requested by the defense); A. SHEENAN, supra note 41, at 29 (prosecution, defense, and civil parties
all have equal right to cite witnesses).
520. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 218-21.
521. In my informal discussions with French lawyers, judges, and law professors in Lyon during
Spring 1982, 1986, and 1990 I was universally informed that the defendant's confession or
cooperation would lighten the sentence. See also sources cited at supra note 516.
The French courts have considerable discretion regarding length of sentences. See 1 R. MERLE
& A. Vrru, supra note 145, § 763, at 922 (discussing the complete discretion courts have to find
"extenuating circumstances," thus allowing them to impose less than the minimum sentence for the
level of offense). Except where prior crimes limit the suspension of a sentence, French courts have
even broader discretion in fixing the sentence within the authorized range for each offense level. See
FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 32-36.
522. One factor is the possibility of avoiding or minimizing the imposition of court costs. See
infra text accompanying note 524. Other factors may include certain rules of trial procedure or
evidence that might encourage French defendants to testify and thereby "cooperate" by making
admissions or by opening themselves up to questioning. As the first witness, the defendant is forced
to face questions; inferences from silence are not prohibited; defendants are not placed under oath
and need not fear perjury charges; there is no separate sentencing hearing; and the defendant's prior
record is always known to the court-conceivably not just for purposes of impeaching his testimony.
However, as discussed more fully in the Appendix, infra text accompanying notes 703-36, it is not
clear how much of a difference the American rules make in practice.
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At present, my own hypothesis is that tacit "cooperation bargain-
ing" has a relatively modest effect on sentencing in France. I base this
assumption on three closely related aspects of French procedure. First,
there is evidence suggesting that French sentences are generally more
lenient than American sentences,523 which accordingly reduces the range
within which cooperation can affect the sentence. Second, French courts
are much more likely to require payment of the costs of prosecution,524
thus encouraging solvent defendants to avoid contesting issues without
good reason. Third, the structure of French criminal trials facilitates the
exchange of modest sentence concessions for modest degrees of coopera-
tion. Since defendants do not enter formal pleas of guilty or not guilty,
they may choose to contest part of the case against them. They thus
avoid the all-or-nothing choice which often confronts American defend-
ants: Admit all elements of the charge (even those strongly disputed), or
go to trial on all of these elements (even those that were never dis-
puted).525 In turn, American sentence concessions are probably larger
than French ones: The more issues the defendant concedes, the greater
the need to reward him or her, and vice versa.
526
Assuming that my hypothesis is correct, the French system of lim-
ited, tacit sentence concessions should provide a useful model for reform
of American plea bargaining practices. Although some opponents of
plea bargaining insist upon complete abolition of sentencing conces-
sions,527 I do not believe this has been achieved in European systems, and
I frankly doubt that it can ever be achieved in the United States; the
human tendency to reward people who cooperate is simply too strong to
be completely controlled. Indeed, rewards for cooperation may be
523. See generally infra Part VIII, text accompanying notes 563-629 ("Sentencing Laws and
Practices").
524. See CODE DE PROCEDURE PfiNALE [C. PR. PEN.] arts. R.91-R.249 (tariffs and procedures
for collecting costs in criminal cases). See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 26, 29 (such
costs must be assessed against all convicted defendants, unless specifically excused by the court in a
special decision stating reasons). Costs may be collected by any means, including imprisonment for
payment. Id. at 33. The code provides specified prison terms-for example, five days for unpaid
amounts between 1,000 and 3,000 francs-but these terms may not be executed against insolvent
defendants or defendants who post security for the unpaid amount. Finally, imprisonment does not
satisfy the debt. Id.
525. American defendants sometimes have more choice, such as pleading guilty to a lesser
included offense, or to some but not all counts or charges. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note
126, § 20.1(a).
526. Cf. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, note 2, at 222 (arguing that, since West
German trials are simple, defendants who admit guilt-thus making the trial even simpler-need
only be offered minor concessions); Schulhofer, supra note 497, at 1092 (concessions needed to
induce jury waivers will necessarily be smaller than guilty plea concessions, since defendant in
former situation gives up less).
527. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 7, at 978-79 (suggesting that a system which merely substitutes
implicit bargaining for explicit is not a "promising model for reform").
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appropriate5 28 so long as they are not so large that they risk conviction of
the innocent, unfair coercion, distortion of criminal records, or major
disparities in sentencing.129
Using aspects of both French and American procedures as models,
we can devise a system that effectively limits the magnitude of sentence
concessions.530 Unlike the conclusions of most previous researchers,531
my suggestion is not that the United States adopt European nonadver-
sary trial procedures, such as: trial before a "mixed" court of judges and
jurors; defendant called as the first witness, allowing the court to focus
the remaining trial on the contested issues; other witnesses called and
questioned by the presiding judge who is fully familiar with the investiga-
tive file; and few formal rules limiting the admissibility of evidence.
These rules and procedures are so different from American traditions
that there is virtually no chance that they could ever be adopted. 32
Indeed, proposals to relax evidentiary and procedural standards at trial
might actually aggravate the plea bargaining problem. Such relaxation
would presumably make it easier for the prosecution to allege a prima
facie case; this in turn, would tend to encourage prosecutors to file some
of the weak cases they now dismiss, thereby increasing case volume and
thus the need for plea bargaining! Moreover, we should also hesitate to
eliminate completely the option of a "full due process" trial, for in highly
contested or political cases, this right still provides an essential safeguard
against unjust prosecution and conviction.
528. It is usually assumed that any "deserved" leniency for defendants who plead guilty is based
on the concepts of remorse, contrition, or "willingness to assume responsibility for his or her
conduct." See 3 A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 512, Standard 14-
1.8(a)(i); see also FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 434, § 3E1.1 ("Acceptance of
Responsibility").
The problem with these theories is that most defendants who plead guilty probably do so largely
or entirely to receive lenient treatment, not because they are remorseful, contrite, or more
responsible. See Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 652-56,
661-69 (1981). But the same point could be made whenever moral culpability is assessed: We
assume that defendants who commit less serious offenses are less blameworthy, even though their
actions may have been motivated in whole or in part by fear of the greater penalties imposed for
more serious offenses. A separate question is whether such assessments should be made categorically
(all guilty pleas), or case-by-case. Both the American Bar Association's STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 512 (establishing particular requirements beyond a guilty plea for sentence
reductions) and the FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 434, § 3E1.l(c) ("A defendant
who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of
right."), opt for the latter approach. However, case-by-case assessments may be neither sufficiently
reliable nor worth their cost.
529. See supra note 467 and accompanying text.
530. See, ag., C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 285-86, 298-300
(1978); Schulhofer, supra note 440, at 791-95 (discussing implementation of guidelines to control
judicial and prosecutorial discretion over charge reductions and guilty plea concessions).
531. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1010.
532. These aspects of the French system are discussed more fully in the Appendix, see infra text
accompanying notes 637-742.
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I offer the following three suggestions based on French procedures
for the reform of American plea and sentence bargaining. First, we
should eliminate large sentence-bargaining differentials by adopting sen-
tencing reforms that more closely limit the range of penalties available to
the judge for each offense.533 Second, we should expand the use of charg-
ing costs in criminal cases, thereby reminding solvent defendants that
trials are expensive and that unnecessary litigation should be avoided.534
Indigent defendants could perform community work as a substitute for
monetary payments. Third, we should develop alternatives to our "all-
or-nothing" approach to the adjudication of criminal charges. While we
should not abandon the traditional common law guilty/not guilty plea
concept, we should experiment with issue-narrowing procedures analo-
gous to those used in European criminal cases. Although American law
and tradition probably preclude adoption of the European procedure
itself-including calling the defendant as the first witness-other
approaches are possible.
One idea, modeled after American rules of civil procedure, is to
employ pretrial "requests for admission. ' 535  The prosecution would
serve the defendant and his or her counsel with a request after the com-
pletion of all pretrial discovery5 3 6 and suppression hearings. The request
could track the elements of each offense charged,5 37 or it could be more
533. A number of states have recently adopted such reforms, and they seem to work. See, eg.,
MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, THE IMPACT OF THE MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: THREE-YEAR EVALUATION (1984); Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices
Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 155, 161-76 (1987) (concluding that unregulated prosecutorial decisions
did not circumvent goals of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines); see also Sentencing Reform Act
of 1981, WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.010-9.94A.910 (1989) (creating commission to develop
the sentencing guidelines and prescribing sentencing guidelines which became effective July 1, 1984).
534. American courts often have authority to impose costs on convicted defendants. See, eg.,
28 U.S.C. § 1918 (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.48 (West 1989); see also Commonwealth v.
Hower, 267 Pa. Super. 182, 406 A.2d 754 (1979) (upholding assessment of court costs ($635.22) and
prosecutor's "necessary and reasonable" trial preparation expenses ($4,174) in a vehicular homicide
case, and rejecting arguments that such assessments unconstitutionally burden vigorous defense
efforts or the privilege against self-incrimination). This authority, however, seems to be rarely used;
the categories of taxable costs are limited, and no fixed prison terms are specified for solvent
defendants who refuse to pay. See generally O'Malley, The Assessment of Costs in Federal Criminal
Prosecutions, 31 ST. Louis U.L.J. 853 (1987) (commenting on the federal statute and its application
in United States v. Burchinal, 657 F.2d 985 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1086 (1981), which
upheld imposition of costs on one of four defendants who refused, with no apparent reason, to
stipulate to foundational aspects of government's exhibits).
535. FED. R. Civ. P. 36.
536. This proposal would probably work better in jurisdictions allowing broad pretrial
discovery in favor of the defense, as is allowed in France, see infra notes 669-77 and accompanying
text. In those jurisdictions, defendants would be more willing to "throw in the towel" on some or all
issues once they saw how warm the water was. However, in jurisdictions allowing more limited
defense discovery, the proposal should still work at least as well as current plea bargaining practices,
which require defendants to admit all of the case against them.
537. For example, the defendant in an assault case would be asked to admit or deny-or allege
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detailed and fact-specific-approaching the pleading and discovery rules
found in American civil procedure and in the criminal procedures of
some foreign countries.5 38  Defendants could, in turn, request that the
prosecution either drop certain elements of the charge, or admit certain
elements of the defense case.5 39 Admitted matters would not have to be
proved at trial unless the court subsequently allowed the admitting party
to withdraw or amend his or her admissions."4 Moreover, failure to
inability to admit or deny-the elements of identity, intent to injure, causation of injury, and extent
of injury produced. Common defenses not already included in pretrial notice requirements might
also be listed. Cf. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding notice-of-alibi statute against
fifth and fourteenth amendment challenges).
538. See generally Harnon, Criminal Procedure in Israel-Some Comparative Aspects, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 1091, 1107-08 (1967) ("[D]efendant receives a narrative statement of the facts
constituting the offense... [and is asked] whether he admits or denies all or any of the facts alleged
in the statement of charge.").
A somewhat analogous issue-narrowing procedure exists in England, where the committing
magistrate may "conditionally" summon witnesses for trial if their previously recorded testimony or
statements are unlikely to be disputed. The witnesses are not actually required to attend the trial
unless the prosecution or the defense serves notice insisting on attendance. M. GRAHAM, supra note
9, at 44. Some observers believe that this procedure is not used widely enough in England and have
proposed to add a "requests to admit" procedure similar to that discussed in the text. See 2
JUSTICE, THE TRUTH AND THE COURTS: BRITISH SECTION OF THE INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS,
WRITTEN EVIDENCE TO THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (PART II) 13-15
(1980); see also FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 434, § 6B1.4(b) (policy statement
governing stipulations of facts relevant to sentencing; stipulation shall identify facts that are
disputed); M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 270 (proposing "mandatory admission at trial of witness
statements concerning either undisputed or inconsequential matters").
539. A separate and much more difficult question is whether defendants should be allowed to
admit certain matters over the prosecutor's objection. This strategy can be especially useful to the
defense where it serves to avoid the prosecutor's introduction of highly prejudicial matter, such as
prior convictions made relevant by an enhancement statute, or gruesome details of a homicide.
Selective admissions also allow the defendant to avoid taking the stand to admit these matters, thus
subjecting himself to cross-examination, impeachment by prior convictions, and impeachment by
illegally seized evidence. See, eg., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that statement
otherwise inadmissible against defendant in prosecution's case may be used to impeach).
On the other hand, the prosecution will often argue that the defendant should not be allowed to
make selective, "self-serving" admissions not subject to cross-examination; or the prosecutor asserts
that the admitted matter is relevant to disputed issues or adds persuasiveness and coherence to the
prosecution's case. Thus, in practice, most trial courts hold that the prosecution may not be forced
to accept a stipulation. See, eg., People v. McClellan, 71 Cal. 2d 793, 457 P.2d 871, 80 Cal. Rptr. 31
(1969) (prosecution did not have to accept stipulation that if the shots fired during an armed robbery
caused the death, and the jury found that the defendant was one of the armed robbers, then he was
guilty of first degree murder). But see State v. Davidson, 351 N.W.2d 8 (Minn. 1984) (trial court
erred in refusing to accept defendant's stipulation to his prior felony conviction, where jury should
have been instructed that defendant admitted he had no right to possess pistol and that the sole issue
was possession).
540. The standard for withdrawal or amendment would be similar to that applied under
American civil procedure rules governing answers to requests for admission. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv.
P. 36. The admitting party would have to show mistake or changed circumstances; the other party
could object by showing detrimental reliance (for example, witness no longer available). Cf. R.
HAYDOCK, D. HERR & J. STEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION §§ 8.12-8.13
(1985) (examining provisions concerning admissions under Federal Rules).
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admit facts subsequently proved at trial would, as in American civil pro-
cedure, subject the nonadmitting party or his or her attorney to possible
assessment of the costs of such proof.541 Finally, the failure to admit
might also be taken into account at sentencing, as seems to be done in
France.
Within the limits imposed by the charging and sentencing reforms
suggested above, 42 the parties would be free to negotiate explicitly the
exchange of defense admissions for either prosecution admissions or sen-
tence recommendations. In addition, the opposing party could, under
some circumstances, use the proponent's earlier unwithdrawn admissions
or failures to admit in order to impeach conflicting evidence offered at
trial.5 43 Although neither perjury nor contempt sanctions would apply,
each side would have an incentive to admit matters not seriously in dis-
pute in order to increase the credibility of its case on the contested issues.
A further advantage of the procedure outlined above is that much of
it could be implemented without changing any state rules of criminal
procedure. Prosecutors and defense counsel already engage in less struc-
tured forms of "stipulation bargaining" over issues such as chain of cus-
tody and authentication of records. Nothing prohibits prosecutors from
541. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16(f), 26(g), 37(c). Indigent defendants would have to
perform community work as a substitute for payment of costs.
542. See supra text accompanying notes 502-08, 530, & 533-34.
543. Use of the defendant's answers to impeach his trial testimony does not violate the fifth
amendment privilege if such answers are not "compelled." Compare Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971) (permitting impeachment with pretrial statements obtained in violation of Miranda rule,
but which were not shown to be coerced or involuntary) with New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450
(1979) (testimony compelled under grant of immunity could not be used to impeach). Several
aspects of the proposal in the text argue against a finding of compulsion here: (1) defendants are not
subjected to the "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt," Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (reversing contempt charges against state witness who refused to
testify because he was granted only state, and not federal, immunity); and (2) such requests are not
"inherently coercive" since, unlike the police interrogation context addressed in the Miranda line of
cases, defendants may answer the questions at their leisure, with full advice of counsel, on the basis
of full pretrial discovery and defense investigation. Nor do such requests unfairly "burden" the
decision to testify, ef. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (Tennessee statute requiring the
defendant to "testify first for the defense or not at all" violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments
because it denied defendants freedom of choice and advice of counsel), for defendants themselves
could still testify in any way they wished. Use of the defendant's "silence"-that is, his failure to
admit-to impeach his trial testimony would also not violate his fifth amendment privilege, since
such silence is not "induced" by the government. See, eg., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231
(1980). Nor would impeachment violate due process, since the defendant would not have been
implicitly assured that silence would carry no penalty. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982)
(absent Miranda-like affirmative assurances, no violation of due process to permit cross-examination
on prearrest silence after defendant takes stand); cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) (violation of
due process to use postarrest silence to impeach since defendants had received Miranda warnings).
Indeed, defendants could be explicitly warned that their failures to admit could be used against them
at trial. Such warnings are less problematic here than in the Doyle context, where they would add to
the "inherently coercive" atmosphere of police interrogation in the absence of counsel.
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broadening the subject matter of such stipulations," and nothing pre-
vents the defense from accepting such proposals or from serving its own
requests for admission. Once broader use of such issue-narrowing proce-
dures is established, changes in criminal rules or statutes could foster
their operation by clarifying the role of the court and the precise conse-
quences of admission or failure to admit. 6
To summarize, the proposed request-for-admission procedure (or
some other system of "partial guilty pleas," expanded "stipolation-bar-
gaining," or modified "civil" pleading) could streamline criminal trials.
Courts could then concentrate on the issues that are genuinely in dispute.
These trials would save time and money, reduce the burdens of testifying,
and allow the court or jury to focus more clearly on the dispositive
issues. The availability of "partial" trials might also make litigation of
genuinely contested issues more affordable, thereby encouraging the par-
ties to litigate key issues that should not be plea bargained away. Even if
there were no net change in the total number of witnesses and trial days,
the result would be a more rational use of trial resources and a more
accurate resolution of the issues. Finally, any pressures, abuses, or con-
stitutional problems stemming from this system would be fewer than
those inherent in current plea bargaining practices: in the proposed sys-
tem, less is at stake in any given "bargain." European criminal and
American civil courts have long operated successfully using similar issue-
narrowing procedures; American criminal courts should follow suit.
2. Pretrial Release Bargains
As suggested earlier,545 some French defendants are probably
strongly encouraged to confess to, or otherwise cooperate with, the
examining magistrate in order to avoid the latter's disfavor and to obtain
release from pretrial detention. 46 Such "pretrial release bargains" are
analogous to the notorious "time served" guilty plea, in which American
defendants plead guilty to avoid continued pretrial detention.147 Indeed,
the French approach is potentially worse than its American counterpart
544. Of course, since any such admissions by a defendant are tantamount to a partial or
complete guilty plea, they must be based on the defendant's consent, thus representing a voluntary
waiver of trial rights. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7 (1966) (agreement not to contest state's
prima facie case was "practical equivalent" of guilty plea); cf United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d
832, 836 (9th Cir. 1980) (when stipulation to "crucial fact" is made in open court in presence of
defendant and agreed to by his counsel, and defendant does not object, court may assume defendant
agrees to and is thereby bound by the stipulation), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 934 (1981).
545. See supra text accompanying notes 491-95.
546. See Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 381 n.90. Similarly, defendants may also be encouraged
to cooperate with police authorities to obtain release from investigatory detention, although the
strictly limited duration of the latter (48 hours, in most cases) limits the coercive potential of such
bargains. See supra note 161.
547. See sources cited at supra note 295.
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in two respects: French defendants are pressured to cooperate at an ear-
lier stage, and the French law enforcement official offering the "bargain"
also has direct control over whether the pretrial detention will continue.
In contrast, American "time served" pleas must, at least in theory, be
approved by a trial judge independent from the investigation. 548 Yet the
opportunity for such coercive bargains in the French system is limited.
Examining magistrates are involved in all felony cases but take part in
fewer than 10% of delict cases and have virtually no role in contraven-
tion cases.5" 9 Nevertheless, this is clearly an important area for future
research. To the extent that the French system relies heavily on a form
of highly coercive "confession bargaining" at the investigative stage, its
adjudication procedures become less impressive. And the alternative of
eliminating the objectionable procedures before transplant to this coun-
try may cause the entire system to work less successfully.55 0
3. Penal Orders, Scheduled Fines, and Plea Bargaining
Another form of tacit sentence bargaining in France is the use of
penal orders and scheduled fines.55 1 Each of these procedures avoids the
necessity for trial in police court, provided the defendant agrees to pay
the fine set in the penal order or prescribed in a fine schedule. It is not
clear, however, whether defendants who refuse to pay these fines face a
substantial risk of more severe penalties upon conviction at trial, such as
higher fines, loss of driving privileges, or imprisonment. Some research-
ers claim that a trial "tariff" exists in the similar West German penal
order procedure;55 2 others maintain that a sentence differential of that
548. Moreover, although French defendants can, in theory, later "withdraw" their confessions,
the trial court retains broad discretion to "evaluate" the validity of such retractions. See supra note
486.
549. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 12-13. Investigatory detention, however, is widely
used. See supra note 161. During detention-or even without it-police and/or prosecution
authorities could still obtain confessions by threatening to open a judicial investigation (and then
seek pretrial detention of the accused).
Until recently, Parisian prosecutors engaged in another form of pretrial release bargaining in
the context of the "immediate appearance" proeedure, described at supra note 301. Prosecutors
would agree not to insist on further detention, provided defendants agreed to reappear for trial
within the 48-hour limit applicable to detention cases (rather than the two-week period applicable to
released defendants). This procedure was struck down by the Paris Correctional Court as violating
the formalities required in immediate appearance cases, and because of doubts that the defendant's
waiver was "perfectly free" of coercion. See Judgment of Sept. 22, 1986, Trib. gr. inst., Paris, 1987
RECUEIL DALLOZ [D.S. JUR.] 58; see also id. note J. Pradel (accompanying casenote by Professor
Jean Pradel praising the decision for putting a stop to this form of "North American plea
bargaining" (his term), but conceding its practical value in dealing with overloaded courts and jails).
550. See supra text accompanying note 36.
551. See infra note 587. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 31.
552. See Goldstein & Marcus, Comment, supra note 4, at 1575 n.18.
Note that the French and German penal order procedures differ in three important respects:
(1) the French police court drafts the penal order and sets the proposed fine, which must then be
accepted by the prosecutor, whereas the opposite is true in Germany, see J. LANGBEIN, supra note 7,
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kind would be illegal and does not in fact exist.5 53
Although further research is needed, it does appear that French
defendants risk a higher penalty if they refuse to pay the proposed fine.
The Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that any fine imposed
after trial may not be less than the amount of the scheduled fine that the
accused previously declined to pay.: 5 4 No such formal rule applies to
penal orders, but French treatise writers note that penal order fines are
kept very low and that defendants almost never refuse to accept them.5"
In addition, any costs assessed as part of the penal order 556 are presuma-
bly less than they would be after trial-thus producing, in effect, a lower
fine.
In any case, even if some sentence or court cost differentials exist in
these French procedures, they need not be very great to minimize trial
demands effectively. Research on the disposition of petty offenses in the
United States suggests that the principal reason French defendants agree
to pay the penal order or scheduled fine is to avoid the collateral "process
costs" associated with going to trial-lost time and wages, defense costs,
prolonged anxiety, humiliation, and notoriety.1 7 Assuming this to be
true, what are the implications for reform of American procedures? Can
we adopt a version of these streamlined French procedures to unburden
our lower trial courts and to help defendants minimize the costs of plead-
ing guilty?
Although some American reformers have suggested that we adopt
the penal order procedure,558 something closer to the scheduled fine
approach offers greater promise for useful and feasible reform. Sched-
uled fines are preferable to penal orders because they bypass the expense
and possible abuses of case-by-case fine-setting. Where minor violations
lend themselves to a uniform fine approach, the fines should be set by
general court order rather than by individual judges or prosecutors. If
certain kinds of offenses require individualized judicial assessment of the
fine or nonfine penalties, the scheduled fine approach could be coupled
at 96-97; (2) French penal orders can only be used in contravention cases, whereas in Germany this
procedure can apply to any misdemeanor (roughly comparable to French delicts), Id.; Herrmann,
supra note 7, at 484; and (3) French penal order sanctions are limited to fines, whereas in Germany
suspension of a driver's license, for example, may also be ordered, see J. LANOBEIN, supra note 7, at
97.
553. W. FELSTINER & A. DREW, supra note 7, at 20-21; Langbein, Land Without Plea
Bargaining, supra note 2, at 213-18.
554. Proc. Code art. 530-1[2].
555. 2 R. MERLE & A. Vrru, supra note 40, § 1448, at 753 (1% refusal rate in Northeast
departments); J. PRADEL, supra note 40, §§ 539-540.
556. Proc. Code art. 526.
557. J. LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 218; Alschuler, supra note 7, at 952-56. See generally M.
FEELEY, supra note 362.
558. See, e.g., M. FEELEY, supra note 362, at 296-97; Alschuler, supra note 7, at 956-57; Pugh,
supra note 2, at 969. Contra W. FELSTINER & A. DREW, supra note 7, at 20-22.
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with a prosecutorial screening procedure analogous to the German and
French prosecutorial control exercised over the initiation of the penal
order procedure. The scheduled fine procedure would be invoked only if
the prosecutor concluded that this disposition was appropriate given the
facts of the case. 59
An equally important reason for preferring the preset fine approach
is that it builds on an institution already well-established in this country:
payment of scheduled fines for traffic and other petty infractions at the
municipal court violations bureau. 60 Indeed, some local jurisdictions
have already expanded the use of this approach to permit payment of
scheduled fines for a wide variety of petty and nonpetty misdemeanor
violations.561 These expedited procedures appear to be working well, and
we should consider further expanding their use. Nor is it necessary, as
some have suggested, to decriminalize or downgrade offenses to petty
infractions before subjecting them to the violations bureau approach. 62
There is no contradiction in providing an expedited, "administrative"
procedure to dispose of nonserious "criminal" charges so long as the
defendant may still insist on a trial under standard criminal rules. This
is, after all, essentially what we now do by means of plea bargaining. The
violations bureau procedure would merely allow us to achieve the same
results with greater consistency, and with less delay and expense for all
concerned.
559. The French only use the scheduled fine approach for very minor offenses such as non-
jailable contraventions of the first four classes, and prosecutors have no control over the invocation
of this approach. Proc. Code art. 529. For more serious contraventions, only the penal order
procedure is available. Id. art. 524. But since some American jurisdictions have applied a scheduled
fine type of procedure to jailable offenses, see infra text accompanying notes 560-61, it is not clear
why these jurisdictions could not also choose to adjudicate the offenses by combining elements of the
scheduled fine and penal order.
560. Cf. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 218 ("real parallel" of
German penal order procedure is the "short-form American citation practice for traffic offenses:
'Pay this fine or appear in court.' "). However, as suggested in the text, this comparison overlooks
the distinction between preset fines and case-by-case fine setting.
561. See, eg., HENNEPIN COUNTY (MINNESOTA) SCHEDULE OF REQUIRED COURT
APPEARANCES AND FINES (rev. ed. 1988). Among the offenses with scheduled fines payable at the
Violations Bureau are those involving fish and game, public parks, and various regulatory offenses
(such as housing, zoning, fire, building, food, refuse, weights and measures, and health). Id. Most
of these offenses are classified as misdemeanors under state or municipal law, and they carry a
maximum penalty of $700 and/or 90 days, with rights to jury trial and appointed counsel. Id. at 7.
562. See, ag., N. ABRAMS, supra note 155, at 5; M. FEELEY, supra note 362, at 296; W.
FELSTINER & A. DREw, supra note 7, at 23-26; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, REPORT ON COURTS 168 (1973) (Standard 8.2: "Administrative
Disposition of Certain Matters Now Treated as Criminal Offenses"); Alschuler, supra note 7, at
993-94.
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VIII
SENTENCING LAWS AND PRACTICES
A. The Sentencing Severity Hypothesis
Many American observers have suggested that European systems
make much lighter use of imprisonment as a penal sanction than do most
American jurisdictions.5 63 This assessment, if it is correct,"6 has impor-
tant implications for reform of American sentencing practices. In the
debate over the purposes of punishment and the alternatives available to
achieve those purposes, we must know whether other Western nations
have been able to impose just and effective punishment by means of sen-
tencing alternatives that are less costly and more humane than our
own. 65 And although American traditions and legal processes make it
difficult to reduce-or even appear to reduce-the rate or duration of
custodial sentences,566 international comparisons may at least help legis-
lators resist short-term political pressures to increase the use of penal
sanctions. Finally, apart from the issue of sentencing reform itself, less
severe foreign sentencing practices would affect other topics of reform-
oriented comparative research, since sentencing variations may explain
additional differences between foreign and domestic systems.5 67
The hypothesis that French sentences are less severe is plausible in
light of several characteristics of the French system. First, the French
563. See, eg., J. LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 59 (citing Professor Hans Zeisel's suggestion that
"each month of imprisonment in Continental sentencing corresponds to a year's imprisonment in
American sentencing"); A. RosETr & D. CRESSEY, JUSTICE BY CONSENT: PLEA BARGAINS IN THE
AMERICAN COURTHOUSE 182 (1976) (U.S. sentence severity out of step with other "civilized"
nations); Cole, Mahoney, Thornton & Hanson, The Use of Fines by Trial Court Judges, 71
JUDICATURE 325, 326 (1988) (noting increased use of fines in England, Sweden, and West
Germany); Herrmann, supra note 7, at 473-74 (Vest German sentencing practices); Morris, Lessons
From the Adult Correctional System of Sweden, 30 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (1966).
564. In his study of sentencing severity in England, Canada, and West Germany, Professor
Lynch found that only West Germany had substantially lower offense-specific incarceration rates
(estimated) than did the United States, and only for certain offenses. Lynch, supra note 9, at 194-95.
For burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft combined, the arrest-based incarceration rates for the
United States and West Germany were 11.8% and 4.2%, respectively. Id. at 195. For robbery, the
incarceration rates were 36.4% and 21.5%, but this difference might be entirely explained by the
much lower proportion of German robberies which involved the use of a firearm. Id. at 196-97.
However, the incarceration rate for homicide was slightly higher in Germany (76.6% versus 70.6%).
Id. at 195. Some methodological problems with these comparisons are discussed at infra note 593,
and at infra text accompanying notes 621-27.
565. See generally N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 59-62 (1974) (discussing the
principle of"parsimony": criminal sentences should be no more severe than necessary to achieve the
purposes of punishment).
566. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
567. In previous sections of this Article, I have suggested some of the ways in which less severe
sentencing practices in France might explain lower rates of pretrial detention, see supra text
accompanying notes 376-79, as well as less need for formal limits on prosecutorial discretion, see
supra text accompanying notes 424-37, and plea bargaining, see supra text accompanying notes 453
& 523.
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have downgraded a large number of consensual and public order offenses
so that, by statute or enforcement practice, they are punishable by a fine
only.568 Second, the maximum authorized sentences for many prevalent
property offenses appear to be somewhat lower than for their American
counterparts. 569 In the case of violent crimes and drug-related crimes,
however, French and American maximum terms are more similar, 70
although it should be noted that France, like all other European coun-
tries, has abolished the death penalty.5 71 Third, French sentencing law
generally forbids the imposition of consecutive sentences,5 72 and the sen-
tence enhancements applicable to recidivists are based solely on the
severity, not the frequency, of the defendant's prior convictions.5 73
Fourth, French law authorizes courts to impose a wide variety of non-
custodial sanctions 57 4-- not only fines, community work orders, proba-
tion, or stayed imprisonment, but also several other sentencing options
rarely used in the United States. These include banishment from the
568. See supra text accompanying notes 146-55 & 551-57.
569. For example, the Code pdnal and the American Law Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 6.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) specify the following maximum penalties (in years) for these
crimes:
Offense French Penal Code ALI Model Penal Code
Forgery 3 or 5 (arts. 150-153) 5 or 10 (§ 224.1)
Larceny
(non-petty) 3 (art. 381) 5 (§ 223.1(2))
Embezzlement 2 (art. 408(1)) 5 (§ 223.1(2))
As is true in most American jurisdictions, French sentences are subject to "good time" reduc-
tions and parole. A French convict is generally eligible for parole after serving half of his sentence
(reduced by good time allowances of up to three months per year served). FRENCH SYSTEM, supra
note 41, at 39. Thus good time also effectively reduces the maximum term.
570. Compare C. PEN. arts. 309 to 310 (aggravated assault maximum sentences are 2, 4, 10, or
15 years, depending on circumstances) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2) (5 or 10 years for
aggravated assault); C. PEN. arts. 332 to 333-1 (maximum sentences for various rape offenses are 5,
10, 20 years, or life imprisonment) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (5 or 10 years, or life
imprisonment); C. PEN. art. 384 (maximum for robbery causing serious injury or death is 20 years;
sole penalty for armed robbery is life imprisonment) with MODEL PENAL CODE § 222.1 (10 years or
life imprisonment).
Drug crimes are covered by the CODE DE LA SANTA PUBLIQUE. For offenses involving illegal
narcotics and other stupefacients, the maximum sentences are 10 or 20 years. Id. art. L.627. For
other drugs, the maximum is two years. Id. art. L.626. But see id. art. L.628 (one-year maximum
for illegal "usage" of narcotics or other stupefacients).
571. Law of Oct. 9, 1981, No. 81-908, J.O. Oct. 10, 1981, 64 Bulletin l6gislatifDalloz [B.L.D.]
347, La Semaine Juridique (Juris-Classeur P6riodique) [J.C.P.] III No. 51,862 (1981). See generally
F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 3-25 (1986)
(discussing the general trend among Western democracies in the twentieth century toward de facto
or de jure abolition of the death penalty).
572. See supra text accompanying note 424.
573. See supra text accompanying notes 425-33.
574. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 32-36.
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country, city, or certain districts;171 confiscation of vehicles or weap-
ons, 576 and suspension of privileges to drive, hunt, or carry arms (which
can be ordered even when the current offense did not involve these
objects or privileges); 57 7 day fines;578 automatic imprisonment for solvent
convicts who fail to pay their fines;5 7 9 and dispensation from any punish-
ment whatsoever.58 0 Finally, French law contains liberal expungement-
of-record provisions,581 and periodic amnesty statutes also benefit many
defendants.5 82
B. Empirical Support for the Hypothesis
While the rules and procedures summarized above suggest that sen-
tencing is more lenient in France than in the United States, what happens
in actual practice in either country may be another matter. Unfortu-
nately, the available empirical data on French and American sentences
are neither sufficiently detailed nor sufficiently comparable to prove or
disprove the sentencing severity hypothesis. The following discussion
examines the available data for each country, explains the problems of
detail and comparability raised by the data, discusses the limited support
which the available data lend to the sentencing severity hypothesis, and
suggests the additional data needed to prove or disprove the hypothesis.
The available aggregate data on French sentences indicate that cus-
todial penalties are rare and are usually of short duration. Instead,
French courts dispose of the vast majority of cases by imposing a fine. In
1980, for example, French criminal courts imposed the following
sentences: 583
575. C. PEN. arts. 44 to 55-1.
576. Id. arts. 43-3, 52 (confiscation of vehicle used to commit crime); id. art. 52-1 (confiscation
of weapon used to commit crime). The provisions for seizing vehicles were added in 1975 but were
little used until 1983, when courts were given the option of ordering temporary seizure. See Cotte,
Sanctions pinales: Alternatives pour la peine privative de liberti in CRIMINAL LAW IN ACTION: AN
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT ISSUES IN WESTERN SOCIETIES 315, 324-27 (1986).
577. C. PEN. art. 43-3.
578. Id. art. 43-8.
579. Proc. Code arts. 749 to 762; see also supra text accompanying note 524.
580. Proc. Code arts. 469-1 to -3.
581. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 33, 39.
582. Id. at 39-40; see also supra note 39 (discussing the effects of the 1981 Presidential Amnesty
Decree, Law of Aug. 4, 1981, on the number of convictions from 1981 to 1983).
583. ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 109-25. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra
note 41, at 34-36. These statistics do not include scheduled fines imposed for parking and other
minor offenses. See infra note 587.
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Number %
Executed Custody Sentences .................. 111,984 4.3
- of less than 3 months ................... 57,260
- 3 months to less than 1 year ............. 40,383
- one year to less than 5 years ............. 12,949
- five years or more ....................... 1,392
Executed Fines .............................. 2,313,147 89.7
- imposed after trial ...................... 763,544
- imposed by penal order .................. 1,549,603
Fully Suspended,584 and Other ................ 153,904 6.0
Total Convictions 5  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2,579,035 100.0
Aggregate American sentencing patterns may be equally dominated
by the use of fines and by short jail terms. However, we cannot verify
this because there are no national sentencing statistics for all offenses.
Indeed, even the available felony sentence statistics cover less than half
the states58 6 and tell us nothing about sentencing of misdemeanors and
other minor offenses in those jurisdictions. The French statistics above
clearly include a large proportion of less serious offenses, although they
do exclude many minor moving traffic violations and all parking fines.5 87
584. Partially suspended custody sentences and fines are lumped together with fully executed
sentences of each type. Thus, the data on custody sentence length shown in the table in the text
overstates the duration of actual sentences.
585. For the total number of convictions, 2,255 of the sentences (0.1% of the total) were
imposed by assize courts (felony charges), and 472,397 (18.3%) were imposed by correctional courts
(delict charges). ANNUASRE STATimQUE, supra note 39, at 109-25. The remainder (2,104,383 or
81.6%) were imposed by police courts (contraventions); of these, 554,780 (21.5% of the total) were
imposed after trial, and 1,549,603 (60.1%) were penal orders (described at infra note 587).
ANNUAIRE STATISTQUE, supra note 39, at 109-25.
586. See, eg., TRACKING OFFENDERS, supra note 405 (documenting the disposition of felony
arrests in 11 states whose combined populations represent only 38% of the U.S. population as a
whole); FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 426 (describing sentences imposed during 1983 in 18
"predominately urban" jurisdictions). But see BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE CouRTs-1986 (1989) [hereinafter FELONY SENTENCES,
1986] (in first nationally representative survey of felony sentences, sample of 51,594 cases from 100
of the nation's 3,109 counties produced a nationwide estimate of 583,000 felony convictions in 1986).
587. The table in the text includes all convictions entered after a court hearing, plus penal
orders. The latter procedure may be used in any contravention case: The prosecutor initiates the
procedure, and the court without a hearing recommends a specific dollar amount (representing the
fine plus costs). If the prosecutor agrees and the defendant does not object, the defendant is ordered
to pay the amount and the case is disposed of without any hearing or trial. Proc. Code. arts. 524 to
528-2. Given the volume of these orders (see text), it appears likely that a great many are minor
traffic offenses.
However, most minor traffic offenses and all parking offenses are disposed of by payment of
scheduled fines (which are excluded from the table in the text). Prior to October 1, 1986, the
scheduled fine procedure applied to contraventions of the first four classes which were violations of
the traffic and national parks codes and punishable by fine only. C. PR. PEN. art. 529. Since that
date, the procedure has also applied to violations of regulations relating to freight, public
transportation, and motor vehicle insurance. Law of Dec. 30, 1985, No. 85-1407, tit. II, ch. III, J.O.
Dec. 31, 1985, 4 Actualit6 Lgislative Dalloz [A.L.D.] 125, 128, J.C.P. III No. 58,135 (amending C.
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Even if we excluded all the penal order cases-most of which are proba-
bly minor moving traffic violationsSl 8-the remaining French data would
have no U.S. statistical counterpart. In fact, there are no nationwide (or
even multijurisdictional) U.S. statistics on the number of misdemeanor
convictions,58 9 let alone misdemeanor sentences.
While we do have considerable data on the "stock" of sentenced
inmates in local jails, such as one-day counts and average daily popula-
tions,590 no national data exist on the number of sentenced offenders
admitted to jails in a given time period ("flow" data). The latter are
essential for any comparison of the frequency of custodial sentences since
inmate "stock" data inevitably confound the distinct issues of frequency
and duration of custody sentences.5 91 In any case, all jail-based data-
whether based on "stock" or "flow" of sentenced prisoners-inherently
understate the incidence and duration of jail sentences, because many
defendants serve some or all of their "sentence" while being held in pre-
trial detention.592 What is needed is court-based sentencing data. 93
PR. PEN. art. 529). There are no published data on the total number of scheduled fines paid each
year, but they must substantially outnumber penal orders. For example, in 1980 there were
6,657,458 augmented parking fines (amendes pdnales fixes). ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note
39, at 121. Those fines were imposed only after a person failed to pay or to protest the scheduled fine
amount within the required time limit. See C. PEN. app. C, at 568-69 (86th ed. Petits Codes Dalloz
1988) (CODE DE LA ROUTE (vehicle code) arts. L.27-L.28).
588. See supra note 587.
589. Cf BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: CASE FILINGS
IN STATE COURTS 1983, at 2 (1984) (trial courts in 46 states and the District of Columbia reported
approximately 10,500,000 "criminal" (felony and misdemeanor) filings, and 57,300,000 traffic filings
in 1983). For 24 selected states, misdemeanor filings comprised between 68-95% of criminal filings,
with most jurisdictions falling in the 85-95% range. Id. at 4.
590. See, eg., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: JAIL
INMATES 1986 (1987).
591. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 182-83 (noting the importance of distinguishing between these
two dimensions of "punitiveness," as well as a third: the conditions of incarceration-maximum
versus minimum security, work release, and so on). The need to explore other ways to measure the
use of imprisonment are also discussed in NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
RESEARCH IN ACTION: MEASURING THE USE OF IMPRISONMENT (1986).
592. When a defendant held in pretrial detention is convicted and sentenced to a jail term to be
served in the same jail, administrators may not count him as "entering" again. In any case, the
duration of his remaining term-and thus, his chances of being included in sentenced "stock" data-
will be substantially reduced if he receives credit for "time already served" in pretrial detention.
Moreover, if a defendant's entire custody sentence consists of credit for time already served, he will
be released without ever appearing as a "sentenced" inmate in either "stock" or "flow" statistics.
Given the prevalence of "time served" guilty pleas, see supra note 295 and accompanying text, such
cases could constitute a large proportion of the total number of "jail sentences" in misdemeanor
cases, and perhaps even in felony cases.
593. Notwithstanding the problems noted above, one recent study attempts to use available jail
population ("stock") data to estimate the total number of U.S. jail sentences per year ("flow") for
FBI index offenses. See Lynch, supra note 9, at 204-06. These estimates are then compared to
(divided by) total FBI arrests for each index offense, and the results are compared with arrest-based
custody sentence rates for England, Canada, and West Germany. Id. Apart from the "time served"
problem, see supra note 592, and the question of whether the number of arrests alone provides a
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Of course, even aggregating U.S. court-based sentencing data for all
offenses included in the French data above would not definitively estab-
lish which country has more severe sentences. To make such aggregate
comparisons, we would have to assume that the offense mix in each
country is similar in terms of offense severity, criminal history of offend-
ers, and so forth. If, for example, American judges sentence a much
higher percentage of violent offenders, we would expect the judges to
impose more, and longer, custodial sentences.594 Clearly, comparative
sentencing research must examine French and American sentencing pat-
terns by offense, and must also take into account any other major
national differences in factors known to significantly influence sentencing
severity, such as an offender's prior record.
Existing French and American sentencing statistics do include a
considerable amount of offense-specific data, but the data are neither
published nor even collected in a form permitting meaningful compari-
son of French and American sentencing severity. There are several rea-
sons for this "noncomparability." The most obvious reason involves
differences in offense definition: For example, in France, burglary and
robbery are considered aggravated forms of larceny (vol). 5 95  And
although French police statistics report separate figures for burglary and
for robbery, sentencing and prison statistics usually do not.596
A second related problem concerns differences in the grading of
offenses. The dividing line between French felonies and delicts (maxi-
mum sentence more, or less, than five years, respectively) does not corre-
spond to the American felony/misdemeanor dividing line of one year. In
the case of burglary or robbery, French felony crimes of vol include only
the most serious robberies and burglaries, and French delict crimes of vol
sufficiently precise "base" for such comparisons, discussed at infra notes 622-25 and accompanying
text, Professor Lynch's data clearly show how small errors in estimated jail sentence rates can have a
very dramatic impact on estimates of overall sentencing severity. For nonviolent property offenses
(burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft combined), Lynch's jail "correction" factor accounts for
almost two-thirds of his estimate of total U.S. custody sentences. Lynch, supra note 9, at 208-09
tables D, E.
594. The limited available data does not entirely support this hypothesis. Although violent
offenders in France constitute a lower proportion of persons charged by police with non-traffic
offenses, see supra table in text accompanying note 133, the proportions of persons charged with
homicide, rape, or robbery are about equal in both countries. See supra note 380. The
comparability of both sets of proportions, however, is unclear; the French statistics exclude all traffic
offenses and contraventions, whereas the American statistics exclude only traffic offenses.
595. Compare FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATEs-1987, at 315 (1988) (listing separate definitions for robbery and burglary)
with C. PEN. arts. 379, 382 (prescribing same penalty for larceny (vol) committed with violence or by
unauthorized entry into a building).
596. Compare LA CRIMINALrr EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 56 (chart showing separate
crime figures for burglary, theft with a firearm, theft with violence, and other thefts) with ANNUAIRE
STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 11, 115 (reporting sentences, by offense, in assize and correctional
courts; for each court, all thefts (vols) are reported in a single category).
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include some robberies, burglaries, and American felony larcenies, as
well as many other larcenies which would be misdemeanors in the
United States. 97 Another consequence of these grading differences is
that sentencing statistics often contain inconsistent categories. In
American statistics, any sentence of exactly one year is generally defined
as a "misdemeanor" sentence and is lumped together with shorter
terms,598 whereas in France, one-year sentences are lumped together
with longer terms, as in the table above.5 99
A third problem of comparability, and perhaps the most difficult to
overcome, involves differences in prosecutorial charging practices. Even
if offenses are defined and graded similarly in both countries, they may be
charged very differently. The result is that seemingly comparable catego-
ries of sentenced offenders will include very different kinds of cases. For
example, French and American sentencing statistics both report data for
rape, but it is well known that in France a substantial portion of felony
rapes-both forcible (viol) and statutory (attentat d pudeur sans vio-
lence)-are correctionalized, ° that is, prosecuted in correctional court
under various delict statutes.6°1 The same process often occurs in the
United States,' 2 but there is no way to determine from sentencing statis-
tics alone whether an equally high proportion of offenses is reduced, or to
what charges. Thus, it is quite possible that sentenced "rape" cases in
one country consist of a much narrower, more aggravated group of
offenses than sentenced "rape" cases in the other. Nor can we aggregate
sentences for rape and various lesser offenses, since the latter include an
unknown number of cases which are not "really" rape cases. One solu-
tion to these problems is to analyze the sentences imposed on all offend-
ers originally charged by police with the same offense. Such "offender-
based transaction statistics" (OBTS) now exist for a number of American
states, 6°3 but they are not yet available for France.
597. Similar problems arise in cases of assault. French "felony" assaults correspond to only the
most serious American "aggravated" assaults, while French "delict" assaults include both American
felonies and misdemeanors. See C. PEN. arts. 309(1)-(2), 310.
598. See, eg., TRACKING OFFENDERS, supra note 405, at 3 (tables reporting sentences of one
year or less, and of more than one year); see also supra note 464 (felony/misdemeanor dividing line).
599. See supra table at text accompanying note 583.
600. See supra text accompanying notes 445-52 & 483-506.
601. COMPTE GfNtRAL, supra note 39, at 26 n.4. Forcible rape and attempted rape are often
charged as nonsexual assault (violence), indecent assault (attentat d la pudeur avec violence), or
public indecency (outrage public d lapudeur). J. PRADEL, supra note 40, § 91, at 94; M. VOUIN,
supra note 139, at 200. Statutory rape is charged as assault on a minor (violence d l'enfant). Id. at
204.
602. See, eg., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND
DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK CrrY's COURTS 10 (1977) (chart showing that, of persons convicted by
plea who were originally arrested on rape or other sex felony charges, 30% plead to a lesser felony
and 34% plead to a misdemeanor).
603. See TRACKING OFFENDERS, supra note 405. The limitations of OBTS data are discussed
at infra text accompanying notes 621-27.
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In light of the problems noted above, we can only conclude with
certainty that the United States and France both have some "catching
up" to do in the area of criminal justice statistics. American authorities
need to gather more information about misdemeanor sentences; the
French need to begin gathering offender-based transaction statistics; and
both countries need to work toward making their offense and sentence
definitions more uniform, at least for statistical purposes, in order to
facilitate international comparisons.'
Before turning to a more detailed discussion of the new data needed
on both French and American sentencing practices, we should consider
whether the existing data can tell us anything. Are French sentences
more lenient in some respects? I believe the answer is a qualified "yes."
Given the severe problems of data availability and comparability dis-
cussed above, only a few rough comparisons of French and American
sentencing severity are possible. The limited purpose of such compari-
sons is to encourage further, more detailed research, to confirm or dis-
prove these preliminary findings.
As noted above, sentencing comparisons should, whenever possible,
be offense-specific. Among the offenses for which sentencing data are
available for both countries, there appear to be only two that are defined,
graded, and prosecuted in similar enough fashions in both countries to
permit even rough comparisons. Nonnegligent homicide and drug traf-
ficking are generally only prosecuted and convicted at the felony level in
the United States, and they are also separately identified in French con-
viction statistics. As shown in the following table, French defendants
convicted of each of these offenses are slightly less likely to receive a
custody sentence than are their American counterparts.
Percentage of Convicted Defendants Who
Received a Jail or Prison Sentence
Conviction Offense U.S. 605 France 606
Non-Negligent Homicide 95% 85%
Drug Trafficking 64% 55%
604. Greater research and uniformity have already been achieved, to some extent, in the area of
police statistics. See supra text accompanying notes 133-36, 276-83 & text accompanying and table
at note 291 (reporting French and American arrest and clearance rates for FBI index offenses). The
need for more uniform sentencing statistics is also discussed in Lynch, supra note 9, at 199-201.
605. The American statistics are from FELONY SENTENCES, 1986, supra note 586, at 2 table 2.
Even though it covers a different time period than the French data, see infra note 606, this source
provides the best comparison to French statistics because earlier American sources employed
broader definitions of homicide offenses. See, eg., FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 426, at 3 table
1 (custody sentence rates for homicide and drug trafficking in 1983 were 91% and 64%,
respectively); see also id. at 7 table 7 ("homicide" includes negligent manslaughter, which had lower
custody rates than other homicides).
606. The source for the French data is the COMFrE GfNtRAL, supra note 39, at 102, 122-23
(data for 1978).
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For both offenses, the difference is small enough to be easily explained by
variations in the offenses themselves,1 7 but at least the differences are
both in the same direction. It is also possible that the two countries differ
more in the duration than in the frequency of custodial sentences, or that
the variations in duration and/or frequency are greater (or less) for other
offenses. To examine these possibilities, however, we must resort to
aggregate, nonoffense specific comparisons based on correctional, instead
of court-based, statistics.
The most reliable sentence-related data available for both countries
are the total number of persons held in custody ("stocks") at any given
point in time. Comparison of sentenced stocks provides an overall mea-
sure of sentencing severity, although, as noted previously,6" 8 it does not
allow us to evaluate separately the rate of imprisonment and the duration
of custody terms. However, we cannot simply compare raw numbers of
prisoners, since the population of the United States is four times larger;
nor can we compare prisoners per unit of population since American
crime rates are higher.6" 9 Instead, we need to compare the number of
prisoners relative to some other meaningful base.
One such base is the number of persons charged by police with seri-
ous offenses against persons and property, or with drug offenses. Police
statistics on these offenses are fairly comparable, and these are also
offenses most likely to result in large numbers of custody sentences.
Using them as a base thus provides a rough index of the total number of
"custody sentence eligibles" in each country. The following table ana-
lyzes American and French sentenced inmate populations as a percent-
age of the number of persons charged with drug and FBI index offenses:
607. Although all murders are of course serious, perhaps American murders, or murder
convictions, are more "aggravated." In 1980, 24.4% of all murders were known or believed to have
involved other felonies, and in 62.4% the weapon used was a firearm. CRIME IN THE U.S.-1980,
supra note 134, at 11-13. Comparable data on French homicides are not available.
As for drug trafficking, the available data suggest that French cases are at least as serious. In
1980, 70% of American drug arrests-which include possession as well as trafficking-involved
marijuana. Id. at 191. In the same year, marijuana violations accounted for only about 50% of
persons charged by French police with drug offenses. LA CRIMINALITA EN FRANCE, supra note 39,
at 3 6-37, 60-61 (5,472 out of a total 10,958 persons charged; the separate figures reported are 518 out
of 771 drug traffickers, and 4,954 out of 10,187 drug users).
608. See supra note 591 and accompanying text.
609. See supra text accompanying note 291.
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U.S. France Ratio
Number of Prisoners on 12/31/80610 418,814 21,689 19:1
Number of Persons Charged in 1980:611
- FBI Index Violent Crimes 612  197,690 15,873 13:1
- Drug Crimes 580,900 10,958 53:1
- FBI Index Property Crimes 6 13  1,843,500 241,621 8:1
Total 2,622,090 268,452 10:1
Prisoners as a Percentage of Persons Charged:
614
- Unweighted Base (Totals, Above) 16.0% 8.1% 2:1
- Weighted Base A (Violent X 10) 9.5% 5.3% 1.8:1
- Weighted Base B (U.S. Prison Rates) 11.8% 6.3% 1.9:1
- Weighted Base C (U.S. Time-Served) 29.6% 15.7% 1.9:1
The different base weightings used in this table reflect the assump-
tion that certain offenses, especially violent crimes, are likely to have a
disproportionate impact on prison populations. Persons convicted of
such offenses are more likely to receive very long prison terms, causing
them to accumulate in prison far out of proportion to the number of
offenses, arrests, convictions, or custody sentences for these crimes.
610. The French data are from ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 183. However, the
category of "sentenced" prisoners reported in these statistics apparently does not include prison-
sentenced convicts who have already or may still file an appeal. See Daville, Lesjuges d'instruction
de nouveau sur la sellette, 107 G.P. 692-94 (Nov. 10, 1987). That study found that such cases
accounted for about 14% of pretrial detainees (privenus). ANNUAIRE STATIsTIQUE, supra note 39,
at 183. Accordingly, the French figure shown in text includes the number of sentenced prisoners
reported inAnnuaire statistique plus 14% of the number of pretrial detainees reported in that source.
Id.
The American data are taken from two sources, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: JAIL INMATES 1982, at 1 table 1 (1983) [hereinafter JAIL INMATES 1982]
(data as of June 30, 1982, which was the first time since February 1978 that U.S. jail populations had
been surveyed); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON
DECEMBER 31, 1980, at 2 (1982).
611. CRIME IN THE U.S.-1980, supra note 134, at 191 (persons arrested or cited); LA
CRIMINALrrIT EN FRANCE, supra note 39, at 60-61 (persons mises en cause, see supra note 133).
612. These statistics include murder and nonnegligent homicide, rape, and robbery. Aggravated
assault is excluded because there are no comparable French figures. See supra notes 595-97.
613. These statistics include burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, but not arson.
614. The unweighted-base percentages are computed by dividing the number of prisoners (line
one) by the total number of persons charged (line five of figures). The denominators used to
compute the three sets of weighted-base percentages are as follows: Base A equals total persons
charged, after multiplying the number charged with violent crimes by 10; Base B equals the number
of persons charged with each of the Index and drug offenses, weighted (or multiplied) by the
percentage sentenced to prison for more than one year in the United States for that offense, see
TRACKING OFFENDERS, supra note 405, at 2 table 1; Base C equals the number of persons charged
with each offense, weighted (or multiplied) by the percentage sentenced to any period of
incarceration, id., times the median number of months served in prison for that offense in 1981, see
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PRISON ADMISSIONS
AND RELEASES, 1981, at 3 table 1 (1984) [hereinafter PRISON ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1981].
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Regardless of the base used, however, the results are remarkably consis-
tent: Overall custodial sentencing severity (rate plus duration) in 1980615
was almost twice as high in the United States as in France.
There is one further problem with the above comparisons, however,
which relates to the numerator (number of prisoners), rather than the
denominator or base used. As noted previously, many defendants serve
some or all of their sentences in pretrial detention, thus spending little or
no time as "sentenced" prisoners.616 If this phenomenon is more com-
mon in one country than in the other, it would affect the comparisons
above, since a larger proportion of custody-sentenced defendants would
fail to be included in the "sentenced" prisoner stocks for that country.
Any such bias can only be eliminated by including all pretrial detainees
in the numerator-in effect, treating them all as "sentenced" prisoners.
This adjustment narrows the gap between French and American sentenc-
ing severity shown in the table above, but American sentencing still
remains about 50% more severe.6 7
C. Future Research on French and American Sentencing Severity
The data summarized above, in addition to the lenient French sen-
tencing rules discussed at the outset, 618 lend considerable support to the
sentencing severity hypothesis, but they fall short of proving it. Further-
more, even if the hypothesis is correct as a general proposition, we also
need to know precisely when and in what ways French sentences are
more lenient. For example, are French sentences more lenient for some
(such as nonviolent) offenses, but not others? Are sentences more lenient
615. Since 1980, the number of sentenced prisoners in France has risen substantially, but the
American sentenced population has gone up even more. By the end of 1987, the U.S. prison
population had reached 581,609. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1987, at 1 (1988). The most recent jail survey in mid-1986 found 127,067
sentenced inmates. BUREAU of JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: JAIL
INMATES 1986, at 2 (1987). The total of these figures (708,676) is roughly 70% higher than the 1980
figure shown in the table in the text. In France, the number of convicted prisoners (including those
with unexpired appeal rights, see supra note 610) had risen to 30,838 by mid-1987, Daville, supra
note 610, at 7, which represents only a 42% increase over the 1980 figure shown in the text.
616. See supra note 592.
617. Statistics on the number of American pretrial detainees are taken from JAIL INMATES
1982, supra note 610, at I table 1. The number of French pretrial detainees is derived from
ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 183 (reduced by the estimated proportion representing
convicts awaiting appeal, see supra note 610). With these prisoners added to the numerator, the last
four lines of the table in the text would be as follows:
U.S. France Ratio
Prisoners as a Percentage of Persons Charged:
- Unweighted Base 20.5% 13.0% 1.6:1
- Weighted Base A 12% 8.8% 1.4:1
- Weighted Base B 15% 10.0% 1.5:1
- Weighted Base C 38% 25.8% 1.5:1
618. See supra text accompanying notes 568-82.
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with respect to rates of incarceration, the duration of custody terms, or
both? Which noncustodial sanctions are used?
To prove or disprove conclusively the sentencing severity hypothe-
sis-as well as to clarify its scope-new data on each country are needed.
The earlier discussion of the limitations of current statistics619 identified
four major difficulties of comparison: 1) differences in offense definition
and grading; 2) potential differences in prosecutorial charging practices;
3) the lack of multijurisdictional data on American misdemeanor sen-
tencing; and 4) the lack of police-charge, offender-based transaction sta-
tistics (OBTS) for France. Therefore, the most efficient, short-term
research strategy would be to start with existing American OBTS data,
select a comparable group of French offenses (using the OBTS defini-
tions), and collect OBTS-type statistics on the sentencing outcomes for
persons charged by French police with those offenses. In the long run, of
course, it would be highly desirable to encourage prosecutors and courts
in France, the United States, and other countries to standardize their
official offense definitions and statistics.6 2' But the likelihood of achiev-
ing such uniformity in the near future seems quite remote, given the
national differences in criminal laws, procedures, and statistical
traditions.
Future research must also recognize the limitations of American
OBTS data. First, American OBTS data generally fail to take into
account the important dimension of sentence duration-that is, length of
time actually served in custody.621 Existing information on median time-
served-to-first-release622 is insufficient because it is not arrest-based; it
thus provides no measure of the impact of nonconviction and noncustody
sentences, or of conviction on lesser charges. Unless this dimension is
added to OBTS data in the near future, some other durational measure
must be devised.
Another limitation of OBTS data is both more fundamental and
more difficult to correct. Arrest-based analysis assumes that groups of
persons charged by police with crime X are comparable across jurisdic-
tions. However, existing OBTS data do not include many critically
important variables such as weapon use, victim injury, victim-offender
relationship, offender's prior record, and strength of the evidence. The
619. See supra text accompanying notes 586-604.
620. Cf. Lynch, supra note 9, at 199-201 (suggesting steps to facilitate more and higher quality
cross-national research on criminal justice practices).
621. See, ag., TRACKING OFFENDERS, supra note 405, at 2 (reporting proportions of offenders
sentenced to more than one year, and one year or less, with no further specification of maximum
sentence or the actual time to be served). Information on actual time to be served is omitted because
OBTS sentencing data are collected at the point of final disposition in trial court, or before trial-
owing to prosecutorial decision not to charge. Id. at 5. Thus only the maximum custody term is
known, and not the time that will actually be served.
622. See, eg., PRISON ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1981, supra note 614.
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latter variable is especially critical, since the police in different coun-
tries-and even within one country-may apply very different standards
in deciding when and how they should charge a suspect. Consider, for
example, the crime of burglary. If, in a given jurisdiction, most persons
found in possession of property recently taken in a burglary are charged
by police with burglary-and not just with possession of stolen prop-
erty-then 100 "burglary" arrests in that jurisdiction will contain sub-
stantially more weak cases than in a jurisdiction with stricter police
charging standards. A high proportion of weak cases will in turn trans-
late into apparently greater sentencing leniency on "burglary charges":
Many more burglary arrests will result in nonconviction or conviction on
lesser charges (with sentences appropriate to those charges), and sentenc-
ing judges may take evidentiary weakness into account even if the bur-
glary charge is retained through conviction. Finally, the statistical
impact of seemingly minor differences in police charging policy can be
dramatic, because borderline cases are often the most numerous within
any offense category. 623
Differences in offense details, victim or offender characteristics, and
evidentiary strength can sometimes be measured and controlled statisti-
cally.624 Otherwise, the differences must be identified through careful
interviews of police officials in each jurisdiction. An alternative-or sup-
plemental-strategy would be to develop a series of hypothetical fact sit-
uations incorporating varying offense details, victim and offender
characteristics, evidentiary strength, and so on, and pose these hypotheti-
cals to American and French judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
These sentence "predictions" can be used both to examine sentencing
variables that are not included in existing statistics, and to corroborate
and explain those statistics.625
A third major problem with existing OBTS data, as well as with
most other published sentencing studies, is the failure to consider the
interaction between pretrial detention and short-term custody sentences.
This interaction can bias disposition-based estimates of sentencing sever-
ity in both directions. An overestimate of sentencing severity results
when large numbers of defendants who would not have received custody
623. See F. ZIMRING & R. FRAmE, supra note 34, at 78 (two-dimensional graph of frequency by
severity yields bottom-heavy pyramid shape, even for narrowly defined offense categories).
624. For an example of a multiple regression model of sentencing that includes measures of gun
use, injury, prior record, and evidentiary strength (for example, physical evidence, number of lay
witnesses, defendant arrested at scene or within one day of offense), see Rhodes, Plea Bargaining:
Who Gains? Who Loses?, reprinted in F. ZIMRING & R. FRASE, supra note 34, at 550-58.
625. Obtaining sentence predictions from prosecutors and defense attorneys can corroborate the
reliability of the judges' proposed sentences. Some studies have found that simulated criminal justice
decisions sometimes differ substantially from observed real decisions by the same officials. See, e.g.,
Ebbesen & Konecni, Cognitive Algebra in Legal Decisionmaking, reprinted in F. ZIMR!NG & R.
FRAsE, supra note 34, at 303-08 (bail-setting).
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sentences (or who would have received shorter terms) if they had been
released pending trial are given time-already-served custody "sentences"
designed merely to legitimate the time spent in pretrial detention. 626 In
these cases, the real problem is overuse of pretrial detention-not overuse
of custody sentences. Pretrial detention can also cause sentencing data to
underrepresent sentencing severity. This occurs when defendants who
would have received a custody sentence if they had been released pending
trial are given probation, or are dismissed without conviction, 627 because
they are deemed to have been sufficiently punished by the time spent in
pretrial detention.
The two opposing pretrial detention effects described above may or
may not cancel each other out, and the net effect may be different across
jurisdictions even within a single country. It is difficult to assess these
effects statistically, since they depend on what the sentence would have
been in the absence of pretrial detention. But with sufficiently large sam-
ples and sophisticated multiple regression techniques, it should be possi-
ble to measure comparative sentencing severity independent of pretrial
detention effects, essentially by examining sentences in nondetention
cases and taking into account all other factors known to influence sen-
tencing severity. Thus, future OBTS and other sentencing studies should
include measures of pretrial detention status and duration. And, as sug-
gested previously, pretrial detention variables could also be incorporated
in studies employing hypothetical fact patterns.
D. Conclusion
The problems discussed above demonstrate the critical importance
of systemic analysis of criminal justice processes. Decisions at the sen-
tencing stage are often largely dependent upon earlier decisions, such as
police charging, prosecutorial charging, and pretrial detention. Thus, we
cannot understand, let alone compare, sentencing severity without taking
into account these earlier decisions and their consequences. Systemic
interdependence also has important implications for reform, since
attempts to encourage the use of noncustodial sentences will fail if simul-
taneous efforts are not made to minimize the rate and duration of pretrial
detention. The opposite is also true: Sentencing reforms that discourage
or eliminate custodial penalties can help reduce the use of pretrial
detention.628
626. See H. ZEISEL, supra note 286, at 47.
627. See id. at 219 (in New York City, 32% of defendants held in pretrial detention were not
convicted, and of the 68% who were convicted, 25% did not receive a custody sentence; thus 49% of
all detained defendants received no formal custody sentence).
628. See supra text accompanying notes 377-79.
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An equally important conclusion to be drawn from the methodolog-
ical problems discussed above is that they are probably not unique to
international comparisons. To a very substantial extent, they arise in any
cross-jurisdictional study of sentencing levels, whether the comparison is
between cities, states, or nations. Many of the same problems (for exam-
ple, finding comparable offense categories) also confront comparative
studies of other criminal justice processes, such as pretrial detention and
prosecutorial screening. Thus, until we develop more reliable and uni-
form measures of criminal justice, researchers should interpret the avail-
able data with caution, and must, whenever possible, employ multiple,
overlapping measures. 29
Ix
CONCLUSION
French criminal justice differs from American law and practice in
many important respects; yet there are major similarities as well. The
differences suggest possibilities for useful reform of American proce-
dures, and the similarities suggest that transplants may be feasible. A
number of such reforms have been proposed in the legal literature of the
past fifteen years, but the academic response so far has generally been
chilly, and the progress toward implementing these reforms-glacial. To
a large extent, this apparent stalemate is due to the fact that the trans-
plants most often suggested are actually the least desirable or feasible,63
whereas other, more modest reform possibilities have been overlooked or
misunderstood.
Of course, it is more exciting to propose drastic changes than to
allow existing similarities to guide reform suggestions. It also seems far
easier to approach research and reform piecemeal, issue by issue, or from
a formalistic or "families of law" perspective, rather than with the single-
country, system-wide, empirically based methodology adopted in this
Article. Yet such a methodology is essential. The systemic interrelated-
ness of criminal justice is an undeniable fact that researchers and reform-
ers must not fail to take into account. Similarly, the surprising results of
some of the statistical comparisons presented in this Article63 1 demon-
strate the grave risks of assuming that law-in-action conforms to law-on-
the-books.
But, in the end, are international comparisons ever really valid? Or
are all systems of criminal justice (perhaps even those within a single
629. See H. ZEISEL, supra note 44, at 190 ("triangulation of proof").
630. For a discussion of several other important features of the French system, noting some of
the problems of attempting to transplant these features to the American context, see the Appendix,
infra text accompanying notes 637-742.
631. See, eg., supra text accompanying notes 133-36, 276-83 & 319-37.
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country) basically not comparable? Criminal justice research and reform
are hard enough to achieve in this country, much less with the additional
barriers of language, culture, and distance, as well as the further
demands of a system-wide, empirically based methodology. So why con-
duct such comparative research? And what remains of this Article's
"working hypothesis" that selective transplants are possible?632 If proce-
dures are inevitably interrelated but simultaneous reform of our entire
system is unlikely (and perhaps even undesirable), what chance is there
of "borrowing" procedures found in other systems, foreign or domestic?
Once this question is posed, initial optimism fades, the stalemated debate
is abandoned, and off we go in search of new "solutions" for the
problems of our criminal justice system.
And yet there is much that American reformers can learn from a
careful study of foreign systems.633 At the very least, such study opens
our minds to new reform possibilities by showing that there are different
approaches to the problems of criminal justice. At the same time, com-
parative study should always lead us back to a closer analysis of our own
system. When guided by the insights of comparative study and a sys-
temic, empirical methodology, such analysis often reveals that our own
system is not as different in practice from foreign systems as we had
thought. This conclusion is cause for further optimism since, as stressed
throughout this Article, it is much easier to "borrow" small differences
than big ones, thereby building on what we already have.
Sometimes comparative research reveals that foreign criminal proce-
dures have counterparts in American civil, not criminal, practice.634 In
many respects, of course, the gulf between our civil and criminal proce-
dures is at least as wide as the ocean separating France and the United
States, but from time to time we need to re-explore these seemingly "nat-
ural" boundaries to see whether all the distinctions made are necessary
and desirable. Thus, ironically, another important lesson of comparative
research may be that criminal justice reformers need to look across the
courthouse hall as well as across the ocean for new ideas.
632. See supra text accompanying note 36.
633. Of course, comparative research has value independent of questions of domestic reform.
Beyond its usefulness to lawyers and judges faced with the occasional "foreign law" question, a
better understanding of how criminal processes work in other countries helps avoid international
misunderstandings over how particular cases are handled, especially those involving our own
countrymen or political prisoners. In addition, the "science" of comparative law, see supra note 32,
may eventually contribute to a better understanding of the essential nature and limits of
governments and their laws. For all of these purposes-except, perhaps, judicial rulings on foreign
law questions-a systemic, empirically based methodology is as essential as it is for reform purposes.
We can never hope to understand foreign systems by studying formal rules alone or by examining
only parts of these systems in isolation.
634. See supra text accompanying notes 535-41 (noting similarities between French criminal
and American civil practice in the area of narrowing of disputed issues at trial).
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But whatever the source of our new ideas-international, domestic
criminal, domestic civil, or sheer imagination-research and reform
efforts must strive to remain both idealistic and realistic. However much
we believe that our criminal justice system can and should be fundamen-
tally changed, we must constantly keep in mind that such reform is diffi-
cult and slow; modest, incremental change is the most we can hope to
achieve. It is useless to pretend that we have dictatorial powers, capable
of simultaneously changing major institutions of justice, constitutional
interpretations, and state statutes or criminal rules. Yet this is precisely
what would be required to implement many recent reform proposals, 635
including some not derived from comparative study.6 36
I believe that successful reform proposals generally share the follow-
ing characteristics: First, they can be implemented one at a time, or at
least in fairly small "packages," by individual prosecutors or defenders,
or by single acts of the legislature or rules-drafting body, and they
require no major, simultaneous changes in other areas of law or practice.
Second, they build on institutions or practices already existing in some
form within the same jurisdiction. Third, they have elements that can
appeal to both prosecution and defense interests, thus ensuring the
"bipartisan" support needed for adoption and successful implementation.
In this Article, I have sought to identify aspects of the French crimi-
nal justice system that suggest feasible reforms meeting each of the three
requirements stated above. I have also indicated the most important
areas where further research is needed on French and/or American prac-
tices. Although my primary goal has been to encourage and facilitate
research in these specific areas, the Article also has several broader aims:
to encourage reform-oriented comparative studies generally, expanding
to other procedures or other countries; to identify the methodological
principles that should guide all comparative studies-even those within a
single country; and to suggest some of the inherent barriers to criminal
justice reform, even when reform is not inspired by comparative study.
Whichever procedures are selected for scrutiny, researchers must
examine the entire system within which each procedure operates.
Researchers must consider all available sources of quantitative and
descriptive data on the operation of that system, and they must subject
635. See, e.g., M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 279 (recommending a sweeping overhaul of U.S.
criminal procedure, including Supreme Court promulgation of rules and eschewing case-by-case
adjudication of the rights of the accused); see also supra text accompanying notes 14-17 (Professor
Weinreb's proposal calling for changes in many fundamental American practices). Weinreb states
that his proposal was inspired by his observations of the French system, but that he favors it not
because "something similar has worked acceptably elsewhere, but [because] that is where our own
principles and experiences lead." L. WEINREB, supra note 2, at x.
636. See, eg., Dripps, supra note 15 (multilevel proposal for compelled interrogation of
defendant at preliminary hearing, total prohibition of use of any statements made to police after
arrest, and "disincorporation" by the U.S. Supreme Court of fifth amendment privilege).
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domestic procedures and systems to equally comprehensive scrutiny
before making any comparisons. On the other hand, when it comes to
designing reform proposals, almost the opposite approach is necessary.
Reform proposals must remain modest, building incrementally upon
existing law and tradition. These lessons, it seems to me, are the legacy
of past research and reform efforts: researchers must "think big";
reformers must "think small"; and reform-oriented researchers must do
both.
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APPENDIX
OTHER IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE FRENCH SYSTEM
This Appendix briefly discusses several other distinctive features of the
French criminal justice system. These features deserve lower research and
reform priority for two reasons: They are less likely to suggest feasible
American reforms, and they are severable from the French practices sug-
gesting such reforms.
As noted at the outset, this Article emphasizes those features of
French criminal justice that appear to have the most significance for
reform purposes. Each of the features examined in detail in Parts II
through VIII suggests desirable and feasible adaptations for the
American system. The subjects discussed in Parts II (criminal justice
officials) and IV (evidence-gathering limits) are also important for
another reason: These two features might be seen as so fundamental to
the French system, and so incompatible with our own, that they pose
insuperable barriers to the adoption of other French practices with which
they are inseparably linked.
The object of this Appendix is to call the reader's attention to other,
less significant features of the French system. These other features
deserve lower priority in both this Article and future research efforts
because they are not likely to suggest feasible American reforms; nor are
they inextricably linked to the French practices that do suggest such
reforms. Future researchers and reformers are not required to study
these features of the French system in detail, but neither should they
ignore them. Future research and reform should focus instead on the
possible impact of these features on other parts of that system.
A. Pretrial Judicial Investigation and Review of Charges
One of the most distinctive institutions of French criminal proce-
dure is that of the examining magistrate, and some American scholars
have proposed creating a similar office in this country.637 A related
French institution is the indicting chamber, in which a panel of three
judges performs functions analogous to those performed in the American
preliminary hearing and by the indicting grand jury.63 Although each
of these institutions has attractive features, I doubt that either offers
desirable and feasible reforms for this country; nor is it crucial to the
functioning of other aspects of the French system.
Having an examining magistrate allows for more direct and efficient
637. See, e.g., L. WEINREB, supra note 2, at 131-38, 147-64. A related but more limited
proposal involves the use of judicially supervised pretrial interrogation. See Alschuler, supra note 7,
at 1007 n.351.
638. See FRENCH SYsmM, supra note 41, at 17.
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judicial control over both police and prosecutorial discretion at the inves-
tigatory and charging stages. In France, as in the United States, this
judicial involvement is assumed to improve the quality of these decisions;
moreover, judicial involvement may more readily accommodate the par-
ticipation of defense counsel.639 Nevertheless, the French today make
relatively little use of this procedure,"' ° and when they do, much of the
actual control of the investigation is delegated to the police who often
operate with minimal guidance from the judge. 41
The French have expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the deci-
sions still controlled directly by examining magistrates and have recently
sought to reform this institution substantially. Under a 1985 law, the
functions of the examining magistrate would be performed by a collegial
body of three judges, which would avoid the inconsistencies, errors, and
abuses attributed to individual magistrates.' 2 Because this new regime
would have been much more costly, the original effective date was post-
poned, and the law was almost completely repealed in 1987;"4 however,
the fact that it was enacted at all is perhaps a warning to those tempted
to borrow the concept of the examining magistrate. It is also noteworthy
that the West Germans abolished their version of this office in 1975,6 4
and that proposals to do likewise in France are again being heard." 5
There is also considerable doubt whether the office of the examining
magistrate could be feasibly adapted to American political and constitu-
tional traditions. Since the office combines the functions of police, prose-
cutor, investigating grand jury, and committing magistrate, it violates
639. L. WEINREB, supra note 2, at 131.
640. See ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 106 (in 1984, for every 10,000 matters
screened by prosecutors, 386 were tried in assize or correctional court; of the latter, only 31 (8.0%)
were preceded by a judicial investigation). The percentage of matters referred to examining
magistrates has been falling in recent years. Id at 99, 107 (for the years 1974 through 1984, the
number of matters referred remained fairly constant, while crime rates and direct referrals to
correctional court increased).
641. See supra note 164 (use of rogatory commissions).
642. Law of Dec. 10, 1985, No. 85-1303, 105 G.P.L. 801 (1985), J.O. Dec. 11, 1985, at 14,391, 4
A.L.D. 32 (1986) (creating the investigating chamber, "chambre d'instruction"). This law
contemplated that the chamber would designate one or more of its members to act as examining
magistrate for each matter, id art. 3, but most decisions of that magistrate would be reviewed by the
entire chamber. Id.
643. See Law of Dec. 30, 1987, No. 87-1062 art. 2, 108 G.P.L. 19 art. 2 (1988), J.O. Dec. 31,
1987 art. 2 (1988) (repealing the provisions of Law No. 85-1303, discussed at supra note 642, and
requiring that examining magistrates submit all requests for pretrial detention to a three-judge
panel); Law of Jan. 13, 1989, No. 89-18 art. 1, 109 G.P.L. 68 art. 1 (1989), J.0. Jan. 14, 1989, at 542
art. 1, 7 A.L.D. 86, 87 art. 1 (1989) (postponing the effective date of Law 87-1062, supra); Law of
July 6, 1989, No. 89-461 art. 23, 109 G.P.L. 323, 325 art. 23 (1989), J.O. July 8, 1989, at 8,538 art.
23, 7 A.L.D. 225, 227 art. 23 (1989) (repealing the provisions of Law 87-1062, discussed supra).
644. Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision, supra note 4, at 248 n.22; Langbein &
Weinreb, supra note 2, at 1551 n.6.
645. See, eg., Bauve, Le juge d'instruction en question, 107 Gazette du Palais, Doctrine
[G.D.P.] 334 (1987).
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fundamental American principles of the separation of powers. Although
such combinations of functions are not unheard-of in this country,646 the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Lo-Ji Sales v. New York 7
suggests that police and judicial functions must be kept separate. In that
case, the judge issued a warrant to search an adult bookstore and seize
pornographic materials-most of which were not specifically listed on
the warrant until after the search. The judge accompanied the police to
the bookstore, viewed a large number of films and magazines, and speci-
fied the materials to be seized. The Supreme Court held that the warrant
lacked sufficient particularity at the time it was issued, and that it was
further invalidated by the judge's active participation in its execution.
When the judge "allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader,
of the search party which was essentially a police operation,... he was
not acting as a judicial officer but as an adjunct law enforcement officer,"
and was therefore not acting as the "neutral and detached judicial
officer" required under the fourth amendment. 4" This case thus seems
to invalidate both modes of operation followed by French examining
magistrates: direct involvement in the investigation, and broad delega-
tion of investigatory authority to the police.
What, then, of the other half of the French model: the indicting
chamber? Although few American researchers have suggested that we
adopt this procedure, it might seem more efficient and effective than its
American counterparts-the preliminary hearing and indicting grand
jury."9 Here too, however, there is reason to doubt the value of the
indicting chamber in the French system. Impressionistic studies and the
available statistics indicate that the chamber almost always approves the
felony charges recommended by the examining magistrate.650 Similarly,
one might ask how often three American judges would decide, based
largely on the paper record, to overrule the determinations of the police,
the prosecutor, and an investigating judge that there is probable cause to
bring felony charges to trial. Without the institution of the examining
magistrate, such a panel of judges might very well take a much more
646. See eg., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 261 & n.4 (1948) (describing the Michigan "one-man
grand jury" procedure, and noting that 10 other states had concurrent statutes with "some
similarities"). The current Michigan version is codified at MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 767.3, 767.4
(1982 & Supp. 1990). See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-14-11 (1988); Wis. STAT.
§ 968.28 (Supp. 1988).
647. 442 U.S. 319 (1979); see also Goldstein, supra note 188, at 1192-93.
648. Lo-Ji Sales, 442 U.S. at 327-28.
649. See supra text accompanying note 466.
650. A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 68; Goldstein & Marcus, Myth of Judicial Supervision,
supra note 4, at 263 n.58. The number of defendants tried in assize courts averages about 30% more
than the number of matters referred to the indicting chamber, so it seems unlikely (even allowing for
multidefendant matters) that very many are dismissed by the chamber. See CoMvra GtNAiRAL,
supra note 39, at 20, 25 (for the years 1974-78, 7,087 matters were referred to indicting chambers,
and 9,459 defendants were convicted or acquitted in assize courts).
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active role, but if we are to consider adopting such a "collegial" prelimi-
nary hearing, we must look first to our own experiences, not to those of
France.
B. The Rights of Crime Victims in France
The space limitations of this Article, in addition to considerable
doubts about the feasibility of granting American crime victims all the
rights enjoyed by victims in France, were equally important reasons for
my giving this topic less attention. In recent years, the United States has
witnessed a virtual explosion of writing and law reform in the area of
victim's rights,6"' and the topic deserves more detailed treatment than is
possible in a broad, survey article.
The French "civil party" procedure6 2 gives crime victims three
analytically distinct rights: (1) the right to initiate prosecution; (2) the
right to participate and be heard as a party in any prosecution; and (3)
the right to attach a "pendent" claim for civil damages to the prosecu-
tion. As indicated in the earlier discussion of prosecutorial discretion, 5 3
the first of these rights serves as an important check on the power of
public officials to decline prosecution. Americans thus ought to consider
giving victims at least the right to obtain administrative review of decli-
nation decisions-that is, right to appeal to higher level prosecutors. To
do more than this, however, would be problematic in the American sys-
tem, where both the pretrial investigation and the presentation of evi-
dence at trial are completely controlled by the police and prosecution.
The viability of victim-initiated prosecutions in France may depend
651. See, eg., PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982);
Abrahamson, Redefining Roles The Victim's Rights Movement, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 517; Goldstein,
Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MIss. L.J. 515 (1982); Henderson, The
Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1985); Welling, Victim Participation in Plea
Bargains, 65 WASH. U.L.Q. 301 (1987); Note, The Victim's Veto: A Way to Increase Victim Impact
on Criminal Case Dispositions, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 417 (1989) (authored by Karen L. Kennard). See
generally Perspectives on Proposals for a Constitutional Amendment Providing Victim Participation in
the Criminal Process, 34 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1987); Special Issue: Criminal Victimization and Crime,
33 CRIME & DELINQ. 435 (1987).
As of 1983, Congress and over two-thirds of the states had passed some form of victim's rights
or assistance legislation. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 26 (1983).
652. See generally FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 20-21 (discussing rights of civil party
injured by commission of a crime); Campbell, supra note 7, at 323-32 (describing French procedure
(action civile) by which a party may institute a civil suit against a defendant in criminal court); Pugh,
supra note 2, at 965-66 (commenting on civil party's occasional domination of state interest in
prosecution, and noting that French appellate courts spend approximately 20% of their time on civil
aspects of such "mixed" cases).
653. See supra text accompanying notes 414-15; see also Note, Private Challenges to
Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488 (1988) (authored
by Stuart P. Green) (proposing victim's right to seek advisory declaratory judgment that non-
prosecution constituted abuse of discretion).
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heavily upon the active roles of the examining magistrate and presiding
trial judge. Indeed, there is some question how viable this procedure is
even in France, where it appears to be very rarely invoked." 4 Although
infrequent use could mean that the procedure is highly successful in
goading prosecutors to file charges, an equally plausible explanation may
be that French victims are deterred by the array of procedures designed
to prevent filing of frivolous charges, such as the requirement of posting
bond and the risk of being held liable for costs and damages.6 5 5
The second aspect of the French civil party procedure, the right to
participate in the prosecution, has already been adopted in a number of
American states.656 Unlike the French procedure, where the victim
enjoys the status and many of the rights of a party,65 7 American statutes
generally confer only the right to be notified of the progress of the case,
and the right to be heard at various stages, with no concomitant right to
call witnesses or to appeal.6 8 On the other hand, American procedures
put somewhat greater emphasis on the victim's right to be heard on the
disposition of the criminal charges (for example, use of pretrial diversion,
plea bargains, and sentencing); instead, the French procedures emphasize
the victim's civil claim. Field studies of American procedures suggest
that they have not had much effect on case dispositions,65 9 although they
may help some victims understand and accept the ultimate disposition.
However, American victims might actively participate more often if
greater emphasis were placed on investigation and pursuit of their civil
claims.
The third aspect of the French procedure-the right to demand an
award of civil damages from the criminal court-also has a well-estab-
lished American counterpart: the victim's right to request restitution.
However, the French right is broader in several important respects.
First, the French victim can insist that the examining magistrate investi-
gate and help document the victim's civil claim. 6° Second, French trial
courts must rule on the civil claim, whereas American courts generally
654. A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 22 n.38 ("In 1970 in Paris, about 2 out of every 1,000
criminal prosecutions were initiated by a 'partie civile.' ").
655. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 20-21.
656. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611A.03-
04 (West 1987).
657. See, e.g., Proc. Code arts. 183, 197, 217 (right to notice of rulings and hearings); id. arts.
198, 281, 315, 316, 346, 454, 460 (right to be heard); id arts. 186, 186-1, 497 (appeal rights). It
should be noted, however, that French victims may only appeal as to the civil aspects of the case.
Id. art. 497.
658. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611A.03-
04 (West 1987).
659. See, eg., E. VILLMOARE & V. NETO, VICTIM APPEARANCES AT SENTENCING UNDER
CALIFORNIA'S VICTIMS' BILL OF RIGHTS (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1987).
660. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 13, 20.
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retain broad discretion to decide whether or not to order restitution.66'
Third, French damages awards are enforceable not only as a condition of
probation662 but also as civil judgments.
The first of these features-the right of the crime victim in France to
require the examining magistrate's assistance--could not be directly
adopted in the United States since it depends on the existence of the
office of examining magistrate (which, as noted previously, is not likely to
be adopted in this country). However, there are certainly other ways to
provide American victims with improved civil investigatory resources.
For example, this could be achieved through better coordination with
existing legal aid and publicly funded crime victim reparation pro-
grams, 6 1 which all too often remain unknown or unavailable to victims
seeking orders of restitution. Similarly, American victims could easily be
given greater rights to demand and enforce restitutionary claims.
Indeed, some American sentencing statutes already require the court to
state reasons why a request for restitution was granted or denied.6 4 In
addition, some statutes explicitly make restitutionary claims enforceable
as civil judgments.665
How far we want to take this reform would depend in part on the
resolution of some related legal and policy issues-for example, the scope
of federal and state civil jury trial rights; 666 the problem of jury confusion
of civil and criminal issues; the desirability of retaining specialized crimi-
nal court judges; and the jurisdictional amount limitations in lower
courts. Ultimately, we must decide how much we value the goal of vic-
tim compensation by defendants and the subsidiary goal of encouraging
victims to cooperate with the criminal justice system. The answer may
also depend on how we choose to view the entire process: If restitution is
"punishment, '' 667 can it be substituted for some or all of the criminal
661. Compare Proc. Code arts. 371, 464 (requiring French courts to rule on a crime victim's
civil claim) with D. McGILLiS, CRIME VICTIM RESTITUTION: AN ANALYSIS OF APPROACHEs 1-2
(U.S. Dep't of Justice 1986) (noting that, despite growing interest in awarding restitution to crime
victims, recent programs have encountered several obstacles including failure of American courts to
order restitution).
662. C. PR. PEN. art. R.58(6) (Reglements d'administration publique).
663. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611A.51-.68 (West 1987).
664. See, eg., id. § 611A.04 subd.l(c).
665. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 3663(h) (1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.04 (West 1987).
666. See United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516, 534 (N.D. Ala. 1983) (holding that federal
statute permitting court-ordered restitution to be enforced as a civil judgment violated the
defendant's rights under the seventh amendment), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743
F.2d 827, 838 (1lth Cir. 1984) (holding that the same statute did not "contravene congressional
intent, convert the restitution aspect of the sentencing hearing into a civil proceeding, or deny the
defendant his right to a jury trial under the seventh amendment"), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117
(1985).
667. Cf Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 52-53 (1986) (holding that restitution orders are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy because, like fines, they are imposed more for rehabilitation and
punishment than for compensation).
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penalty? If it is not punitive, and if the goals of compensation and pun-
ishment often conflict (for example, employable defendants -who would
not be able to make restitution if sent to prison), which goal is more
important? Is it possible to pursue both goals in a single proceeding
without inevitably confusing and compromising them? The French
approach-joinder of legally distinct criminal and civil aetions66 -may
help to avoid confusion of compensation and punishment goals, but it
does not eliminate the risk that one or both will be compromised.
C. Broad Pretrial Defense Discovery Rights669
In France, counsel for the defendant has an absolute right to inspect
the full dossier of the case prior to trial67 ° and at certain stages of pretrial
procedure.671 In contrast, American defendants and their attorneys have
traditionally received far less information about the nature of the prose-
cution's case. However, the uniform trend of the last twenty years has
been toward increasingly broader discovery on behalf of both the defense
and the prosecution.6 72 Indeed, the revised ABA standards now advo-
cate what is essentially an "open files" policy: "Upon the request of the
defense, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense counsel all of
the material and information within the prosecutor's possession or con-
trol . "673
Thus, American courts may already be well on the way to adopting
broad defense discovery rules similar to those found in France.674
Whether we can expand discovery as far as the French have, however,
668. Another approach to these problems is essentially the opposite of the French civil party
procedure-the award of punitive damages in civil cases, payable in part to the state. See Geller &
Levy, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 73 A.B.A. J. 88, 91 (1987).
669. This Section focuses on defense discovery of the prosecution's case, as opposed to
"investigatory" discovery (for example, discovery of pro-defense evidence or witnesses known to the
government but not included in the dossier, or defense depositions). As to defense depositions,
French defendants have few recognized rights; however, some of the purposes of a defense deposition
can be achieved by requesting that the examining magistrate interview particular witnesses (for
example, those who may disappear or who refuse to talk to the defense). American defendants can
generally obtain depositions only to preserve testimony, see, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a), but they
may have somewhat greater rights to discover favorable evidence or witnesses. See United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-84 (1985). But see id. at 675 n.7 (asserting that the Constitution does not
require the prosecution to deliver its entire file to defense counsel).
670. Proc. Code arts. 278[2], 279, 280, 393[3].
671. Id. art. 118 (interrogations and confrontations of the accused or civil party, conducted by
the examining magistrate, see supra text accompanying note 222); id. art. 197[3] (review by the
indicting chamber, see supra text accompanying note 638).
672. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1147-53
(5th ed. 1980) (summarizing arguments for and against expanded defense discovery in criminal
cases, and describing liberalizing trend which began in the late 1960s); see also Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that notice-of-alibi statute did not violate defendant's constitutional
rights).
673. 2 A.B.A., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 11-2.1(a) (2d ed. Supp. 1986).
674. Reforms in this area are suggested in Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 372-77.
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may depend on whether we are willing to adopt certain other aspects of
the French system. In particular, the willingness of the French to allow
defense counsel to inspect the entire dossier prior to trial may depend on
several factors. These include: (1) the existence of detailed pretrial depo-
sitions and other recorded witness statements and the ease of gaining
admission of these statements at trial if the witness fails to appear or
recants;675 (2) the possibility that French police and examining magis-
trates, unhampered by Miranda and other American limitations, are
more likely to have obtained detailed pretrial statements from the
defendant which can be used to impeach him if he tries to "tailor" his
trial testimony to the prosecution evidence contained in the dossier;
676
and (3) the availability of trial in absentia6 7 7 for defendants who flee after
discovering the strength of the prosecution's case.
D. Nonadversary, Judge-Run Trials
Another distinctive feature of the French and other "civil law" sys-
tems is the active role of the presiding trial judge.678 By contrast, in the
United States evidence is presented by the parties, and the judge's role is
that of a passive "umpire," responding to objections or acting on requests
by one or both parties for a ruling.679 As a result, important evidence
occasionally is not heard because each side had some reason to prevent
its admission. Adversary presentation of the evidence may also be more
confusing for juries and inherently biased in comparison to the civil law's
seemingly logical and neutral marshalling of the evidence on both sides
of each issue. Finally, as noted previously, 680 judicial control of the tak-
ing of proof, combined with the practice of calling the defendant as the
first witness, allows the proof of guilt to focus only on the contested
issues, thus improving the speed and quality of the guilt determination
process.
For all these reasons, several American observers have suggested
adopting some version of the civil law, nonadversary trial procedure. 81
675. See infra text accompanying notes 703-06.
676. But see supra text accompanying notes 222-49 (suggesting that, in practice at least,
American police have interrogation powers as broad as those exercised by French investigators).
677. See supra text accompanying notes 365-70.
678. See supra text accompanying note 15.
679. See, .g., cases cited infra note 686; cf. M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 83-84, 94-95
(discussing the more active role of British judges, in comparison to their American counterparts, in
questioning witnesses, preventing improper questions, summarizing evidence, and commenting on
credibility, even though several of these judicial powers are rarely invoked). See generally A.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 391.
680. See supra text accompanying notes 531-34.
681. See, e.g., L. WVEINREB, supra note 2, at 139-40; Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1003-05;
Frankel, supra note 15, at 1053-54.
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It is usually understood that the presiding judge would have to be famil-
iar with both the prosecution's file and the proposed witnesses for each
side in order to understand the issues and evidence, to know which wit-
nesses can supply which evidence, and to identify the issues that are
likely to be critical to the outcome. However, allowing the presiding
judge to study the prosecution fie in advance of trial assumes that there
is a sufficiently detailed, written file to study. Ideally, this file would be
similar to that compiled by the French examining magistrate, 682 or it
would resemble a more detailed version of the police and grand jury files
that currently exist in most American criminal cases. Absent these
changes, though, judge-run trials would not work well in the American
system.683 Finally, even if American judge-run trials were feasible, with
or without the detailed dossier available in France, I doubt that
American defense attorneys and prosecutors would agree to give up the
control they now possess over the order and presentation of evidence.
Apart from practical and political feasibility, there are also legal and
philosophical objections to allowing the presiding judge to study the
prosecution and defense claims, conduct the trial, and then (in bench
trials) sit in judgment of the facts. A basic assumption of Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence seems to be that the factfinder should
remain ignorant of the prosecution's case until the witnesses and evi-
dence are introduced at trial.684 Jury trials avoid this problem, 685  but
frequent claims of lack of judicial impartiality would still arise if judges
682. L. WEINREB, supra note 2, at 139. But see Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1004 (suggesting
that a European-style detailed pretrial dossier would be unnecessary if parties gave the judge a list of
proposed witnesses and a summary of expected testimony). Alschuler further suggests that the
prosecutor should reveal the names of persons whose testimony he or she considers "unnecessary"
but who the prosecutor believes possess "relevant information," id. at 1004 n.339, but the means of
enforcing this prosecutorial duty are not spelled out. There is also some doubt whether such witness
lists and testimony summaries would give the trial judge a sufficiently coherent view of the case to
conduct the trial even if, as Alschuler suggests, cross-examination were left to the parties. See id. at
1004; see also M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 83-84 (more active British judges receive a "bundle" of
evidentiary documents before trial).
683. See supra text accompanying notes 637-48.
684. This may be of less concern in France, where there are fewer discrepancies between the
prosecution's file and the evidence at trial, owing to the looser standards of admissibility of evidence.
Yet it is highly unlikely that American admissibility standards will soon change to approximations
of the looser French rules. See infra text accompanying noter. 703-36.
685. Indeed, a judge-run trial with a common law jury presents fewer "bias" problems than in
France, where factfinding is dominated by judges. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 2-3
(single judge in police court; single judge or three-judge panel in correctional court; mixed court of
three judges and nine lay jurors in assize court). The common law jury remains sole judge of the
facts, and any bias on the part of the presiding judge can only affect legal rulings and instructions.
Moreover, since the common law trial judge traditionally rules on admissibility of evidence, he or
she is presumed to be capable of hearing prejudicial, inadmissible evidence without becoming biased
in favor of the proponent of that evidence. See, eg., United States v. Kelley, 712 F.2d 884, 889-90
(Ist Cir. 1983) (extra-record facts learned by judge while acting in his judicial capacity in another
case cannot serve as basis for disqualification for bias).
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were to take a more active role in presenting the evidence. 68 6 Finally, it
does not appear that American defendants could constitutionally be com-
pelled to disclose their own proposed testimony or that of other witnesses
prior to trial;687 without this information, the presiding judge could only
present half the case.
Despite these problems, there may still be something we can learn
and adopt from the French approach. American trial judges could be
given more explicit authority to call their own witnesses or to question
party witnesses whenever this would serve the search for truth.6 8
Indeed, judges in some jurisdictions already possess these powers,689 and
they need only be encouraged to use their authority more often. Never-
theless, the very fact that such powers exist but are rarely used 690 sug-
gests the difficulty of employing nonadversary measures in an adversarial
trial system.
E. The 'Mixed Court" of Lay and Professional Judges
American observers of the French and German "mixed court" have
sometimes recommended its adoption in the United States.691 The
potential advantages of this institution include: (1) sentencing by a colle-
gial body that includes lay persons; (2) reduced risk that jurors will vote
to acquit in order to avoid too harsh a sentence; (3) lessened need to
instruct the jury in advance on complex legal issues; (4) lessened need to
exclude evidence for fear that jurors will misapply it; (5) shorter delibera-
tions, with fewer deadlocked juries; (6) lessened need for separate trials
686. See, eg., United States v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that judge's
active role denied defendant fair trial by giving jury the impression that judge favored the
prosecution; trial judge should "'seldom'" intervene in questioning, and "'should never assume the
burden of direct or cross-examination' ") (quoting United States v. Bland, 697 F.2d 262, 265-66 (8th
Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); Marshall v. State, 291 Md. 205, 213-14, 434 A.2d 555,
560 (1981) (reversing conviction where, out of jury's presence during break in cross-examination,
trial judge admonished defendant to tell the truth or be charged with perjury, after which defendant
changed his testimony).
687. See cases cited supra note 543.
688. For example, American judges could avoid potential partisanship in selection of expert
witnesses by making greater use of court-appointed experts. See generally Weinstein, Improving
Expert Testimony, 20 U. RicH. L. REv. 473 (1986) (proposing state-licensed experts, possibly
subject to disciplinary measures).
689. See, eg., Marshall, 291 Md. at 213, 434 A.2d at 560; FED. R. EVID. 614(a) (calling court
witnesses); FED. R. EVID. 614(b) (questioning any witness); FED. R. EvID. 706(a) (court appointing
expert witnesses).
690. Weinstein, supra note 688, at 489-90; see also id. at 494 (noting that federal and many state
judges also have, but rarely use, their "extensive power" to comment on the weight of the evidence).
One practical impediment to broader use of powers to call and question witnesses is the trial judge's
relative ignorance of the basic facts of the case. See Frankel, supra note 15, at 1042-45; see also
supra text accompanying notes 681-83.
691. See L. WEiNREB, supra note 2, at 139; Alschuler, supra note 7, at 997-1003; Langbein,
Mixed Court and Jury Court, supra note 2, passim.
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of offenses and offenders to avoid jury confusion of issues; and (7)
reduced emphasis on time-consuming juror selection procedures.
Each potential advantage gained, however, has its negative side. In
particular, there is a risk that judges would completely dominate the
jurors, thus defeating most of the purposes served by the common law
jury." It is also questionable whether Americans would be willing to
substantially relax trial evidence rules in proceedings before a mixed
court; we have not done this even in nonjury trials, at least as a matter of
formal law.693 In any case, I doubt that a mixed court could ever be
adopted in this country, at least so far as this involved substituting the
mixed court for the common law judge and jury system.694 Americans
view the jury with a degree of reverence and respect which is unlikely to
be easily transferred to such a novel institution69 as the mixed court, and
trial lawyers seem even less likely to accept a reform that might revolu-
tionize trial practice and strategy.
There are also major constitutional impediments to overcome. In
Duncan v. Louisiana, 696 the Supreme Court, in holding that the jury
right is "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" 697 and there-
fore implicit in fourteenth amendment due process, stressed the deep his-
torical roots of the jury right, the unanimous judgment of the states to
preserve the right in serious cases, and the jury's critical role in protect-
ing citizens from governmental oppression and the abuses of individual
prosecutors and judges.698 State and federal constitutional jury rights
thus represent "[t]he deep commitment of the Nation" to this particular
safeguard, and "a profound judgment about the way in which law should
692. See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). For an empirical
analysis of the impact of lay judges on guilt determinations and sentences in the German mixed
court, see Casper & Zeisel, supra note 7, at 185-91.
693. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 1101; see also infra text accompanying notes 703-36 (discussing
trial evidence rules).
694. It might, however, be possible to offer such mixed panels to defendants willing to waive
their right to trial by common law jury. This approach has some of the advantages claimed by those
who propose substituting "jury waiver bargaining" for plea bargaining, see supra note 497 and
accompanying text, without entirely eliminating the role of lay persons in the determination of guilt.
695. A court of this kind is not totally unprecedented in this country. See Casper & Zeisel,
supra note 7, at 191 n.50 (describing the county courts of Vermont). These courts, now known as
superior courts, consist of two lay judges ("assistant" or "side" judges) elected every four years, VT.
CONST. ch. II, § 53, and one professional judge. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, §§ 71(a), 112 (1988). See
generally Note, A Farewell to Side Judges; Or, Are We Available?, 10 VT. L. REv. 321 (1985)
(authored by Richard H. Coutant). However, this institution seems to be of less and less importance
in Vermont. The mixed court includes assistant judges only "if available," which they often are not.
Such judges rule only on sentences and on questions of pure fact, not "mixed questions of law and
fact," and only in cases not tried before a common law jury. Finally, the superior court itself
receives almost no criminal cases. Id. at 322, 340-42, 347-48.
696. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
697. Id. at 149.
698. Id. at 151-54.
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be enforced and justice administered." '699 Although the Court suggested
in a footnote that the states are free to substitute "alternate guarantees
and protections" serving the same purposes as the jury,7" it maintained
that the entire American criminal process is built around the jury right,
thus implying that major modifications in that process would be required
if the jury right were to be substantially changed.7 0 1
Thus, I seriously question whether American legislators, judges, and
trial lawyers would be willing to redefine fundamentally the meaning of
"trial by jury." The fact that the French are satisfied with their defini-
tion is probably a reflection of the lower value they place on citizens'
participation in the adjudication process in general.7"2
F. Relaxed Trial Procedures and Evidence Rules
703
There are without question far fewer limitations on the admissibility
of evidence in French criminal trials than in American ones. The defend-
ant's prior criminal record is always admissible; hearsay testimony and
documents are frequently admitted; and, in general, there are few formal
rules governing the form or scope of admissible evidence. 7° Moreover,
the rule providing for the general admissibility of the defendant's prior
record, as well as certain other procedural and evidentiary rules, appear
to make it much more likely that defendants will testify and thus provide
another important source of evidence. A number of American observers
699. Id. at 155-56.
700. Id. at 150 n.14.
701. Id. ("In every State... the structure and style of the criminal process-the supporting
framework and the subsidiary procedures-are of the sort that naturally complement jury trial, and
have developed in connection with and in reliance upon jury trial.").
702. For example, civil cases are tried exclusively by professional judges, there is no grand jury
of citizens, and only the most serious criminal cases are triable before the mixed court. See FRENCH
SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 1-3; see also supra note 132 (five-year minimum penalty for cases tried in
assize court). In contrast, the American constitutional jury right applies to any offense with a
maximum sentence greater than six months, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), and many
states grant even broader jury rights. Compared to France, West Germany seems to have a greater
commitment to citizens' participation: All nonpetty offenses are tried by a mixed court. Casper &
Zeisel, supra note 7, at 141-43. It should be noted, however, that the German mixed courts, usually
consisting of three or five "judges" who need not decide unanimously, id, would not meet minimum
U.S. constitutional requirements. See Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (six-person jury
must reach unanimous decision); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five-person jury
unconstitutional).
703. The focus of this Section is on what Professor Langbein calls "common law" evidence rules
(for example, those excluding hearsay and prior convictions), as opposed to "constitutional"
exclusionary rules (relating to the products of police interrogations, search and seizures, line-ups,
and so forth). See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 7, at 68-69. The latter group of rules is discussed in
Part IV, supra text accompanying notes 157-291.
704. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 21-31; Pugh, supra note 35, at 22-24, 26 (court
may consider all properly acquired material within the dossier). See generally Damalka, Evidentiary
Barriers, supra note 7 (comparing evidentiary rules of common and civil law systems).
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have proposed that we adopt some or all of these evidentiary and proce-
dural rules, not only to maximize the amount of relevant information
available to the factfinder, 705 but also to achieve several additional advan-
tages. Broader admission of pretrial statements by absent witnesses
would lessen the witness-intimidation problems caused by expanded pre-
trial defense discovery,7 06 and general relaxation of trial evidence rules
would make trials more "affordable," thereby reducing our dependence
on plea bargaining. 70 7
With respect to admissibility of evidence, although American rules
should be simplified, I think it is unrealistic to expect that we could
adopt anything close to the French approach. First, the French have less
need for elaborate evidence rules largely because French factfinding is
dominated by professional judges; as noted previously, Americans are
unwilling to substantially reduce the role of lay jurors in criminal cases.
Second, even those reformers who have proposed substantial reduction of
hearsay limitations have recognized the constitutional and policy argu-
ments favoring these limitations in criminal cases and have noted the
lack of any real progress in hearsay reform, even in civil cases.70 8 As for
the defendant's prior record, since as many proposals have been made to
limit the admissibility of such evidence7°9 as to expand it, it seems quite
unlikely that sufficient "bipartisan" support can be obtained to achieve
substantial reform in either direction. Finally, as suggested before,
relaxed trial evidence rules might simply encourage prosecutors to file
more weak cases, thereby increasing court congestion and the need for
plea bargaining. 7
10
There is also some question whether the rule allowing the admission
of a defendant's prior record and other French rules seeming to promote
705. See, eg., Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1007-09, 1020-22; Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 382-85.
706. See Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 7, at 520 n.20; Schlesinger, supra note 2, at
375-76. To some extent, American courts already admit pretrial statements from threatened
witnesses. See supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
707. See Alschuler, supra note 7, at 1010; Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note
2, at 206-10.
708. See, eg., Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REv. 51, 51-
104 (1987).
709. See eg., M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 244-46, 263-64, 273-74; Beaver & Marques, A
Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585 (1985);
Murphy, The Connecticut Law on Prior Convictions to Impeach an Accused, 7 U. BRIDGEPORT L.
REV. 275, 322-26 (1986); Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 845 (1982); see also People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558,
420 N.W.2d 499 (1988) (narrowing admissibility of prior convictions).
710. See supra text accompanying notes 532-33; see also supra text accompanying notes 284-86
(available data suggest that, despite seemingly looser standards of evidence and trial procedure in
France, overall conviction rates for robbery, burglary, and theft are no higher than in the United
States).
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the use of a defendant's testimony or silence at trial are really so differ-
ent, in practice, from American rules. On the surface, French and
American rules are dramatically different. The French defendant is the
first witness in every trial, and must at least stand mute while the presid-
ing judge poses questions suggesting the defendant's guilt.71 1 Moreover,
French law does not forbid drawing adverse inferences from the defend-
ant's silence,712 and silence in response to specific questions is said to be
more damning than a refusal to testify at all.713 Furthermore, French
defendants are not placed under oath; hence they need not fear perjury
charges. 1 The absence of a separate sentencing hearing further encour-
ages them to testify during the guilt determination phase of the trial.715
Finally, French defendants need not fear impeachment with their prior
criminal record since it is admissible whether or not they choose to
testify.71
6
In contrast, American defendants have an absolute right not to take
the witness stand,717 and the exercise of this right may not be a basis for
adverse comment by the court or the prosecutor.718 The defense may
also require the court to instruct the jury to disregard the defendant's
silence at trial.719 American defendants are, however, placed under oath
and are subject to perjury, and defendants may be impeached with prior
convictions if they testify. Yet they retain the option to testify as to guilt
after hearing the prosecutor's case, or to testify only as to sentencing
issues after being found guilty.
Once again, however, we must be careful not to overstate the differ-
ences between French and American procedure. The Supreme Court has
held that prosecutors have an independent right to demand over the
defendant's objection a "no-inference-from-silence" instruction, even
though the instruction has the effect of inviting the jury to make the pro-
hibited inference.72 ° Thus, there is reason to question the effectiveness of
711. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 22.
712. See id. at 22 n.156.
713. See Damalka, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 2, at 527.
714. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 22; see also Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 380
(regarding West German procedures).
715. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 25-30; see also Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 380.
716. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 21-22.
717. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
718. Id. at 615.
719. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
720. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 339-41 (1978). The defendant in Lakeside argued that
such an instruction "is like 'waving a red flag in front of the jury.'" Id. at 340 (quotations in
original); see also J. KUNEN, "How CAN You DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?" THE MAKING OF A
CRIMINAL LAWYER 243 (1983) ("[W]e figured the jury wanted to hear [defendant] and would draw
negative inferences if he didn't testify, especially because the judge would instruct them not to."); cf.
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The naive
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this rule.7 2 ' In any case, given the limited role of lay jurors in the French
system,722 the absence of a no-inference-from-silence rule is probably less
damaging to the defense than it would be in the American context.723
It is also said that French defendants are disadvantaged by being
required to decide whether to testify before any of the prosecution evi-
dence is introduced;724 American defendants, by contrast, can wait until
the close of the prosecution's case-or even the close of the defense721_
and then decide whether and how to testify. However, the disadvantaged
position of the French defendant is significantly reduced by the broad
pretrial discovery permitted to the defense,726 and the thorough pretrial
investigations that are conducted and then documented in the official
dossier.727 Interrogation at the outset of the trial thus holds few sur-
prises. Moreover, American defendants typically face this dilemma at
earlier stages--during plea bargaining-when the defendant has even less
knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's case.
The absence of a separate sentencing hearing in France may be more
significant because it arguably forces most French defendants to expose
themselves to questioning on issues of guilt in order to ensure that they
will be heard on issues of punishment. There is at present no empirical
data on this question, and any future research should keep in mind that
American and French "trials" are not directly comparable: Most
American defendants do "testify" as to guilt by pleading guilty, so
American trials are only comparable to the most contested of French
trials, not to all French trials.728 Nevertheless, within comparable
groups of cases, it may well be that French defendants are more likely to
submit to questions relating to guilt than are American defendants.7 29
assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury all practicing lawyers
know to be unmitigated fiction.") (citations omitted).
721. When an American defendant chooses to testify as to some but not all matters at issue, the
Griffin and Carter rules may not apply. See, eg., People v. Perez, 65 Cal. 2d 615, 422 P.2d 597, 55
Cal. Rptr. 909 (1967) (when defendant testified and provided an alibi as to two counts, prosecutor
properly cross-examined defendant as to the other two counts charged, and the court properly
instructed the jury that it could draw adverse inferences from defendant's selective silence).
722. See supra text accompanying note 702.
723. This assumes that professional judges are more familiar with the reasons why an innocent
person might choose not to testify, and judges are therefore less likely to draw unwarranted
inferences of guilt from defendant's silence. Cf. supra note 720.
724. Dama~ka, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 7, at 528-30.
725. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (defendant cannot be required to testify (or
waive his right to testify) before any other defense witnesses are heard).
726. See supra text accompanying notes 669-77.
727. FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 9.
728. A further problem in selecting "comparable" groups of French and American trials is that
"contested" French trials appear to display more degrees of "contestedness" than are found in
American trials. See supra text accompanying notes 525-26.
729. Indeed, it is claimed that "almost all continental defendants choose to testify." Dama~ka,
Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 7, at 527.
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However, it is far from clear what accounts for this apparent differ-
ence between French and American defendants. Unless an American
defendant believes that cross-examination as to issues of guilt would sig-
nificantly increase his or her chances of conviction, a defendant should
present any mitigating facts both at trial and at the time of sentencing.
Favorable defense evidence could cause the jury to acquit or convict on a
lesser offense, and sentencing judges may be unsympathetic to defendants
who wait until the last possible moment to speak up. On the other hand,
if the French defendant refuses to answer questions during the initial
interrogation at trial, he or she can still present mitigating evidence
through the testimony of other witnesses. Furthermore, the French
defendant always has the "last word" after all the evidence is in and the
attorneys have made their final arguments.730
Another explanation for American defendants' reluctance to testify
at trial is that some are discouraged by the risk of being charged with
perjury. Of greater practical significance, however, is the court's power
to increase the sentence of defendants who are suspected of having lied,
with no requirement that perjury be formally charged or proved beyond
a reasonable doubt."' Since this informal sanction is probably also avail-
able in France,732 the absence of formal perjury sanctions in that country
may not be so significant.733
The remaining commonly offered explanation for the reluctance of
American defendants to testify is that they fear impeachment with a
prior criminal record. 3 However, American prosecutors are often able
to use a defendant's criminal record as substantive evidence in the case-
in-chief,735 and they are thus able to introduce the prior record even
without the defendant's testimony. Moreover, even if a defendant's
"impeachable" offenses were not admitted in the case-in-chief, their
730. See FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 23. The French defendant, however, is
disadvantaged by not being allowed to wait until the trier of fact has found him guilty before
deciding whether and how to present mitigating facts.
731. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
732. Damaika, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 7, at 528 n.44.
733. Of equal or greater significance, perhaps, is the lack of oath itself: does this lead French
jurors and judges to give less weight to the defendant's testimony? Cf. Pugh, supra note 35, at 25
(testimony of unsworn witnesses "is viewed with skepticism, in light of their interest"). It may be
that the lack of oath discourages French defendants from testifying (but makes it easier to convict
them when they do testify).
734. FED. R. EvID. 609; see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 692, at 159-62 (when
jurors knew or suspected that the defendant had a prior record, they were much more likely to
convict).
735. A prior criminal record is often introduced in the prosecution's case-in-chief to identify the
defendant as the author of the current offense, to establish motive or intent, or to show lack of
mistake or accident. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Many courts interpret this rule (and similar state
laws) broadly. See, eg., United States v. Estabrook, 774 F.2d 284, 287 (8th Cir. 1985); see also R.
FRASE, supra note 265, at 180-91 (Minnesota case law); Uviller, supra note 709, at 877-79.
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admission as impeachment may do little additional damage to the
defendant beyond that already done by the prosecution's admission of
prior crimes. Given the current broad admissibility of "prior crimes"
evidence, it would indeed be interesting to see if there has been an
increase in the willingness of defendants to testify at trial. In this respect,
as in many others, American and French practices may be less dissimilar
than they once were.736
G. Broader Defense and Prosecution Appeal Rights
Except for the statistically rare cases tried in assize court, all issues
of law, fact, or sentencing decided in French trial courts are appealable
by both the defendant and the prosecution.737 In contrast, the American
prosecutor has very limited rights to appeal on legal issues without risk-
ing double jeopardy. Furthermore, neither side can appeal on most
issues of fact except in minor offenses, where trial de novo is provided.
Finally, prosecution sentence appeals have only recently been permitted
in the federal system and in some states, and only a bare majority of
states permit defendant sentence appeals.738
The recent trend toward broader use of sentence appeals, usually in
connection with reforms aimed at reducing sentencing disparity,739 sug-
gests relatively little need to look abroad for guidance in this area. Simi-
larly, aspects of the French appeal system, such as prosecution appeals
and defense appeal of factual issues, are not so closely linked to other
features considered in detail in this Article that they merit either
extended discussion or a high degree of reform-oriented research. Prose-
cution appeal of jury acquittals seems too incompatible with our com-
mon law and constitutional traditions74  to gain acceptance in this
country. Broader defense appeals-for example, of factual determina-
tions underlying a conviction-would also probably be barred by "mutu-
ality" considerations as well as by the fundamental American tradition of
limiting appeals to legal issues.74 1 Finally, the limited frequency of crim-
inal appeals in France742 suggests that broad appellate review does not
736. Similarly, defendants in some states may have been further encouraged to testify by recent
narrowing of impeachment rules. See, eg., People v. Allen, 429 Mich. 558, 420 N.W.2d 499 (1988).
737. See FRENCH SYsmM, supra note 41, at 36.
738. See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, §§ 1.3(b), 24.1-.4, 25.2(f), 26.3.
739. Id. § 25.2(f) (federal prosecutor appeals); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.11 (West
Supp. 1990) (authorizing two-way sentence appeals).
740. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 126, § 24.3(c).
741. See generally 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appeal & Error §§ 820-821, 838-839 (1962).
742. Only about 5% of final delict convictions are pronounced by the courts of appeal; for
contravention convictions, the figure is 0.5%. ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE, supra note 39, at 115, 121.
These figures include prosecution as well as defense appeals. There are no published statistics on the
number of appeals not leading to conviction (that is, successful defense appeals and unsuccessful
prosecution appeals). One might speculate, however, that successful defense appeals are not that
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play a major role in their system.
much more frequent than unsuccessful ones, since any increase in the former tends to increase the
latter. There are also several procedural deterrents to the filing of defense appeals: Witnesses other
than the accused are rarely heard, see FRENCH SYSTEM, supra note 41, at 37, and the filing of a
defense appeal consistently provokes a prosecution cross-appeal, thus permitting the sentence to be
increased. See A. SHEEHAN, supra note 41, at 90-91. In addition, the defendant will be ordered to
pay costs if the court finds that his appeal was not well founded. Proc. Code art. 514[2], [3].
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